withstanding, however, the truth and the importance of this doctrine, the general principle already stated remains incontrovertible, that in every particular instance our duty consists in doing what appears to us to be right at the time; and if, while we follow this rule, we should incur any blame, our demerit does not arise from acting according to an erroneous judgment, but from our previous misemployment of the means we possessed for correcting the errors to which our judgment is liable."-Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. Book iv. chap. v. sec. 3. Outlines, Lecture 5.] [The business of ascertaining the rules of absolute rectitude is the most important part of the science of ethics. “Indeed without this study, the best dispositions of the heart, whether relating to ourselves or to others, may be in a great measure useless." This is the study which is to be pursued in the subsequent part of this work.]

THE CULTURE OF THE MORAL FACULTIES.

[Mr. Stewart gives the following as the difference between conscience and moral faculty. "Conscience refers to our own conduct alone; whereas, the moral faculty is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others."-Active and Moral Powers of Man. Book iv. chap. 2.

The moral faculty, like the faculty of reason, (which forms the most essential of its elements,) requires care and cultivation for its developement; and, like reason, it has a gradual progress, both in the case of individuals and of societies."-Ib. Book iv. chap. 5. sec. 4.

"While God has so formed our nature as to be capable of admiring and practising virtue, he has intrusted the culture of our moral powers to our own care; and has reminded us that for our diligence in improving this noblest part of our stewardship, we are to give an account at his tribunal.". Dewar's Christian Ethics. Book ii. chap. 9.

There are several methods by which our consciences may be cultivated; and,

116 Where in such circumstances would our guilt fall? 117 What then is the most important part of ethics? 118 How does the moral faculty differ from conscience? 119 Can the moral faculties be improved?

120 Is it our duty to improve them?

121 What is the first means of training our moral faculties?

1. By the virtuous influence of others. The infant mind is formed by the care of our early instructors, and for a long time thinks and acts in consequence of the confidence it reposes in their superior judgment. All this is undoubtedly agreeable to the design of nature; and, indeed, if the case were otherwise, the business of the world could not possibly go on. For nothing can be plainer than that the multitude, condemned as they are to laborious employments, inconsistent with the cultivation of their mental faculties, are wholly incapable of forming their own opinions on the most important questions which can occupy the human mind." But the authority of this influence must not be too much relied upon. For, "it is evident that as no system of education can be perfect, many prejudices must mingle with the most important and best ascertained truths."-Stewart.

2. By a continual solicitude that our opinions and conduct should conform to the principles of moral rectitude. "Let any honest man," says Butler, "before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going to do, right, or is it wrong; is it good, or is it evil? I do not in the least doubt but that these questions would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man, in almost any circumstances."

3. The study of the Scriptures, and a firm adherence to the precepts they contain.* "Man in his present state," ́says Dick in his Philosophy of Religion,

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can be directed

122 Is this influence in accordance with the design of nature?

123 Is it necessary? Why?

124 Is this influence always on the side of virtue ?

125 What is the second help in moral culture?

126 Would this disposition lead to truth?

127 What is the next great help in teaching us our duty?

*To some, this article may seem as foreign to the subject. But its application where revelation is known is unavoidable. The intermediate truths, of the being and government of God, the revelation of his will to mankind, and his wisdom and holiness in willing that which is right, is considered, in this work, as assented to. We wish to state, however, in the language of Mr. Dick, "That the laws of God are not the commands of an arbitrary sovereign, but are founded on the nature of things, and on the relations which exist in the intelligent system." And again, in the language of Dr. Dewar, "The law of God is the explicit announcement of the nature and extent of those obligations devolving upon men, which had previously existed, and would have existed though no such announcement had been made."

only by positive laws, proceeding from the Almighty; whose comprehensive mind alone can trace all their consequences to the remotest corners of the universe, and through all the ages of eternity. These laws are contained in the Scriptures; and we know, in point of fact, that in every country where these laws are either unknown, or not recognised, there is no fixed standard of morals; and vice, in its various ramifications, almost universally prevails."

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4. Finally an habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the Divine presence, and an habitual desire to have the whole moral condition regulated by this impression."-" He who earnestly cultivates this purity within, feels that he requires continual watchfulness, and a constant direction of the mind to those truths and moral causes which are calculated to influence his volitions. He feels further that he is in need of a might not his own in this high design; but for this he knows also he can look, with humble confidence and hope, when, under a sense of moral weakness, he asks its powerful aid."

