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impossibility is obvious to every man who will freely exercise his reason." Now this I should have supposed alto.. gether unnecessary, had W. I. but read Mr. Burdon's letter (vol. ii. p. 277) where he has certainly assigned a reason, which, if true, absolutely destroys the possibility of a miracle or revelation, and on a ground which must be obvious to every man who admits the fact. It is very concise and simple; the substance of it is, that there is no God; for referring to the argument of a Deist against miracles, he says, "as a Deist however his objections are not wholly unanswerable, because they who allow the existence of un omnipotent creator, cannot consistently deny his power to reverse or alter the laws of nature. It is only on the supposition that those laws are fixed and unalterable, that it is possible to repel the objections of the Christian." Here then Mr. Burdon denies the possibility of a miracle, on the ground that there is no God existing to perform one; and if his assertion is true, I readily give up the contest-but if there is no God, I ask Mr. B. what he means by the fixed and unalterable laws of nature? who gave it those laws? who first arranged and ordered them? But Mr. Burdon is, as I have before described him, a Deist, or an Atheist, as it suits his pur pose-a camelion, whose real colour and character is continually shifting; for after he has tried all the shuffling of a Deist, and finds it will not answer his purpose, he turns round, and says, ah! Sir, all you say may be very possible, if there is a God (vol. ii. p. 255); "but before we talk of revelation, we must first understand the nature of God—we must have clear ideas of that metaphysical being whom we have been accustomed to consider as the author of nature, and consequently as the author of revelation, The gen tleman, in what he calls the Evidences of Christianity, has hitherto combated only the Deists; he must however go deeper, if he means to search the question to the bottomhe must prove the existence of a God, before he can prove the divine origin of Christianity."

Now, Sir, if Mr. Burdon had been a Deist, under which character he has appeared to write, and in which light I wasaccustomed to view him, it would have been as much his business to proye the existence of a God as the Christian; but if he is, as he now declares himself to be, an Atheist, as such he must be treated, though your Prospectus never proposed any thing so preposterous as to open its pages to men blind and mad called Atheists. But I cannot help regretting that Mr. Burdon should have troubled you or himselfin writ ing so much against the evidences of revealed religion, when

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a few words would have sufficed- "there is no God." It was expressly to Deists Christophilus addressed all his arguments; it was particularly stated by him, that on the ground which a Deist reasoned with an Atheist, so he would reason with the Deist. What then had Mr. Burdon to do with the controversy, but to state, when he found he was mistaken for a Deist, and called upon to answer as such, that being an Atheist, and consequently denying the ground on which Christophilus rested his argument, he was not concerned in, the question but this would have been too great a stretch of honesty for him; he therefore goes on as if he believed in a God, till finding with such an admission he could do nothing against Christianity, he cuts the gordian knot, by say ing (first) there is no omnipotent creator of all things, and (next) by calling upon Christians to shew him the nature of God, and also to prove his existence. This is rather an Irish way of stating the argument; he ought to have called for a proof of his existence first; then and not till then would his nature become a question, as it would be a folly to reason on the nature of a being who did not exist.

But let us examine this assertion, that "before we talk of revelation we must first understand the nature of God." In the book of Job a question is proposed, “who can by searching find out God, or know the Almighty to perfection ?" and the philosophers, in all ages, who have believed in such a being, have acknowledged it to be beyond their comprehension. How is it then that Mr. Burdon calls upon Christophilus to solve this question, which men, who, in the opinion of Mr. Burdon, were possessed of so much greater knowledge than Christians, have said is unanswerable. But, Sir, I demur to Mr. Burdon's remark; that before " we talk of revelation we must first understand the nature of God," because it is contrary to every principle of philosophy and the circumscribed powers of man.

There are many things that I and Mr. Burdon believe and talk about, the existence of which we can prove, though we do not understand their nature. Mr. Burdon no doubt believes either that space is infinite, or bounded ; ‚if infinite, what does he know, or how can he describe its nature? if bounded, what is the nature of those bounds? He believes that this world exists, that it forms but a small part of the universe, and that it has fixed and unalterable laws. Does he know how it came into existence, the nature of that existence, and the origin and nature of the laws by which it is governed? He believes that matter is either eternal, or that it had a beginning; if eternal, does he know the nature

of that eternity? or if it had a beginning, does he know the nature of that beginning? He believes the sun, the moon, and stars, exist; does he exactly know their nature? He probably believes the planets are inhabited; does he know the nature of them, or their inhabitants? He knows the needle is attracted by the loadstone; does be know the nature of the magnetic power? or, if he does not know the nature of these things, does he therefore deny their exist ence? Would he say, before we talk of them, we must first understand their metaphysical nature? Will he say, that be fore he believed in their existence, or talked about them, he first enquired into their nature and understood it? I will answer for him that he did not; for I am not disposed to flatter him with the idea, that he has either talent or means superior to other men; and I have always understood, that instead of first finding out the cause, and thereby tracing the effect, the greatest philosophers have been obliged, and have laid it down as the best means of attaining knowledge, to observe the effect, and by tracing it up to its cause, seek the information they wanted. This, upon all other occasions, Mr. Burdon will readily admit, and it is from this source that he and every person who believes the facts before stated. must have gained their knowledge. It was upon this principle that Newton made his vast discoveries.

