to constitute the sole happiness of many animals, which, like oysters, possess no visible means of enjoyment.

From this view of happiness we may infer, what moralists have not proved:-1. That happiness is pretty equally distributed in civil society; 2. That vice has no advantage over virtue, even in this world.

CHAP. VII.-VIRTUE.

Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.

In this definition, the "good of mankind” is the subject; the "will of God," the rule; and "everlasting happiness," the motive of virtue.

[Concerning the first part of this definition, Mr. Stewart says, "It has been supposed by some moralists that the obligation of all our moral duties arises entirely from their apprehended tendency to promote the happiness of society. Notwithstanding the various appearances in human nature, which seem at first view to favor this theory, it is liable to unsurmountable objections."-Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Part ii. chap. 2. sec. 2.]

[Concerning the latter part of the definition, Dr. Brown says, "Virtue he defines to be, the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.' The last part of the definition is the most important part of the whole. For, the knowledge of this everlasting happiness he supposes to be all which constitutes moral obligation; meaning, by obligation, not any feeling of moral love, but the influence of happiness as an object of physical desire, and of pain as an object of physical aversion; one or other of which is to follow our obedience or disobedience to the command of the power who is the supreme dispenser of both. That part of the system of Dr. Paley, then, which makes the sole motive to virtue the happiness of the agent himself, is false.”—Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture 79.]

197 What two inferences are deduced from the positions advanced in this chapter? 198 How does Dr. Paley define virtue ? 199 What does he says is the subject of virtue ?

What the motive?

What the rule?

200 Does Mr. Stewart agree with the first part of this definition?

201 What does Dr. Brown say is all the obligation which the latter

part of the definition supposes? What does he say it lacks? 202 Does he think that this is according to truth?

[Mr. Stewart also says, "The system which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence leads to consequences which sufficiently show that it is erroneous. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy, cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes."-Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Section 6.] [For remarks on the rule implied in this definition, see the chapter on utility.]

["As to the motive," says a writer in Rees' Cyclopedia, "this is still more objectionable than the subject; for it excludes, not only the virtuous actions of those who do not believe in a future state, but even those which spring from a disinterested regard to the welfare of others, to the will of God, or to the dictates of conscience; that is, when an action becomes the most virtuous, then, according to the definition which Paley has adopted, it ceases to be virtuous."]

[The following is Mr. Dymond's definition of virtue, "Virtue is conformity with the standard of rectitude; which standard consists primarily in the expressed will of God."]

Virtue has been divided into benevolence to propose good ends; prudence to suggest the best means for their attainment; fortitude to encounter the difficulties and dangers attending our undertaking; and temperance to bear down the opposing feelings from within. For instance, benevolence leads us to assist an orphan; prudence teaches us how to assist him best; fortitude enables us to bear the evils resulting from such act of assistance; and temperance keeps down every selfish consideration likely to interfere with the end proposed.

Virtue has been also divided into prudence and benevolence; the former, attentive to our own interest, the latter to that of our fellow creatures; and both directed to the increase of universal happiness.

203 What conclusions does Mr. Stewart say the last part of the definition leads to?

204 What does another writer say that it excludes? What follows from this?

205 What is Mr. Dymond's definition of virtue?

206 How does Dr. Paley say that virtue has been divided? Give an illustration.

The four Cardinal Virtues are, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice.

But the division of Virtue, in modern times, is into duties: 1. Piety, &c. towards God: 2. Justice, &c. towards our fellow-creatures and, 3. Temperance, &c. towards ourselves.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE REGULATION OF CONDUCT.

Man acts more from habit than reflection. On few points of moral conduct do men think at all; on fewer still do they wait for the result of reflection. The opinion is generally determined by a sudden impulse, which is the result of previous habits. This conduct, though apparently wrong, is really right, and the best suited to the weakness of human nature. In the rapid events of life there is little leisure for reflection and were there more, he who reasons when he ought to act, is sure, in case of temptation, to reason wrong.

We

But if man is thus passive under his habits, where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue and the guilt of vice? answer, in the formation of such habits.

