to the operation of his desires, his wishes, and his appetites; shewing that as they always originate in these, they must therefore necessarily be subservient to them; let us now enquire whether those desires, those wishes, and those appetites themselves, are free, or in what respect it would be improper to apply to them that epithet. In the first place, we ask then, as before, what are the immediate causes of their existence, and by what means are they produced and called into being? Now that they invariably arise either from the general or peculiar construction of the mind and body of the individual who entertains them, is evident; and that they are called forth and excited into action by the situation and circumstances in which he happens to be placed, would appear to be equally so. Independent, therefore, of these they cannot be; but, having once resulted from their influence, they are (no extraneous or external impediment presenting itself) free to work their full due and effect in influencing the subsequent and more advanced operations of the mind, Constitution and circumstances then, it appears, acting upon the mind, and the bodily frame of man, produce in him desires, wishes, appetites; those desires, wishes, and appetites, cause him to will, or determine their gratification, and that will or determination is necessarily productive of action. As long as this chain of causes and effects is regularly preserved, and continues connected, so long does man stand possessed of the greatest degree of freedom of which his nature is susceptible; and he can, in fact, only be said to be deprived of liberty when, through the intervention of some foreign or external cause, either his desires do not naturally flow from the circumstances in which he is placed, or his will is not regularly prompted by those desires, or (which is the most common, as well as most apparent defect of liberty), his actions are prevented from duly following the determinations of his will. It is to no purpose to say that this very process is in itselfa degree of slavery-it may indeed be such; but we should at the same time remember, that is through the medium of this process, we receive the blessings of existence and perception; this being, in fact, the very te nure by which, and which alone, we hold of our great Lord and Master, the power and privilege to live, and move, and have our being. Remove it, and you render the mind of man fit for the mad-house, and his body for the grave, To establish this point, however, with the greater cer-. tainty, let us more fully enquire into the consequences resulting from the necessary connection between the various processes of the mind, and into the supposed advantages or disadvantages arising therefrom. And first, let us ask, whether it were better that man should be thus unavoid. ably induced to desire, to will, and to act, at the very mo ment, and in the exact mode, that such processes are actually necessary for his safety and happiness, or that he should be left perfectly at liberty to make his own election, uninfluenced by the invariable dictates of disposition, and undirected by the resistless controul of circumstances? Hap pily for us (the only end of whose existence is the possession of enjoyment and the attainment of happiness) the latter of these modes of being is in its own nature contradictory and absurd, as it in fact imagines effects to exist without a cause; for how can either desires, or actions, or will exist, without something to produce them? and by whatever things they are produced, to them, whatever they may be, whether existing externally in the circumstances of the case, or internally in the mind of the individual, must the desires, the actions, and the will of man, necessarily, and in the very nature of things, be submissive and obedient. By those, however, who (self-evident as it may appear) deny the force of this representation, the question has been frequently put in this shape. "When a man (they say) is so circumstanced, as to have his choice among several dif ferent modes of conduct, is he not in the first place evident ly free to determine on which he pleases, and afterwards at liberty, as far as his limited powers will allow, to pursue the proper means for the accomplishment of that determina tion? To this we answer indeed that he is so, but must at the same time accompany our affirmative by the following observations first, that to resolve on what we please does not, as is commonly supposed, imply an absolute and unconstrained freedom of choice, but on the contrary, the mere power of doing that only which pleases us, or, in other words, the liberty of following the dictates of our own na ture and disposition, which we have already shewn to be the utmost extent of freedom, that created and imperfect beings can enjoy. Secondly, as to choice, we see indeed various individuals, under similar circumstances, resolve or choose differently, and we therefore conclude, that the same individual might possibly have done so likewise; but this is not the case, for under the same frame of mind we must necessarily always have acted in a similar manner : and mankind only differ from each other, as we so often differ from ourselves, because their dispositions are changeable, various, and dissimilar. Thirdly, it is here allowed, as indeed it always must be allowed, that man is only capable of acting as far as his limited powers will allow. But why should we not be consistent, and if we must acknowledge him imperfect, submit alike to all the limitations and inperfections of his nature, as well mental as bodily? or if we must indeed consider it as a want of internal freedom, that he should be incapable of resolving and acting independent of his sensations and appetites, why may we not be allowed to exclaim against it, as an equal want of external freedom, that he is not at liberty to visit the moon, or cannot at plea sure transport himself to the Antipodes? No, it is said, this he evidently has not the powers to do; neither, we reply, has he the faculties to do the other. The same may be applied to those, who, contending for the unrestrained liberty of man, deprecate all idea