Now, Sir, not possessing supernatural powers, nor being ashamed to follow the path in which Newton trod, I shall venture to talk of revelation; the effect, (though I cannot understand the nature of God); the cause of this effect, as it must be clear to every man who is not an ideot or a madman; that if the great, the wise, the learned, the disinterested, Mr. Burdon, is obliged to believe and to talk about many things so infinitely below an omnipotent first cause, before he understands their nature, that I, who am but a simple, plain, unlettered man, may be at liberty, notwithstanding the ipse dixit of Mr. Burdon, to talk about revelation, before I under. stand the nature of God! But, Sir, although I have clearly shewn that we may believe many things, of whose precise nature we are ignorant, let me observe there is a wide dif ference betwixt believing in the existence of a thing and the metaphysical nature of that thing. Of this the learned Mr. Burdon can give you a thousand instances: one at present strikes me. My pen follows on this paper the ideas formed in my mind; now, do you believe, Sir, that I have not sense sufficient, even with the aid of a Locke, a Hartley, or a Darwin, to know precisely the connexion between my brain and the pen? yet I really do believe there must be some con

nexion-there must be a cause, or I could not write. Perhaps Mr. Burdon will laugh at my ignorance, and, shrugging up his shoulders, and shaking his learned head, will exclaim, fool that you are to write; before you attempt to write, you ought first to understand the nature of this connexion. Why then, Sir, it follows that I must not avail myself of any knowledge, according to the creed of this credulous man, however necessary or valuable, till I know the nature, not only of the thing itself, but also the nature of its cause!

Oh how unhappy must be the situation of one not acquainted with the nature of things! The man who does not understand the metaphysical nature of food must not ́eat; or of medicine, must not have medical aid. As to electricity and electric fluids, so far from being benefited by them, he must not even talk about them, till he understands their metaphysical nature. Pray, Mr. Burdon, do deliver the world from this dilemma, by writing a book, explaining the nature of every thing we may use or talk about, that we may not be starved to death, or doomed to eternal silence.

Having shewn that we are all obliged to talk about and believe many things, of which we cannot understand their metaphysical nature (by reason of our limited powers, and that the only true method of gaining knowledge is by tracing effects to their causes), I hope I may be allowed to talk of Christianity though I have confessed that I believe in the existence of a God, but do not understand his metaphysical nature. It was upon this principle Christophilus reasoned; and if his arguments are well founded, and Atheists or Deists are incapable of answering those arguments in favour of revealed religion, by producing adequate causes (mark, he does not ask them first to understand their metaphysical nature before they talk about them) for the facts and effects adduced by him, he proves the existence of a God at the same time that he proves the truth of revealed religion; for if these facts and effects can alone be traced to an "omnipotent creator," it must prove to a certainty the existence of such a being; and if no other adequate cause can account for or could produce those facts and effects, connected with revealed religion, which Christophilus has cited, but an "omnipotent creator," then the Christian religion must be true, the existence of such a being is placed beyond all dispute, and Mr. Burdon is refuted either as Atheist or Deist.

Now, Sir, though it was never your intention to enter into a controversy with Atheists, yet as Mr. Burdon is an old Cor

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respondent, and has now thrown off the mask, by declaring himself an Atheist; and as he has given us data to reason from, allow me to address a few observations to him as such. He says (vol. ii. p. 277) "It is only on the supposition that those laws (the laws of nature) are fixed and unalterable, that it is possible to repel the objections of Christians" Now as he says there is no omnipotent creator, he being a philosopher who cannot admit of an effect without a cause, and I being an unlearned man, who have been taught to seek for adequate causes, would be much obliged if he would account to me for some of those effects I behold, and which I am ignorant enough to trace to an omnipotent first cause. A first cause he no doubt will admit, though not an omnipotent one" (because no effect can exist without a cause). I only ask him for the adequate cause. I do not require he should understand the nature of the cause, before he talks about it-all I want, I repeat it, that he may not mistake me, is an adequate cause -that will satisfy me, especially if backed by his learned authority. All the privilege I reserve to myself is, that I may demur if it does not appear to me adequate to produce the effect; and I also insist upon it as a preliminary that where Mr. Burdon cannot assign the adequate cause he will confess his ignorance, and allow the possibility of there being causes which he does not understand. If he will but stick to the point, we shall be sure to come to a right understanding. No doubt can exist but the man who insists upon understanding the metaphysical nature of a thing, before you talk about it, must be fully competent to assign a cause for every thing that he believes to exist, when he denies the exist ence of an omnipotent cause, or be would not be justified in rejecting it. I therefore beg leave to ask him for an adequate cause to the following effects:- 1st. I behold the world we inhabit wonderfully arranged and governed by "fixed and unalterable laws.". Will Mr. Burdon assign to me an adequate cause for its existence, and for such "fixed and unalterable laws?"-2nd. I find that matter is invariably the same in its effects; that it produces no new trees, new animals, new fish, or any thing now which it did not produce some centuries ago. If matter ever had the property of forming these things, I ask why it does not produce them now as well as in its origin? I dare say Buona. parte would be glad to see it form a navy spontaneously in one of its delightful vagaries. But Mr. Burdon may say, that matter is eternal; it has neither beginning nor end; but as it is a principle of philosophy, that nothing can exist

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