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Let us now attend to the subject of debate. The gentleman who has undertaken the affirmative, has, at his own option, voluntarily proposed to maintain that the man Christ Jesus, is the supreme God. Does not this look like Materialism? What can be so, if the belief that a man is God, amount not to the very doctrine which Mr. M'Calla so strenuously opposes? The God in which he professes to believe, was born of a woman, laid in a manger, suffered, died, and was buried. Thus it is easy to retort on my opponent, that the God whom he acknow. ledges, is a material being. This might be also shown from the manner in which he divides and subdivides the Deity into a number of intelligent agents, or persons. Indeed, if his doctrine be true, that Jesus is compounded of two distinct beings in one person, three such persons must make six beings. At one time he tells us, God consists of three persons; and at another, he assumes that Jesus is the supreme God, and consists of only one person. This is Materialism, and borders on Atheism; for if Christ be supreme God, and each of the other persons be also a supreme God, there must be three supreme Gods; or, in other words, no supreme God at all. Now why am I called an infidel and a materialist, and charged with the worship of a material God, no better than Jupiter? Must not every one perceive, that my opponent is deficient in argument, and unable to approach the discussion of the subject in a pertinent and suitable manner?

But my opponent believes that Jesus Christ, in his divine nature, is the supreme God; and in his human nature, truly and properly a man; and that these two natures are united in one person. With this belief, let us read the fifth verse of the seventeenth chapter of John. Father, glorify me with thine own self, with the glory I had with thee before the world was. Now, will my oppo. nent tell the congregation, which of the two natures makes this prayer. If he say the divine, which according to his doctrine is the supreme and eternal God, may we not ask him, to what Father can the supreme God pray? or, how can the eternal God have a Father? If he say the human nature made this address to the su

preme Deity, then may we not also ask, was the human nature of Christ in heaven before the world was, and some thousands of years before it was conceived by the Virgin Mary?

In resuming the argument, Mr. M'Calla assigned as a reason of his not attending to the evidences adduced by his opponent, that he had not a copy of them on paper, but said if Mr. Lane would give him his arguments on paper, he would answer them.

Whether Mr. M'Calla perceived the inaccuracy of denominating Jesus the supreme God, we cannot say; but he here affirmed his belief that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, constitute the one supreme God.

He then proceeded to a farther consideration of the heathen and material God of Unitarians. He said the objects of the Trinitarian and Unitarian worship were wholly dissimilar. He informed the audience that Christians of the Antisch order had always worshipped a scriptural Go, but the Christians to which his opponent belonged, were heathens right out. Their God was not better than Nebuchadnezzar's golden image. He denounced the prayer of his opponent as no better than howlings, or the cries of the worshippers of Baal, when they prayed and cut themselves. To pray to the God of the Christians, was of no more avail than to pray to the Virgin Mary, or the Baal, or Jupiter of the heathens. Therefore, he inferred, that no Trinitarian could unite with them in prayer, and none but infidels could associate with them in religious communion.

He read Mr. Kinkade's remarks on three persons in the Deity; again avowed his belief in one supreme God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and observed that Simon Magus was the first who began the opposition to this doctrine, which was now carried on by Infidels and Uni. tarians.

END OF THE FIRST DAY.

NOTICE TO THE READER.

In the foregoing sketches of the arguments produced by the disputants, we have embraced all that we conceived to be pertinent to the subject, or interesting to the reader, in the first day's discussion. The friend of him who sustained the affirmative, and who made the communication to the Philadelphian, which we have inserted in the preface, freely admits that Mr. M'Calla did little more, during the first day, than to draw from Mr. Lane the peculiar doctrines of his system. It cannot therefore be expected, that much should be said by either of the parties, that could have any direct bearing on the proposition selected for discussion. We have consequently abridged the report, so far, as to reject the mere tautologies and recriminations of the different speeches, being persuaded, that frequent repetitions, and irrelevant bickerings, could neither communicate information, nor useful entertainment to our readers, whatever their peculiar opinions may be, relative to the subject of debate.

SECOND DAY.

Mr. Lane commenced, by observing that his opponent seemed to feel much interest in persuading the people to believe, that the God of the Christians was a material God, like Jupiter; but, my friends, said he, I never believed in a material God; and if any of our preachers have ever promulgated such a sentiment, it has been without my knowledge, for I have never heard that any of them has done so. I believe I have shown that the doctrine of a material Deity belongs much more properly to my opponent, than to me, or any of my friends. For myself I can truly say that I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, whom I consider a Spiritual_Being, an Infinite Intelligence; and I believe in one Lord Jesus, the Son of this only true God. I cannot, therefore, be called a Materialist. It is somewhat unnecessary to propose arguments when they do not receive attention; but I shall here adduce evidence that will involve the doctrine of three persons in one Being, in that confusion and unintelligibility, from which my opponent will not be able to extricate or deliver it.

The doctrine of the Trinity involves the idea of three co-equal, co-essential, and co-eternal persons in the Godhead. Now these persons must be either finite or infinite. If they are finite, a multiplicity of finite beings will fall as far short of infinity, as a multitude of miles will fail of measuring infinite space. That they are all infinite, cannot be true; for if the first person in the Trinity be infinite, he can comprehend the second and third persons. If the second and third persons can be comprehended, they are not infinite. If the first person cannot comprehend the second and third persons, he is not infinite; for there are at least two beings whom he cannot comprehend.

Again, the doctrine of the Trinity, involving the idea of three equal persons in the Godhead, brings my opponent into another dilemma; for on this supposition, nei

ther of the three persons in the Godhead can be almighty. If the first person be almighty, he can compel the second and third persons; but if he cannot compel the second and third persons, he is not almighty; for there are two persons of equal power to himself, whom he cannot control. If the second and third persons can be controlled, they are not almighty, for there is a power superior to theirs, by which they are controlled. All that my opponent's three co-equal persons could do, admitting them to be infinite, is, to meet in the centre of infinite space, and eternally neutralize each other's influence!

"If God be possessed of all possible perfections, in an infinite degree, all other Gods must be useless, or rather, the very supposition of their existence is absurd. Their existence, if possible, might only tend to disturb, pervert, or overturn the order and harmony of the universe.

What more could be necessary for the formation and government of infinite space, filled with worlds, than infinite power and infinite wisdom, universally diffused throughout that infinite space. Can infinite space itself, admit more than one infinite Deity? And can that Deity inclose, in his very nature, any other being, that it is not subordinate and limited, seeing such a one must be entirely under the influence of his control, and shut up in his unbounded grasp ? One infinite Jehovah is sufficient; more would be unnecessary; they cannot exist; infinite space could not contain them.'

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Mr. M'Calla then addressed the congregation to the following effect:-My opponent has been entertaining you with a discourse about infinity and infinite persons. He also undertakes to speak of philosophy, and yet he knows nothing about it. I was informed by a friend last night, that this would be his course to-day, and here you have it. But I could have read all this, as well as all the arguments he has yet offered, from Mr. Kinkade's book.

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