"it: even though all other incidental questi "ons and points of debate, from the creation "to the death of Chrift, fhould be fuppofed "ever fo favourable to his pretenfions." Again in letter the fecond, paragraph the firft. "I am endeavouring to point out to Chriftians fome one point, which may be of the greatest use to them, as a fhort and cer"tain prefervative against the attempts of "unbelievers: and I have faid, that the fingle fact of the refurrection of Chrift from the

dead, is that one point; because the belief "of a Chriftian in Chrift, does fo depend up"on this, that, without the truth of this fact, it must fall to the ground; and with "it, it must stand."

These things being laid down as principles, from hence I argue: If an impoftor could, by the help of fome foreign agent, perform all those works, which are allowed to be above the natural ability of man to perform, and which are allowed to be performed by Chrift before his death (which is the state of the cafe): then that foreign agent might, in the exercise of the fame power, raise the impoftor from the dead; and confequently the refurrection of Chrift does not prove the divinity of his miffion upon this author's principles, but rather thofe principles render the divinity of that miffion very uncertain.

If it should be urged, that Britannicus puts the cafe upon this iffue, becaufe the raifing a dead perfon to life, is a work above the natural

natural ability, or inherent power of any created being; and as it must be performed by the immediate operation or agency of God; fo, whatever meffage it is wrought to confirm, it proves that meffage to be divine; or at least, if such a work may be performed by the inherent power of fome created being, yet God will not fuffer it to be exerted, when it is for the delufion of his creatures.

I answer, that the raifing a dead perfon to life is a work above the natural ability of any created being, is a point, which is only prefumed, and not proved. For, fuppofing it fhould be above the natural ability of man to perform such a work, yet it will not follow from thence, that it is above the natural ability of every other created being; feeing the extent of man's power cannot be a rule to judge of the ability of other beings, whom we are not acquainted with. But admitting the cafe to be, as is urged above, yet it will not ferve Britannicus's purpose, because it is allowed, that Chrift raised two perfons from the dead, namely Lazarus the brother of Mary and Martha, and the fon of the widow of Nain*. And from hence I argue,

1

If none but God can raife a dead perfon to life, or if God will not fuffer fuch power to be exerted, when it is for the delufion of his creatures, then Chrift's miffion is proved divine, even though he had failed with regard

To which I might add a third, viz. Jairus's daughter.

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to the particular fact of his own refurrection; becaufe fuch power was exerted in his favour by the refurrection of the two persons before mentioned; and confequently his own refurrection, or the want of it makes no alteration in the cafe. Again, if the refurrection of Lazarus, and the young man of Nain, together with the other miracles, which Chrift wrought, are not fufficient to prove the divinity of his miffion, fuppofing the particular fact of his own refurrection had been wanting then the adding that fact to the former does not prove the point. For if God may be fuppofed to proceed fo far for the confirmation of an impofition, as to exert his power in raifing two perfons from the dead; or if he fuffered fuch power to be exerted for that purpofe: then he may, with equal reafon, be fuppofed to proceed one step farther, and exert the fame power, or suffer it to be exerted, in the refurrection of the impoftor, to anfwer the fame end. So that Chrift's refurrection proves nothing in the prefent cafe.

If it fhould be farther urged, that Britannicus does not lay the ftrefs of his argument upon the fact of Chrift's refurrection, confidered barely as a fact, but as a fact foretold:

I answer, this is plainly changing the queftion, by making, not the fingle fact of Chrift's refurrection, but the fulfilling of prophefy the foundation, upon which the

truth

truth of chriftianity refts. But if we put it upon this foot, it will not help the cafe, because it is allowed that Chrift foretold feveral other things in his life-time; namely, that Peter would deny him; that Judas would betray him; that the chief Priefts and Scribes would confpire against him, and deliver him to the Gentiles, to mock, to fcourge, and to crucify him; and that the events answered the predictions. From whence I argue, if the foretelling of feveral contingent facts, which depended upon the will of various voluntary agents, and the events answering the predictions, together with the other miracles, which Chrift wrought, were not fufficient to prove his meffage to be divine, fuppofing he had failed with regard to the prediction of his own refurrection: then the event answering to that prediction does not prove the point; becaufe if the former might be performed by an impoftor, informed and affifted by fome foreign agent, then that impoftor, in the exercife of the fame power, or by the help of the fame foreign agent, might foreknow, foretel, and perform the latter.

If it fhould be further urged, that Britannicus does not exclude Chrift's miracles, and his other predictions, with their accomplishments, from being proofs of Chrift's divine miffion, but rather confiders them as fuch; only that he confiders his refurrection, H

when

when answering the prediction, as that which compleated the proof, arifing from the former facts, which proof would not have been compleat without it, feeing it was foretold; not but if he had failed in that one fact, it would not only have invalidated the proof arifing from all former facts, but would alfo prove him to have been an impoftor; because such a failure would have been a plain indication of a defect of knowledge, power, or veracity in his principal, which could not be the cafe with refpect to God.

I answer, this is playing faft and loose, going forward and backward, affirming and denying the fame proportion in the fame breath (if I may fo fpeak.) For, either the working a long train of miracles, the raifing two perfons from the dead, and the foretelling feveral contingent facts, with the events anfwering the predictions, do, in the nature of the thing, either feparately, or conjunctly prove a prophet's meffage to be divine, (fuppofing the meffage itfelf to be unexceptionable,) or they do not. If they do not, then it is impertinent to urge them for proof in the cafe. If they do, then, when all these are done, the prophet's meffage is proved divine, and it is not any after event which can invalidate that evidence, and prove the contrary. And confequently Chrift's meffage is proved divine, though he had fail

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