Hence arises the necessity of doing or omitting many things for the sake of habit alone. For instance, a person in apparently great distress begs for charity. If we asked ourselves, whether the object be really deserving, whether charity so bestowed be not to encourage idleness, whether the money could not be better applied; we should, perhaps, doubt of giving relief at all. But when we reflect that the distress exists, that the feeling of charity ought to be cultivated, that if it be not cultivated, selfishness will spring up; when we consider all this, we will, if we are wise, do for our own sake what we would not do for the beggar's, and act generously rather than do violence to a habit so generally useful. Again, a man is in the habit of strict veracity. But an occasion occurs where a deviation from truth seems excusable for the sake of gratify

207 What are called the four cardinal virtues?

208 What is the modern division of virtue ?

209 What is the great principle of human action?

210 What influence has the understanding generally on opinions? 211 How then are they formed?

212 Is this right? Why?

213 What question does this give rise to? How is it answered? 214 What rule results from this? Give an example.

215 How would a good man act in such circumstances?

216 Give another example. Why would not indulgence be allowab in that case?

ing others and himself. The lie he has to tell is harmless, and also amusing. Why then should he not indulge in it? The answer is, it will destroy his previous habit of strict veracity; that similar occasions may return, where the temptation is less, the mischief more; and as his scruples will wear away by a few transgressions, the habit of lying will be induced, and then yielded to whenever it suits his purpose. Hence, too, may be explained the nature of habitual virtue; through the operation of which a man may perform various acts of virtue, although he may be uninfluenced by, or even ignorant of, the subject, rule, or motive of virtue. How so? it will be asked. Precisely, it will be replied, as a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious of studying at every turn his master's interest. But then he must for a length of time have been under the actual influence of such motives; and in that previous habit his present virtue consists.

Man is, in truth, a bundle of habits. Every virtue and every vice, every modification of word, thought, and deed, can and does become a habit; nor is there a quality or function of the body or mind, that is not influenced by this great law of human nature.

II. Christianity has not defined the precise quantity of virtue necessary for salvation.

As all revelation must be transmitted through the ordinary vehicle of language, this objection will not require an answer, until it be shown that any form of words could express this quantity; or that a standard of moral conduct could exist, adapted to the capacities and circumstances of different men. It is enough for us to know from Scripture* that the rewards and punishments will be so fitted to every degree of virtue and vice, that none may labor in vain. It has been objected, that God acts unjustly in admitting one part into heaven, and condemning the other to hell, because

217 What may be explained from what has been said? 218 What is habitual virtue ? How is it occasioned?

219 What is man as it regards habits?

220 Has habit much influence over his body and mind?

221 What is our second general observation?

222 What two barriers hinder this from becoming an objection? 223 What can we learn from Scripture ?

* Mark ix. 41. Luke xii. 47; xxi. 16. 2 Cor. ix. 6.

there can be little to choose between the worst man received, and the best man rejected. But may there not be as little to choose in their conditions?

This is not the place to anticipate the detail of Scripture morality. But the following positions may be here advanced with safety:

1. That a state of future happiness cannot be expected, except for conduct designedly or habitually prompted by regard to true virtue. For were it otherwise, the sanctions of morality and religion would possess neither use nor authority.

2. That a state of happiness cannot be expected by those who are in the habitual practice of committing one sin, or omitting one duty.

Because, 1. every command of God is equally binding; 2. by such allowance every sin would in turn be committed with impunity; and, 3. such laxity of morals is directly denounced by Scripture, where duties are recited* collectively, and vicest disjunctively; thus proving that single virtues cannot gain, though single vices may lose, God's approbation. Nor can such expressions as "charity shall cover a multitude of sins," and, "he who converteth a sinner, shall hide a multitude of sins," be reasonably extended to sins committed habitually.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

As this doctrine has been laid down expressly by Christ in the parable of the talents,§ all further reasoning is unnecessary; and it is only requisite to direct attention to the language adopted on the occasion, where the servant is censured for being "slothful," and ordered to be "cast out into outer darkness" as an "unprofitable servant."

224 What is the first general position of Scripture morality?

225 Why must that be the fact?

226 What is the second general position?

227 What three reasons are given for this position?

228 Are there any texts which seem to favor a contrary opinion? What is said of them?

229 What is the third general position of Scripture morality? 230 Who has taught this doctrine? Where?

2 Pet. i. 5. Matt. xxv. 14.

† 1 Cor. vi. 9.

1 Pet. iv. 8.

James v. 20.