will fit him for a happy eternity; it will give him a source of felicity that nothing can destroy. He will then smile at the threats and menaces of the world, its temptations he will despise, and its pleasures will pass by him like the idle wind. I closed my last, Mr. Editor, with some remarks on Conceit; but more may yet be said concerning this powerful enemy of the human mind. Conceit appears to have its origin in ignorance, for the most ignorant are.generally the most conceited; they who have the least knowledge think they have the most. It seems strange that any man should make such a conclusion as this, but if we examine the more. ments of the mind that lead to it, we shall find it very natu ral. The ignorant man is so little acquainted with any objeet in nature besides himself, that almost all the ideas he possesses are such as immediately relate to himself. Did he know the immensity of creation, he would see his own insignificancy; did he know the superiority of the wisdom of God, he would be sensible of his own ignorance: but of these he knows nothing. The consequence is, that his own wisdom appears to him to be the best, and the largest world he knows of is the ground on which he daily treads, To clear away this opiniative pride from such a mind, and to set it in the right road for acquiring knowledge and wisdom, is perhaps the most difficult task that instruction could undertake; for strong conceit closes up all the ave nues to the understanding, and sets obstinacy as a sentinel to give the alarm when any thing in the shape of information shall approach. There is often much difficulty in teaching those who are desirous of learning; but to convey instruction to the mind that conceit hath walled round like the city of Troy-to a mind that will not be informed, is almost, if not quite, beyond the best efforts of any man. He, there fore, who encourages it, hath no hope of improvement; for his enemies will not assist him, and his best friends cannot. Although Conceit is founded in ignorance, yet it is not confined to those who are compleatly so, it is often the companion of talent and learning; and here its effects are most to be regretted. A wise man smiles at the conceit of a compleat ignoramus-from him he looks for nothing else; but when he finds it associated with talent, and an understanding by no means destitute of information, he feels the shaft of disappointment, for from such a man he expected better things; and yet how often are these qualities blended together! Where is the man who hath not his conceits? where is he who is not ignorant on some point which he fancies he knows? and would not he who has vanity enough to declare himself an exception to the general rule, at once prove his conceit by his very assertion? Since then every man hath his conceits more or less, it well becomes bim who would advance in wisdom to keep a watchful eye over it, lest it should gain ground upon him; to be careful how he advances his opinion in opposition to another, and when he has advanced it, not to be too positive in its support. When I see a man very positive, I always suspect him to be on the weak side; for argument never wants crutches only when it is lame. He who advances his opinion deliberately, and pushes it forward no faster than as truth clears the road; reserves to himself a safe and easy retreat, in case of necessity; but if he lays it down as absolutely correct, before his auditors can see that it is so, he begins where he should end. While he is defending and proving his point, they are wondering what he is about; and when he has done he looks like a madman, pointing at something which nobody but himself can see. He who is desirous of gaining wisdom will avoid this-he will remember that the force of argument lies not in vehement expression or dogmatical assertion, but in perspicuous reasoning; and as the human mind is not omnipresent, if he claims much of its attention towards sound and action, there can be but little left to listen to his reason. To determine whether a man very conceited, we need only observe his mode of arguing. He who is in pursuit of truth, is always more ready to examine the solidity of his opponent's opinions than to put forth his own; because he already knows the strength of his own sentiment on the subject: but a conceited man is so fully occupied in displaying his own notions, that he pays no attention to the objections that are brought against them; and whether they are strong or weak is all the same to him-truth is not his object, but rather the support of of his own opinions, and therefore, like a wily general, he first defends himself, and then attends to the movements of his enemy, only to thwart them. These men have tied themselves to the stake of conceit, and if they cannot make a larger circle than their cordage will admit, they have surely no reason to complain. is False shame is also another enemy to wisdom. I have known men whose dispositions have been excellent, and who in point of ability were inferior to none; and yet they would sometimes so bewilder a simple proposition, that a plain by-stander would actually think they were crazy: and all this for what? why, because they had advanced an opinjon which happened to be wrong, but were afraid to ac knowledge it to be so, lest it should lessen them in the esteem of those whom they valued. This is false shame, originating in false fears. Now as it regards the shame of the thing, wrong notions are no disgrace to a man, when he has no disposition to favor them. The wisest man in the world has some wrong notions, and no man has corrected more of them than he who is the best informed. The road to perfection lies through the correction of error, and wisdom is the offspring of experience. Experience is progressive, and consequently the first step cannot be so perfect as the last; wrong notions a man must necessarily have, and whatever is necessary to our being cannot be disgraceful; but a disposition to favor and support them is not necessary: on the contrary, a man's constant desire should be to correct them, and if he cherishes a wrong disposition, then indeed he may be ashamed, for it is truly disgraceful to do that which we ought not to do. But then the shame is not in having wrong notions, but in supporting them when they are wrong; and yet the only thing that merits shame in this instance is the very thing we are