influence the conduct of reasonable beings; if two similar acts be not similarly treated, the consequence of such neglect of general rules would be, that mankind would no longer know what to expect, or how to act. Rewards and punishments, distributed at random, might, like a blank or a prize in a lottery, bring pain or pleasure for the moment; but, from the uncertainty of the event, could produce no influence on the conduct.

Hence, if there is to be a distribution of future rewards and punishments, such distribution must proceed on general rules.

But it will be said, that on this system of general consequences, the guilt of a bad action consists in the example; and consequently, if the act be done in secrecy, since it furnishes no bad example, part of the guilt drops off. In the case of suicide, for instance, if the act be done so that none can know or suspect it, the example can do no mischief; nor can a punishment for this deed be necessary merely to save a general rule from an exception.

But such reasoning, if adopted, would introduce a rule the least to be endured; namely, that secrecy can justify an act. Besides, there would be reason to fear that people would be disappearing perpetually.

But before this plea of secrecy can be admitted, we ought to be satisfied respecting the following queries—

1. Whether the Scriptures do not teach us that the most secret actions will be brought to light.*

2. Whether such acts will not be the objects of future rewards and punishments.

3. Whether they will not, when brought to light, be treated, like other acts, by general rules.

75 Without general rules, what would be the effect of rewards and punishments? What does this argue ?

76 What circumstances have been thought a palliative in crime? What is the example?

77 What principle would result from this reasoning? What else would it lead to?

78 How do the Scriptures affect this argument? [The pupil should, in all examples like this, be able to recite the passage.]

79 Why will those acts be brought to light? How will they then be treated?

* Rom. xi. 16. 1 Cor. iv. 5.

CHAP. VIII.-ON GENERAL CONSEQUENCES.

It has been said that the general consequences of an act may be known, by considering what the consequences would be if it were generally committed. But to this it has been objected, that the guilt of one act cannot justly be charged with the accumulated guilt of many similar acts. We reply, that the reason for prohibiting the act, and the measure of its guilt, is in proportion to the mischief which would arise by the general allowance of actions of the same sort. Whatever is expedient, is right. But then its expediency must be seen in all its ramifications, direct and remote. By this habit of viewing the consequences of single acts, the intensity of crimes apparently insignificant is best seen, and the severity of laws, apparently inhuman, fully justified.

For instance; in coining or forgery, the particular mischief is the trifling loss of the sum to the person who received the counterfeit money or forged paper; the general mischief would be to abolish the use of money or of paper in

commerce.

In sheep or horse-stealing and burglary, the particular mischief is the loss of the sheep, or horse, or chattels, to its owner; the general mischief would be the insecurity of any property necessarily exposed.

In smuggling, the particular mischief is the trifling loss to the revenue from the duty unpaid; the general mischief would be the ruin of more honest traders in the same article who had paid the duty.

In a captive's breaking his parole, the particular evil is his escape; the general consequence of the act is the refusal of the indulgence of a parole to other captives.

Hence, in many cases, the punishment for two different commissions of a similar crime is the same, although the individual injury done be not the same. For the general con

80 How may we estimate the general consequences of an act?

81 What objection has been brought against this? How is it answered?

82 In what respect must an action be expedient?

83 What will this habit of viewing consequences lead to ?

84 Give the example in counterfeiting or forgery. In stealing, and in breaking into an uninhabited house. In smuggling. In parole breaking.

85 What principle in human laws does this explain?

sequences may be the same from any two acts that differ only in degree.

From the want of this distinction between a particular and a general consequence, the ancient moralists have been compelled to introduce a new rule of conduct, designated to prepon, or honestum; by which they meant a measure of right distinct from utility. While the principle of utile corresponded to their notions of rectitude, they went by it; but when that failed, they resorted to the other, honestum; and the only account they could give of the matter was, that acts similar to those detailed in chap. vi. might be useful; but as they were not also honesta, they were not to be deemed right.

There is a maxim in every body's mouth, and in most men's without meaning, "not to do evil, that good may come." The caution not to do a particular good through the violation of a general rule is salutary; for the good would seldom balance the evil. But strictly speaking, if good comes, evil cannot, except as we have shown in the preceding views of particular and general consequences. To this it may be added, that if an act produces little effect as regards the many, so will the punishment of such act be little as regards the quantity of general misery.

CHAP. IX.-OF RIGHT.

