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for the anger at its commencement, there can be any now to warrant its continuance.

CHAP. VIII.-REVENGE.

All pain inflicted on an offender, further than what may procure reparation to the injured, or promote the design of punishment, is so much revenge.

There is no difficulty in knowing when we inflict pain; and still less, when we do so through revenge. For if punishment alone be the object, we proceed with reluctance; if revenge, we afflict with pleasure.

It is probable from the light of nature that a passion, whose object is to give pain, is disagreeable to the will of the Creator. Other passions may produce pain by accident, this does so by design: and we think that the Creator has willed nothing to produce pain designedly. This probability becomes a certainty, if we credit the Christian Scriptures, where forgiveness, the opposite to revenge, is specially enjoined.

By comparing the language used in the following passages, it will be seen that revenge is forbidden in any shape; and further, that we are even required to do good to our very enemies.* "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." ."—" And his Lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him; so, likewise, shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.' "Avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath; for it is written, vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord. Therefore, if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head."- -"For

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347 What may be included in the idea of revenge ?

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348 How do we know whether we act for punishment or for revenge? 349 What is probable from the light of nature? Why?

350 What confers certainty upon this opinion?

351 How far is this doctrine carried in the Scriptures?

352 Repeat some of the proofs.

Matt. vi. 14, 15; xviii. 34, 35. Rom. xii. 19, 20. Col. iii. 13.

See also Ex. xxiii. 4.

bearing one another, and forgiving one another; if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye."

But the injunctions in favor of forgiveness do not interfere with the prosecution of public offences. From the language of Christ, "If thy brother, who has trespassed against thee, neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican,"* it is plain that he assents to, and sanctions a proper discipline established in civil and religious societies, for the restraint or punishment of criminals.

But, if the magistrate be permitted to punish, so is likewise the prosecutor; for the office of the latter is as necessary as that of the former.

Nor, by parity of reason, are private persons prohibited from the correction of vice, provided they are provoked by the injury done to others, and uninfluenced by any feelings of a private pique towards the offenders.

Thus, it is no breach of Christian charity to withdraw ourselves from persons, with a view to discountenance any conduct that we deem immoral. This is authorized by St. Paul, 1 Cor. v. 11.

Although we are forbidden to resent an injury, we are not required to expose ourselves to a repetition of it; for this would be to encourage the acts of the offender to his own ruin.

When a benefit can be conferred only upon one, or few; if it is our duty to confer it on the most deserving, the choice must be made without reference to the person so chosen being a friend or foe: but if only a proper object, and not necessarily the most deserving, be required, then we are not bound to prefer a foe to a friend.

Christ, who estimated virtues by their utility, lays the greatest stress on the virtue of forgiveness; knowing that the private feuds which disturb the intercourse of life, and make

353 Are we then forbid to prosecute for crimes committed against us? 354 How is the negative of this question proved?

355 What do we argue from the magistrate's being permitted to punish? Why?

356 What should be our motive in correcting vice?

357 How may we discountenance vice? What authority for this? 358 What is our duty when we wish to confer a benefit on one only? 359 How was the virtue of forgiveness esteemed by Christ?

* Matt. xviii. 17.

up half its misery, owe their origin to the want of a forgiving temper.

CHAP. IX.-DUELING.

Dueling, as a punishment, is absurd; for it is an equal chance whether the punishment fall on the person offending, or on the one offended. Nor is it much better as a reparation, for it tends neither to undo the injury, nor to afford a compensation for the damage that is sustained.

The truth is, it is not considered either as a punishment or as a reparation. But as the law of honor calls the man a coward, who submits patiently to an affront, the duel takes place not to satisfy the parties, but to prevent or wipe off this suspicion.

The unreasonableness of the rule is one thing; the duty of the parties, while such a rule exists, is another.

Then, the question is, whether a regard for our reputation is, or is not, sufficient to justify the taking away of one another's lives. It is not.

For,

1. Murder is forbidden; and life deliberately taken away, except by public authority, is murder. The value and security of life make this rule necessary; for any other would admit all the mischiefs arising from bloodshedding by private hands.

2. If divine laws are to be thus abrogated by human laws, all morality that is founded on the divine will is at end; and fashion may, at one time or other, annul the obligation of every duty.

