Freedom of Mind in Willing: Or, Every Being that Wills a Creative First CauseD. Appleton and Company, 1865 - 455 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
acquired act of choice action activity admitted adopt agent already antecedent appearing most agreeable Appendix apply argument arise asserts become chess choice or preference choosing circumstances comparative act comparison conceivable condition conflicting wants conformity connection consequences creation creative power decide determine difficulty direct directly distinct Edwards's definition effort ence examination exer exercise exertion existence external extrinsic fact faculty finite intelligence finite mind free act free agents freedom freely future habitual hence immediate inclination indifference infer infinite infinite series influence instinctive intel intelligent cause intuitive knowledge knowl liberty matter in motion means ment mind's act mind's view moral inability moral nature moral necessity motive move movement necessary object observation past perceives perception preconception prescience present produce change quired reason regard result rience sensation soul sphere sphere of knowledge suppose Supreme Intelligence term thing tion tive trinsic uniformity volition wholly
Pasajes populares
Página 421 - ... varies not only in different individuals, but in the same individual at different times. If this capacity were infinite, the acquisition of any knowledge whatever would require no other effort than that of directing attention to the subject, and if the attention of a being of such capacity could also embrace all objects, every truth would be immediately apprehended by it. Such a being would be, or at least could be, omniscient.
Página 330 - BY determining the Will-, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise : And the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the determination of motion; we mean causing the motion of the body to be such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another.
Página 236 - The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing; an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.
Página 201 - THE plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases.
Página 225 - ... body, or external objects. Moral inability consists not in any of these things ; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary.
Página 260 - To suppose the will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, either to determine itself, or to do anything else, is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow. And, therefore, if there be any difficulty in the instances of two cakes...
Página 240 - Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which...
Página 260 - ... acting. If it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet to be sure the Will never does ; because the Will's beginning to act is the very same thing as its beginning to choose or prefer.
Página 5 - ... without the intervention of the external, material forms, or forces, to which we impute them, the sensations are not conclusive evidence of any such external existence. In dreams, and especially in nightmare, we have as vivid sensations of what we afterward find had no corresponding external materiality, as we ever have under any circumstances. If this arises from the excited action of our own memory and imagination, it merely proves that the mind, under certain conditions, has a power of reproducing...
Página 212 - Moral Necessity may be as absolute, as natural Necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause.