BOOK VI.

ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

CHAP. I.-ORIGIN OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT at first was either patriarchal or military; that is, of a parent over his family, or of a leader over his followers.

1. [Of patriarchal government.] Had men been born mature and independent at once, paternal authority would never have existed. But as the wants of infancy demand the care, so its weakness gives rise to the control of parents; and thus a single family exhibits the rudiments and outlines of a government, where one directs and others obey. And therefore, governmental authority was, no doubt, coeval with the race of man.

To this, the first stage of government, [that is, of a parent over his young children,] succeeds another, where more families than one are united by the ties of consanguinity; and where all, though adults, look up to the same head under the influence of feelings of respect. Because as the beginning of obedience is not recollected, that habit seems to the parties to be a law of nature; and it cannot be abruptly withdrawn.

But though in the course of time, the common head drops into the grave, yet the interests which bound the families together during the lifetime of the patriarch, cease not at his death. And hence, so far from a dissolution of the society taking place; it is probable that the members of it, having felt the advantages of possessing such a head, would either formally fix on a successor, or silently permit the vacant place to be occupied by one whose services had been useful during

1 What was government at first?

2 What is the foundation of patriarchal government ?

3 When did it commence?

4 What kind of government is likely to succeed parental authority? 5 Would the death of the patriarch affect the common interests of the associated families?

6 What might be caused by the continuation of the common interests ?

the lifetime of the deceased patriarch. Or, perhaps, the first ancestor, anticipating the mischievous effects of disunion, first prepared and then appointed a successor, to whose rule the other members of the family found it their interest to submit.

A clan, thus formed of many families who were sprung from one stock, might fulfil all the purposes of civil union. And as branches continually slipped off to settle in distant lands, separate societies would be established, united still by various bonds; such as marriage, mutual defence, conquest, &c.

11. [Of military government.] Respecting the origin of a military government, it is easy to understand how, in the case of wars offensive or defensive, a leader might be chosen; and how authority, given him for a single expedition, might be retained, at least, in the modified sense of influence, even in times of peace; and how a temporary power may be converted into one for life by the management of various motives of action, suited to the different feeling of partizans.

But how such a power, which has its origin in merit or management, should descend by inheritance, without any reference to the personal qualities of the successor, is a question not so easy for us to explain. It is probable, however, that hereditary dominion has been introduced from the united operations of many causes; such as the feeling of gratitude, by which a part of the respect due to the father is paid to the son; the mutual jealousy of other rival competitors; the support of adherents more interested in preserving than destroying the succession; and the experience of facts, which went to prove that any rule of succession is better than none, and that the one most easy and certain is that of consanguinity.

This account of the supposed origin of government, is confirmed by what we know of the condition of some uncivilized parts of the world; and what we read of in the histories of earlier times. Both conspire to show that nations are formed of single families, each under its own

7 What might possibly be provided for by the first ancestor? How may originate a military government?

9 What attendant of this power is it not so easy to explain? 10 What is a probable explanation?

11 By what are these suppositions confirmed?

head, and united only for purposes of mutual protection; but not possessing, (because not wanting,) a system of laws and government. For that would be perfectly useless to persons occupied with the care of subsistence merely, and free to seek it how and where they best could, at nature's hands alone.

But if this is a correct view of the earlier stages of society, how shall we account for the existence of great empires in remote ages, and the rapidity with which they rose from a state of comparative nothingness? The fact is, that the formation of such extensive empires was facilitated by this very multitude of clans, unconnected with or hostile to each other. For when one tribe had by any means got the start of the rest, it could, as Rome in truth did, under the conduct of a skilful and daring chief, easily subdue by force or gain by alliance the weaker neighboring states, before they felt the necessity, or possessed the means, of confederating against the common foe.

With regard to the conclusion to be drawn from the preceding theory, it is fair to infer that the first form of civil government was a monarchy; being merely the result of the principles which regulated single families, and armies, each under its own head.

CHAP. II.-HOW SUBJECTION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IS

MAINTAINED.