of their dependence upon the external circumstances in which he happens to be placed. Let them however produce one single individual who is not evidently, and avowedly, the very slave and creature of those circumstances, and we will willingly and immediately concede the point. But this they cannot do, for the thing does not actually exist in, nature, What is it we can see? that only which is directly visible to our eyes. What is it we can learn? that alone which is immediately presented to our understandings. We would walk, but lameness, or the walls of a prison prevent us; we would converse with our friends, but distance, or the stormy ocean separates us from their society. Of what avail then would be to man the much-talked-of freedom of his mind, when his actions would still remain thus circumscribed, and when there probably is not a single process in nature, or an individual phenomenon in creation, which is not continually and effectually pursuing an active and necessary operation upon his conduct; producing, inciting, moulding, modifying, correcting, and opposing every wish of his, heart, every desire of his soul, every intention of mind, and every the minutest motion of his bodily frame ? Thus, it is not passion merely, or the unmixed force of constitution, but time, place, temptation, leisure, acquaintance, opportunity, that mark the bounds of his excess; nor is it reason only, or the unbiassed dictates of his will, whether free or otherwiso, that circumscribes his conduct, and chalks out the progress of his steps through life, for that is equally performed by the seasons and the elements, by winds and by rain, by the air, by the earth, by the sea, by the force of gravity, by the power of attraction, by the progress of the distant comet, and the revolution of planets round other suns. How numerous are the chains then, by which man is bound to the triumphal car of his Maker! and can he indeed by unbinding the minute but strong one, whose links preserve, as it were, the continuity of mental operations, can he there by hope to achieve his perfect freedom, to escape from the dominion of his master, or to have a will and a determination independent of that master's influence, and entirely his own? The earth that binds the soles of his feet, would arrest his progress, and the mountainous barriers of his prison would hoot at, and laugh him back with scorn. Let then the fanciful (we had almost said the impious) defenders of a visionary liberty in the human mind, and a false though apparent freedom in human actions, indulge their wild opinions, and enlarge on their unfounded notions at their pleasure; for ourselves, the willing vassals of Deity, obedient servants at once to the person and the will of our Creator, we will equally and openly acknowledge our submission to the moral as to the physical laws of our nature, and humbly, nay even gratefully rest contented with that degree of liberty alone, in which he has actually been pleased to make us free! ON THE CRUELTY OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine. SIR, THE barbarous cruelty of the children of Israel has been a favourite theme with unbelievers of all ages. Among other passages have been adduced the following, which indeed would appear to stand foremost in their rank of crimes-" And David brought forth the people out of the city, and put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron; and he made them pass through the brick-kilns, and thus did he unto all the cities of the children of Ammon"-(2 Sam. xii. 31.) The book of Chronicles also, according to the common translation, says that "he cut them with saws, and with harrows of iron, and with axes." An ingenious commentator has however suggested, that this actually means no more than that they employed their captives in agricultural labours, and in the manufac ture of bricks. If indeed death by means of torture were the object, why pitch upon methods all of which are capable of a double construction? Saws, and harrows, and axes, and brick-kilns? This surely could not have been wholly accidental. The original is said fully to bear out this interpretation, and thus vanishes this objection as compleatly as the more trifling one of Joshua's pulling off his shoes, which produced so triumphant a sneer from the pen of Mr. Paine he happened not to know that this is the almost universal mode of salutation in the east. I am, &c. : DELTA.. STRICTURES ON THE FREETHINKING CHRISTIANS. To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine. IN SIR, N your last number an observation is made by your very able and intelligent correspondent Zeta, which, as it is peculiarly applicable to my subject, and cannot be repeated too often, I beg leave to present to the notice of your readers. "It is remarkable, or rather it is not at all to be wondered at, that every little knot or cluster of men, into which the innumerable tribes of mankind are scantled out, should cherish the fond persuasion, that rectitude of opinion belongs exclusively to itself, and that truth, and reason, and goodness, are unquestionably confined within the narrow precincts of its own contemptible society: indulging at the same time, the no less vain and arrogant expectation, that all the dwellers on earth will, at a period which is fast approaching, joyfully adopt its views and sentiments, whilst they cast indignantly their former opinions to the moles and to the bats,"" 6 It is necessary, when examining a controverted point, to look with a calm and unprejudiced eye on the arguments adduced by both parties; and for the short time I have bad the pleasure of attending your society, I must say the subjects have been, generally speaking, treated in an enlightened and philosophic manner; and therefore I was the more surprised on Sunday last, when a gentleman at the Crescent noticed a deistical work lately published by Mr. Eaton : but this surprise was not confined to myself, for it was openly expressed by several persons when the business of the morning was over. The gentleman to whom I allude, is worthy of admiration for his talents and exertions in the cause of truth; but on this occasion, he manifested such an |