Right and obligation are reciprocal. Thus, if one man has a 66 right" to an estate, others are “ obliged" to yield it up; or if parents have a "right" to respect from their children, the children are obliged" to pay it.

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Now as moral obligation depends on the will of Godright," the reciprocal to it, must depend on it also, and means, therefore, "consistency with the will of God."

But if "right" be only the will of God, how can we conceive that his acts, which are merely a manifestation of such

86 What perplexity has been occasioned by the want of this distinction?

87 When was the rule of honestum brought in ?

88 How did they account for it?

89 What is said of the maxim, not to do evil that good may come ? 90 What reflection is added to these remarks?

91 What is said of right and obligation? Illustrate.

92 To what doctrine concerning right will this fact lead?

93 What question will this give rise to? How is it answered?

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will, can be "wrong?" The answer is, that from the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that his will is the measure of right,—we form in our minds certain rules of right and wrong, which we habitually apply to all acts, and finally even to those of the Deity himself; because at the time of the application we do not perceive that such rules are deduced from the Divine will itself.

Right is a quality of persons or of acts; of persons, as of a man who has a right to an estate, or of one who has not the right over his own life; of acts, as of a state which has a right to punish murder by death, or of one which has not the right to punish a debtor by imprisonment. In the latter case, the definition which we gave above can be substituted directly for the term "right;" as it is "right," or "consistent with the will of God," to punish murder with death. But when we speak of persons, the substitution is imperfect. Thus, in the expression, "a man has a right to an estate," we can only mean, "it is not inconsistent with the will of God" for such a man to have the estate in question.

CHAP. X.-THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

The rights, of persons are, 1. Natural or adventitious; II. Alienable or inalienable; III. Perfect or imperfect.

1. Natural rights are such as would belong to man not in a state of society; adventitious are such as belong to man in a state of society.

Natural rights are a man's right to life and liberty, to the use of his limbs and the produce of his labor, and to the enjoyment of air, light, and water; for if any number of men were cast together on a desert land, they would all be entitled to these rights.

Adventitious rights belong to a state of society which possesses the right to make any and all laws for the regulation of such society; none of which would exist in a newly inhabited island.

94 Of what is right a quality?

95 Explain it as a quality of persons. Of actions.

96 When the term right is a quality of acts, what phrase may we use instead of it?

97 How must the phrase be varied when speaking of the rights of persons?

98 Of how many classes are the rights of persons?

99 What is the difference between natural and adventitious rights? 100 Give a few examples of natural rights. Of adventitious rights.

But how can adventitious rights be created by man, if right itself depends only on the will of God? This question may be answered by appealing to the principle, that God wills the happiness of mankind. Consequently, acts, which lead to happiness in a social state, are right, although, as they do not produce the same effect in a state not social, they would, out of civil society, be wrong.

Hence, adventitious rights, made by men, are not less sacred than natural rights, ordained by God; for both rest on the same foundation,-the will of the Creator. Hence, it would be no less sinful than it is illegal, to dispossess a man by violence of an estate for which he can show as a title the right of law; although he cannot, as the twelve tribes could do, assert his claim to it as a gift from God.

II. Rights are alienable or inalienable; i. e. can or cannot be transferred from one person to another.

The right possessed over things is alienable; over persons, inalienable. A man may transfer his cattle, for instance, to another, but not his wife. Thus, too, he may transfer his right to his own liberty, but not his right over the liberty of other persons.

III. Rights are perfect or imperfect.

Perfect rights can be asserted by personal force, or the force of law; imperfect cannot. For instance, a man may resist, by personal force or by the law, violence done in his own person, or in the destruction of his house; and can compel by law the restitution of an estate, or of portable goods, injuriously taken from him. On the other hand, imperfect rights cannot be enforced. For instance, a poor man has a right to relief; yet if it be refused, he must not extort it. Children have a right to affection and care from their parents, and parents from their children; yet if the rights be withheld on either side, they cannot be recovered compulsorily.

But it may be asked, how can a person have a right to a thing, and yet want the right to use means to obtain it?

101 What question naturally arises concerning adventitious rights? How is it answered?

102 What authority does this answer confer upon adventitious rights? 103 Give an example.

104 What is the difference between alienable and unalienable rights? 105 Give an example of their application.

106 What is the difference between perfect and imperfect rights? 107 Give an example of perfect rights. 108 Of imperfect rights, 109 What difficulty attends the doctrine of imperfect rights?