But

There is nothing in the history of man more surprising than the phenomenon of the almost universal subjugation of strength to weakness; as shown in the fact of millions of robust men, in the full exercise of their personal faculties, waiting on the will of a child, a woman, or a fool. though it be an extreme case to suppose a vast empire under the subjection of a person the weakest in intellect or the most debased by vice; still, as in governments even the most popular, the physical strength resides in the many, it is difficult to understand how a moral strength should exist in

12 What was the civil state of the primary nations?

13 How will this account agree with the formation of extensive empires?

14 What inference may be drawn from this theory?

15 What surprising phenomenon do we observe in political affairs? 16 Can this remark be applied to popular governments? Why?

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the few, powerful enough to control the many. Nor is the difficulty solved by asserting that civil governments are upheld by standing armies; for the question still is, how are these armies themselves, the masters over the many, made to obey the commands of the ruling few?

The fact is, that such submission is not the result of one, but of many causes; each operating on different portions of the community, and thus producing a similarity of conduct from principles extremely various.

These principles are-1. Prejudice; 2. Reason; 3. Selfinterest.

1. The prejudice which influences those who obey, is founded on long established customs. In monarchies and aristocracies, these customs operate in favor of particular persons; in democracies, of particular institutions. And as the whole course of civil life is regulated by such prescriptions, the prejudice that is founded upon them, must needs take a deep root. All the demands, made by the privileged orders on the less fortunate part of society, rest, as many think, on prescription alone; and to that law, when demands are contested, is the appeal made. Hence, persons learn to transfer to the government the same prejudices in favor of prescription, which they feel in the case of individuals; and consider that the sovereign has a right to that obedience which has been given him of old, and that in demanding it he only claims what is justly his due.

In hereditary monarchies, the prescriptive title is strengthened still further by the introduction of a feeling of sacredness attached to the persons of princes. Of this feeling all princes have been quick to take advantage; and by the assumption of titles, suited rather to the majesty of the Deity than to his self-called representatives on earth, and by the adoption of the religious ceremonies of investiture and

17 Does not the fact of the government's employing standing armies solve the mystery?

18 What does such submission result from?

19 What are the three prominent principles?

20 By what means does prejudice assist rulers?

21 How does it operate in monarchies and aristocracies ?

22 How in republics?

23 Is this prejudice strong? Why?

24 How is this illustrated?

25 How is this prescriptive title strengthened in monarchies ?

26 What are the means that have been used?

coronations, they have increased both their actual power and ideal importance. And so well has the folly of man kept pace with the impiety of the prince, that an emperor has been worshiped as a present God; and even to this day, the Lama of Thibet is accounted the immortal God himself, the object at once of civil obedience and religious adoration; a singular instance of the facility with which human credulity may be abused, and of the extent to which it can be carried, when the object is to produce a reverence for a king, by working on the religious principles of mankind.

11. They who obey from reason, are impelled to allegiance by perceiving the necessity of some government, the mischief of civil commotions, and the difficulty of resettling the state when it has been once disturbed.

III. He, who obeys from self-interest, is careless of the general consequences of resistance; but quite alive to that diminution of his individual ease and comforts which he would suffer by nonobedience. Or, even, if disposed to resist, he is restrained by the fear of falling into a worse sitution than his present one, when arrayed singly against the powers that be, and uncertain of support from others.

From this account of the principles which lead men to obey civil governments at all, governors may learn,

1. That, as the physical strength resides in the governed, it is unwise to rouse a power, which, when once excited, can overturn the most deeply rooted dominion; and that as authority is founded on public opinion, that public opinion must be treated with respect, and managed with delicacy.

2. That, as government owes its support to the fact of persons thinking that custom is right, every change of custom diminishes the stability of the opinion of its power. And hence, slight evils ought to remain uncorrected for fear of disturbing antiquated prejudices; and even the charm, which the multitude feel in names, is not to be despised.

27 What have been the effects of such expedients ? 28 How does reason occasion some to obey?

29 What effect has self-interest upon some?

30 What caution is first suggested to rulers from the foregoing accounts?

31 What is the second caution?

32 What follows from this caution? Give an example.