To these may be added the assistance which conscience may receive on particular occasions, as Mr. Stewart says, "from the exercise of reason; especially when there appears to be an interference between different duties, and where, of course, it seems necessary to sacrifice one duty to another; and also, when the ends at which our duty prompts us to aim, are to be accomplished by means which require choice and deliberation."]

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CHAP. VI.-HUMAN HAPPINESS.

"Happy" is a relative term, and regards an individual as compared either with others or himself. In the one case the comparison is with the lot of man generally; in the other with the individual's own previous or subsequent condition. Strictly speaking, that condition may be called happy, in which the aggregate of pleasure exceeds the amount of pain. The quantity of such excess is the measure of the degree

128 What is the state of morals where the Scriptures are not the standard?

129 By what desire should we be actuated in all our doings?

130 What feelings would this occasion?

131 In what cases may the exercise of reason assist us?

132 How is the word "happy" applied?

133 What condition may be called happy?

of happiness; and the greatest quantity attainable by man is what we mean to express, when the phrase human happiness is employed in our discourse. In this inquiry it is needless to enlarge on the dignity of man, of the superiority of the intellect over the body, of the delicacy and refinement of some pleasures, or of the grossness and sensuality of others; because pleasures in fact differ only in degree, and not in kind; and it is from a view of their intensity, or of their continuance, that every question respecting human happiness must receive its decision. It will be our business merely to show, 1. What human happiness does not consist in; and, II. What it does consist in.

1. Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense; that is, gratification of animal appetites, admiration of works of art, and exercise in active sports. For, 1st, these pleasures are short-lived, especially the grosser kind; and much more so when considered independently of the aid derived from preparation and expectation. 2dly, they lose their charm by repetition; for, as the nerves, by which we receive pleasurable sensations, lose their sensibility by frequent exercise; in the same way the mind becomes indifferent to a gratification no longer new. 3dly, the eagerness for intense delights destroys the relish for others less intense; and as such high gratifications occur seldom, time must hang heavy on our hands.

From no delusion do men suffer so much as from the expectation of intense pleasure. The very expectation spoils the anticipated delight. Even when the enjoyment does come, efforts are made to persuade ourselves of the reality of the pleasure, instead of our finding that the pleasure is produced without effort; and the delight we aimed at is gene

134 What is meant by the phrase human happiness?

135 Do pleasures really differ in kind?

136 What two considerations must enter every question on happi

ness?

137 What does the author propose to show?

138 What is his first remark on the negative ? 139 What does he call pleasures of sense? 139 What is the first reason?

140 What is the second reason?

How so?

141 What is the third reason? What follows from that? 142 What is said of the expectation of intense pleasure? 143 When enjoyment does come, how is it accompanied ? 144 Do we experience the delight we aimed at ?

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rally supplanted by the secret grief of having missed our aim. Besides, the habit of seeking powerful stimulants prevents the relish for less intense delights, whose variety and succession alone supply the stream of continued happiness.

They, whose whole business is the pursuit of pleasure, unrestrained by conscience or want of means, are still devoured by ennui. With a restless passion for variety, they become fastidious in the choice of pleasure: and though languid in the enjoyment, are miserable under the want of it. Their pleasures soon reach their limits, from which they as soon decline, because the organs of perception cannot long remain on the stretch. And in the endeavor to compensate for the brevity of the pleasure by its frequency, more is lost than gained, through the fatigue of the faculties and the diminution of sensibility; which, as age advances, are felt the most by the voluptuary, who, teased by desires that can never be gratified, is tortured still more by the memory of pleasures fled never to return. After all, these pleasures have some value; and although the young are always too eager in their pursuit of them, the old are sometimes too studious of their ease to take that pains for them which they really deserve.

2. Happiness does not consist in the absence of pain, bodily and mental, when that absence is accompanied by no kind of exertion. For such a listless state, like the opposite restless state of the voluptuary, brings with it the same feeling of ennui; and oppresses first the mind with imaginary evils, and afterwards the body with real ones. Hence the disappointment felt by those persons, who seek for happiness by a retirement from the bustle and glare of active life, to the leisure and tranquillity of a country house. Where the cause of uneasiness is known, by removing the cause, the uneasiness is cured. But where the distress is imaginary, (and, for

145 What kind of delights occasion continued happiness? 146 How do our anticipations affect the relish for them?

147 What is the general feeling of those whose professed pursuit is pleasure?

148 What is said of their pleasures? Why is that the case?

149 Can their brevity be compensated by their frequency? Why? 150 Are pleasures of this kind really valueless?

151 How do the aged and the young differ in their pursuit of them? 152 What is the second assertion on the negative?

153 What effect has the absence of exertion? 154 What disappointment does this account for?