is, that they are true, and that our senses convince us of their actual being and presence.. Why do we conclude that light and heat proceed from the sun? Not, surely, on account of any intimate know'e ige we suppose ourselves possessed of as to the constituent particles of that body, but simply because we always, in every instance, perceive them to accompany his presence. If indeed the fact had never occurred, we might then have never suspected, nay even have actually denied its possibility; for (the emission of light and heat not having, in that case, entered into our definition of matter, of which the body of the sun is supposed to be composed) we should have been led to pronounce the thing naturally and physically impossible. With the fact, however, daily and hourly before our eyes, where shall we find the man hardy enough to doubt, or to deny it upon any such principles? Matter, then, we find endowed with numerous and even apparently opposite qualities, which are only ascertainable by experience, but which, when known, and actually found in nature, it would be ab surd to doubt of, or to call impossible.

We shall now, as more immediately connected with the subject under consideration, proceed to shew, upon similar principles, the various forms, or modes of existence, of which matter is susceptible, or rather of which we actually find it susceptible in the world which we inhabit. It may indeed be capable of others to an almost inexhaustible extent, but of these we can know nothing; whilst, at the same time, we may rest fully assured, that it necessarily must be capable of producing those, which, in the scenes around us, are actually the objects of our senses and our observation.

The first and apparently least perfect state of organization, under which we find matter, is in inanimate substances, such, as for instance, a clod of earth, or a block of marble; in this state we find it possessed of three remarkable and distinctive properties, viz. those of extension, or continuity of parts; attraction, or power of drawing other bodies; repulsion, or capacity of repelling them; all these we severally learn by the evidence of our senses, when we feel along, when we let drop, or when we strike against any object.

Matter in its next stage, which is that of vegetation, we find possessed of the several other powers of expansion, or change of form, as from the germ to the flower or tree; of growth, or visible distension of parts; of production, as in the cases of leaves, blossoms, fruit, &c.; and of propaga, tion, through the means of seed, by which, in regular suc cession, its likeness is continued on the earth..

In a yet more perfect stage of organization, that of the animal world, we find matter endowed with the additional powers of motion, or capacity of removing itself from one place to another; of sensation, or susceptibility of being impressed by external objects, and capability of enduring pleasure and pain; of memory, of reflection, of judgment, together with many other mental faculties, by means of which a capacity for action, and a consciousness of identity, are created and made to exist in the individual, which continues as long as that configuration of body, actually constituting it what it is, remains entire and unaffected.

In the last and most perfect stage of organization of which matter appears to be capable, which is that of the human species, we find all the powers and faculties of body and of mind, exemplified in the preceding stage, more fully developed, and capable of more enlarged and extensive application; in consequence of which many additional properties and qualities, of a very valuable and remarkable description, are elicited, rendering the material creature man the most perfect specimen of the workmanship of his great Creator, with which we are acquainted here below.Such, for example, are the faculties of speech, by which he is enabled to communicate his ideas to others; of abstraction, by which he generalizes those ideas, and first gains, among other things, the notion of a common Creator, the axioms of science, and the precepts of morality; and lastly, reason, which enables him to judge rightly, and to draw just and correct conclusions as to himself, and the relations in which he stands to other beings.

To sum up the whole of what has been said on this part of the subject, it appears then that matter, in its solid state, is evidently susceptible of four several forms or modes of existence; viz. those of inanimate substances, of vegetables, of animals, and of man; the two latter of which indeed would appear to merge into each other; and, under these forms, it would appear possessed, according to their respective spe cies of organization, of the several distinctive properties (as above explained,) of extension, attraction, repulsion, expan sion, growth, production, propagation, motion, sensation, memory, reflection, judgment, together with the many other mental faculties discoverable in animals, speech, abstraction, and reason,

These, then, among perhaps innumerable others not here recounted, or with which we are unacquainted, these all are evidently and all are equally powers and properties of matter; evidently so, because we have the information of our

senses that they all exist in matter, and because we have never found any of them to exist independent of matter; equally so, because we have the same sort of evidence (and that too all the evidence of which the cases are susceptible) in the favour of any one as of any other of those properties, of the last as of the first of them; which is, in a word, simply this, and no other not that, in any one of the instances, we ourselves conclude it reasonable that matter should have those properties, but because in all the instances we find it actually and visibly possessed of them. Why, let it be asked, do we conclude that mat ter is possessed of extension? Simply, because when we stretch our hands across a table, we find that it consists of a connected continuity of parts. Why do we conclude matter susceptible of growth and expansion? Because, if we sow a small seed, or plant a shrub, we see it in the course of a few years grow and expand itself into a tree. Why capable of motion? Because we daily see animals of every description walking, flying, and moving around us. Lastly, why do we conclude matter capable of the possession of reasoning powers? The answer here is similar, because we ourselves, who evidently are material creatures, are ac tually endowed with reason. Matter, then, evidently has those properties, or, at least, it has a susceptibility, by means of a peculiar organization of its parts, of becoming possessed of them.

