Is it not self evident, that if God foresaw from all eternity the seduction of Adam, and if he ordained from all eternity to save the elect out of the general wreck, either, that it was not the primary intention of the Supreme Being to render Adam and his posterity happy, or that he failed in the attempt? We cannot make the former supposition, without denying to the Deity the only motive that was worthy of him.

Nay, we must suppose that he decreed to form, that is, to compel into existence, beings innumerable, whose eternal misery he distinctly foresaw. Can the imagination devise a determination of cruelty equal to this? Is it possible for such a doctrine to be true, and the Deity to possess the character ascribed to him by the Apostle John, when he says, "God is love;" a being essentially benignant? Could a good being form creatures for such an unworthy purpose, when the very definition of benignity is a disposition to diffuse all possible happiness?

The partial exertion of sovereignty in the predestination of a few to eternal life, which is eagerly urged as a proof of the infinite mercy of God, is in fact an evidence to the contrary. The salvation of this selected few must now be considered as a full indication of the Divine Power to save those destined to perdition, had he chosen it; and therefore it necessarily limits the divine benignity. Had the whole human race been involved in one equal ruin, we might have lamented that Satan should thus triumph over

the benevolent designs of our Maker; and we might, even in misery, have venerated the disposition, which prompted to make us happy. But to display in this small specimen his power, while the disposition continues averse from the promotion of the grand primitive design, is an astonishing limitation of goodness; and what increases the astonishment is, its being produced by the machinations of an infernal spirit.

Most advocates for the distinguishing tenets of calvinism seem to be much more deeply impressed with the idea of Power, than with any other of the divine attributes ; and to be much more cautious not to commit an offence, by placing limits to the exertions of this power, than to the manifestations of wisdom and goodness. The abettors of such sentiments should be peculiarly careful not to support a doctrine, which virtually destroys the sovereignty of God, and transfers that attribute to his grand antagonist. This corruption of the whole human race, and peopling the dominions of sin and misery with such multitudes of subjects, loudly proclaims the triumph, and extends the sovereignty of Satan over the wide region of the damned, while that of the great Creator is contracted to the small province of the elect. He is now deprived of every power, beyond this jurisdiction, but that of executing the purposes of Satan, by inflicting eternal punishments, in perfect conformity to Satan's malignant desires!

Can we venerate the infinite Wisdom of God, and believe that his plans were disconcerted by the wiles of an apostate spirit? Can we imagine that he should have miscalculated the powers of his new favourite man, on the one hand, and the artifices of the Devil on the other; and thus have inadvertently exposed the representative of the human race to a combat, to which he was created so unequal? According to this scheme, the very Prescience of God is an impeachment of his wisdom, since he must thus have concerted a plan which he knew would prove abortive.

If we attend to the plan itself, it will, in every respect, appear unworthy of Deity. In other cases, where we trace the divine footsteps, we discover marks of wisdom; we judge them to be of God from the stamp of excellency impressed upon them; but who can possibly discern the wisdom of a constitution, which not only failed in the primitive design, but inevitably exposed the vast majority of mankind to endless wo? What marks of design worthy of God do we trace, in resting the character and felicity of numberless beings on the single act of a frail individual; in rendering them nominally good or bad, really happy or wretched, by imputation and proxy? If it be an essential character of wisdom to discern and adapt means to ends, that some valuable purpose may be obtained, it surely cannot be found in a doctrine, that represents the means to be inadequate, and

the issue the reverse of what was intended, that is, the reverse of every thing wise and good.

If it be one property of Justice not to inflict punishment beyond desert, can the utmost stretch of imagination conceive of an act of injustice equal to the conduct imputed to the Supreme, which has exposed "numbers, beyond enumeration," to eternal misery for a single act of their primogenitor, while they were sleeping in unconsciousness? Can any act be more unjust, than the judicial punishment of the innocent for imputed crimes, than to rank those who have never transgressed, in the class of the vilest offenders, for a conduct over which they could have no influence; and to exclude them from the pardon you allow to have been granted to the real offender? Had Æsop lived in the christian era, and been informed, that such a tenet was maintained by some professors of christianity, we should have suspected that the fable of the wolf and the lamb, which every ingenuous schoolboy reads with indignation, had been invented to satirize and confute so extravagant an idea.

You say, that this multitude, doomed to eternal perdition, fall a sacrifice to the vindictive justice of God, whose laws have been violated by the grand representative of the human race. But can Deity be unjust and cruel to others, that he may be just to himself? The satisfaction of the attribute justice, is, in reality, a simple abstract idea. Justice suffers no misery, if it be not satisfied; and it cannot demand

the misery of millions, who never intentionally offended it. Besides, since the claims of vindictive justice have been waived in the salvation of the elect, what can have rendered them so inexorable respecting the reprobated? or, why should its claims be paramount to those of every other attribute? Are they more sacred than those of Benignity and Compassion? Must this so peremptorily demand millions of victims, and are the others to be easily satisfied with a few scattered monuments of mercy?

But the principal defence of your fundamental doctrine is founded upon a supposed covenant, which it is said God entered into with Adam; according to which it was stipulated, that he and his posterity should enjoy eternal life, in consequence of his obedience. It is therefore pleaded, that as Adam submitted to the terms, the Deity is fully justified in executing the sentence denounced against disobedi

ence.

The first answer to this assertion is, that it is a mere assertion, and no revelation. Among the numerous covenants really mentioned in the Old or New Testament, it is nowhere to be found. Those upon record are obviously just, most of them replete with benignity and love. They are all worthy of a God, worthy of being adored. Not one of them has the most distant reference to the fall of Adam; and we shall search in vain for a stipulation so formed, that a breach of its conditions on the part of man should involve myriads of innocent beings in endless misery.