"But the sense of shame is insupportable." So is that of hunger. If, then, the former can extenuate murder, so can the latter: yet this finds no advocates, and neither should the other.

Take away the chance of falling himself, and the duelist

360 What may be said of dueling as a punishment? Why? 361 Is it any better as a reparation? Why?

362 Is it actually resorted to on either of these accounts? 363 How then is it occasioned ?

364 Under what two considerations may it be treated?

365 What question shall we discuss?

How is it answered?

366 What is the first reason against dueling?

367 What will result from causing human regulations to set aside divine laws?

368 What excuse is offered? And how answered?

369 What would render the duelist an assassin ?

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becomes the assassin; add it, and even then, the difference is only that fewer will adopt the practice. But a highwayman, who knows that the party whom he intends to rob is armed like himself, may plead the same extenuation; yet his boldness affects not his criminality.

In expostulating with the duelist, I suppose that his adversary will fall, which, in my argument, is a fair supposition; for if he has no right to kill, he has none to make the attempt. On the other hand, I do not urge the Christian principle of the forgiveness of injuries; for on this point he may be guiltless, and be acting only with a wish to save his honor.

In this view of the question, the difference between the parties is none; for both are influenced by the same law of honor, and both incur an equal hazard of committing murder.

But as public opinion is not easily controlled by civil institutions, the custom will continue, till some plan be found to take away the reproach of cowardice, attached to patience under insult and to a refusal to fight.

The insufficiency of the law of the land to meet cases now settled by the law of honor, causes many to seek redress, attended even with the chance of death, rather than to subject themselves to the ridicule which is thrown on the sufferer by seeking compensation in a court of law.

For the army or navy, where the law of honor is rigorously enforced, a court of honor might be established, with power to award such submissions on the part of the offender, as a duel is intended to obtain: and it might become the fashion for others, not of those professions, to refer their quarrels to this tribunal.

CHAP. X.-LITIGATION.

"If it be possible, live peaceably with all men."* Whence it appears, that it is not always possible to do so. But it

370 What difference is made by adding that chance?

371 Does this take away the criminality? Give an example.
372 On what is the argument against dueling founded? Why?
373 Can we urge on the duelist the duty of forgiveness? Why
374 Does this view of the question apply to one or both parties?
375 How can the custom be discontinued?

376 What has frequently caused this practice?

377 How might this be remedied?

378 Is it always possible to live peaceably with others?

* Rom. xii. 18.

smite

will be said, that Christ has enjoined us, "If an enemy thee on the right cheek, to turn to him the other also."* But this is rather a proverbial description of patience, than a positive rule of conduct, as may be inferred from the conduct of Christ himself, who, when struck by a police-officer, thus rebukes the offender: "If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil; but if well, why smitest thou me ?"t

A rule which forbade all opposition to injury, would have a tendency to give a license to insult; because some would feel that they were bound by it, whilst others would despise it, and live in continual depredation on the conscientious. Hence St. Paul, who strongly felt and inculcated the necessity of forbearance and forgiveness, never requires an unresisting submission to every injury; and the same apostle, who reproved the litigiousness of the Corinthian converts, took refuge in the laws of his country and in the privileges of a Roman citizen, from the violence of the Jews,§ and from the injustice of the chief captain.||

But if the injury, personal or public, be small, or the punishment likely to be disproportioned to the offence, then the Christian, because he is debarred of all vindictive motives, is bound not to go to law.

On the other hand, a lawsuit may be instituted on occasions of importance,-1. To decide an uncertain right of consequence; 2. To obtain reparation for some considerable damage; and, 3. To prevent the repetition of the injury.

But, as justice is the sole object, the means must be morally correct, and a process the most simple and direct must be adopted; such as a reference to arbitration, or an agreement to settle the dispute by mutual concessions. Nor

379 What injunction was given by the Savior?

380 How is that to be understood? What authority?

381 What would be the tendency of a rule forbidding all opposition to injury? Why?

382 What was the conduct of St. Paul?

383 In what cases is the Christian bound to refrain from going to law? Why?

384 In what three cases is it allowable?

385 How should a prosecution be conducted?

386 What means may be adopted?

* Matt. v. 39.

† John xviii. 23.

+ 1 Cor. vi. 7, et seq.

§ Acts xxv. 11.

Acts xxii. 25.

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