Every definition of matter, therefore, which does not include all those properties, is an imperfect definition, and must necessarily lead those who receive and argue upon it into error. Thus, for instance, it was once held, that matter was, in its essence and its nature, so absolutely dull and inactive, that nothing short of the actual impulse of another body could move it in the first instance, or afterwards direct and circumscribe its course. Subsequent experience has, however, shewn us, that iron and other substances may be put in motion, and that even those immense bodies the planets, are actually kept within their orbits, without the operation of any such immediate contact.

It is not, as in the present advanced state of science we now plainly see, it is not, that these things are, therefore, the more strange, or untrue, or supernatural; the error was not in nature, but in our own opinions, and it consisted in an omission of the properties of attraction and repulsion from our definition of matter. Similar to this would appear to be the error of the immaterialist, who, first describing matter as being senseless, impenetrable, and inactive,

therefore conclude that the impulse and the interference of another being is necessary to give it life, and rouse it into action; but looking only to facts, let us ask whether we do. not actually see things, such as trees, animals, &c. possessed of life, and capable of action, without the assistance of any such interference? The conclusion, therefore, here, as in the former instance, naturally follows, not that those things are the more strange, or untrue, or unnatural, but that that definition of matter, by which it has been rendered incapable of possessing such life, and of performing such actions, was in fact im perfect, insufficient, and erroneous.

To illustrate the assertion that we can have no knowledge, either affirmative or negative, as to the properties of matter, but from actual experience, we may observe, that it is now the property of clay and of marble to be inanimate, still, and inactive; but had we, on the contrary, always been accustomed to see them rise, and walk about, and converse with each other, should we not, with the fact, (by the provision of the Deity, and as an every-day occurrence, before our eyes) should we not have been equally warranted in concluding that thus to act was as much their nature then, as, under other cir cumstances, it is to do the contrary at present? And if this conclusion be a fair one, as applied to mere shapeless lumps of clay, and unhewn blocks of marble, with how much grea. ter force does it not apply to creatures whose bodies have been evidently and expressly constituted by means of ingenious and highly complicated machinery, for the actual execution of these very purposes?

We have not indeed in this essay at all entered into a description or explanations, of the mechanism of man; it might however, and frequently has been shewn that all his individual sensations, his ideas, and his actions, may be traced to his material organs and visible configuration, and be account ed for, that is, as far as we can account for any of the works of nature, by their unaided effects and operations. The singular fact, that sensation should be the result of a peculiar species of organization does indeed appear inexplicable; but then it is a fact: of that experience and observation assure us; and, when that is actually the case, what have we further to do than to believe, and to adore? That the brain should be endowed with the power of retaining and recalling im pressions is also wonderful; but is it more so than that the eye or the ear should be capable in the first instance of receiving them? What indeed is there which is not wonderfull; what is there which is not inexplicable; what is there which, not existing, we should not reject as impossible, and

deem unworthy of our credit? Nothing short of universal scepticism can be the result of our persisting in a disbelief of facts, merely because we cannot understand their causes and operations; for the original wonder after all is, not that such and such a system of material organization should constitute a human being, but that human beings should exist at all in the first instance; and it is, in fact, to explain this and other such-like wonders-to solve such difficulties, and reconcile such apparent impossibilities-it is for these purposes, and for none other, that we are compelled to believe in the existence and the attributes of a God; remove them without such interference, and immediately the difficulty ceases, the riddle at once is solved, and atheism ceases to be either a folly or a crime.

CLERICAL ELECTIONEERING.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

46

HA APPENING to pass through Bilston a few days since, I was surprized to find the whole town in confusiongentlemen with black coats, and poor men with black faces, all seemingly employed in some very urgent business. Inquiring what could be the cause of such an uproar, I was informed, they were a-going to vote for a Parson;" but wishing to procure further intelligence, I asked one of a crowd, all of whom had blue ribbons in their hats (they were standing at the door of an ale-house, contending with each other for shares of a large jug of ale, which I could now and then catch a glimpse of amidst the thirsty multitude,) who informed me half a dozen candidates had offered themselves to fill the sacred office, then vacant about two hours by the death of the Rev. John Best, Prebendary of the Collegiate Church, Wolverhampton, Vicar of Sedgley, and Curate of Bilston; and so anxious were the reverend gentlemen that the vineyard should not remain untilled for 'want of a husbandman, that they had actually commenced their electioneering operations six months ago.

I sincerely congratulate them upon the consistency with which they may exhort their flock to keep themselves pure and unspotted from the world;" upon the eloquence they may display in denouncing undue influence, bribery, and corruption; and upon the high probability of their living the worthy representatives of the pure and holy founder of our faith. I would advise the successful candi