not ashamed of. O! the weakness and folly of man! The fear of offending his friends, or being lessened in their esteem, is equally fallacious; for a man cannot please his friends better, or do them greater honour, than by suf fering them to set him right when he is wrong. This is the province of friendship; every friend claims it as a right; and he who allows his friend the full exercise of this right, gives him that confidence and attention which he deserves. But if a man, when he has stept into the maze of error, madly pushes forward, regardless of the entreaty or remon strance of his friend, then indeed he gives a just cause for offence; for he disregards the advice of his friend, and makes it appear that he is not worthy of attention: and there is not, in the catalogue of human frailties, a keener dagger for friendship than slight and contemptuous treatment. It is here that a man lessens himself in the eyes of his friends, and finally loses their esteem; not in possessing or advancing an errone ous opinion, for that every one must do over and over again, before he can be generally correct, but in supporting it through thick and thin, without listening to the opposite sentiments of his friend, or hardly allowing the possibility. that he himself can be wrong. Such a man as this nobody likes, neither friend nor enemy; but with the opposite character every one is pleased-so much so, that I am satisfied if in the course of conversation one of the party happens to drop an erroneous sentiment, and on being corrected by another he frankly and obligingly acknowledges the correc tion, such a man will leave more favorable impressions on the mind of his audience than those who have been uniformly correct in their opinions; for these manifest correct judgments only, but he displays a something far more pleasing than a correct judgment-an amiable disposition. : Let, those, therefore, who would advance in wisdom banish false shame and false fear; truth is at all times honorable; it is error, voluntary error only that is disgraceful and if this does not uniformly meet with rebuke, it is not because it is not merited, but because mankind are not sufficiently enlightened and virtuous to give it. And here I cannot refrain from reminding those on whom the education of children devolves, how necessary it is to get them into the early habit of ready and ingenuous acknowledgment of error; it will save them many a stumble in their future progress towards knowledge, and will gain them many a smile of approbation where they would otherwise meet the frown of displeasure. Every possible means should be used to encourage children to acknowledge their faults. When a child has committed an error, and with some reluctance has avowed it, parents or tutors are too apt to pass but a slight encomium on the latter act, and still continue their reproof for the fault. By these means, the child, it is true, may save itself a foolish whipping; but the pleasures it receives from the faint approval of acknowledgment are lost in the painful sensations of rebuke. This I conceive to be bad management. The moment confession is made on the part of the child, all rebuke should immediately cease, encomiums should be passed on the excellence of the disposition, and rewards given for its encouragement; and if it be necessary to enter into a serious discussion of the fault, it were better to do it at some other time, when the feelings are calm, and when the pleasures of approval, as far as it regards the confession, have been fully received; for by attempting too much at once we often fail in doing any thing. These remarks will, in some degree, apply to men as well as to children; if we would correct this false shame in others, we must hold up to their view the beauties of an ingenuous disposition, and encourage them to make it their own; not indeed as we would children, by giving the man an apple or a cake, nor by such inducements the object of which every one may plainly see, for "Men must be taught as if you taught them not, TIMOTHEUS. OBSERVATIONS ON THE OBJECTIONS OF J. C. H. TO THE WICKED LETTER OF A HUMBLE ENQUIRER AFTER TRUTH," ON THE SUBJECT OF FEET WASHING. "We agree with him, that ridicule is not exactly the weapon to be used in matters of Religion; but the use of it is excusable, when there is no other which can make fools tremble."--Edin. Review. To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine. Τ SIR, IT seems, Mr. Editor, I have had the ill or the good fortune to give offence to one (and only one, I trust), of your correspondents, by the letter which appeared in your Magazine for December last, in reply to J. D. concerning "Feet Washing."-As nobody but J. C. H. could have quarrelled with the playful strain of that letter, or have thought it worthy of serious animadversion, so what I have to say, is intended for J. C. H. alone; and, on that account, it shall be short. J. C. H. is, in common with most weak and foolish men, a sworn foe to ridicule; but it happens, that I think it may sometimes be used to advantage, though, like every thing else, it may be misapplied. The powers of ridicule, like the powers of reasoning, are but too frequently abused; the one may be directed against a good cause, and the other exercised in favour of a bad one. But, what then, shall all ridicule, and all reasoning, be proscribed, to prevent their improper use? As well might I protest against the use of the press; because J. D. has availed himself of it, to end a very silly letter into the world; or, because J. C. H. has, through the same medium, been pleased to grumble at the just treatment he received in consequence. The writer informs us, that "laughter is not reasoning, and that evidence, and not ridicule, is the test of truth. Now, though there is, perhaps, more argument in my letter than J. C. H. is either competent to understand, or to answer; yet, it is true, that laughter is not reasoning. But a reasonable man will often have occasion to laugh, and will sometimes produce laughter in others; and though evidence is the test of truth, yet ridicule will, not unfrequently, prove serviceable against absurdity and nonsense. To me, nothing is more insufferable than grave argument, dull disquisition, and heated debate, about nothing-than to treat the whim of a child like the conception of a philosopher-than to attempt, seriously, to explode every ridi |