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Thinking can no more arife from a combina tion of them together, than it can proceed from the amaffing together of Matter. All the Accidents, but Motion, have nothing Active or Operative in them, but are only Matter under different Modes and Relations. And Motion, whatever the Figure, or Bulk and Contexture of any Body may be, can be but Motion still: and suppose what Contexture or Modifications you will; what is Motion, under all Determinations, Collifions and Combinations, but change of Place? and, how can change of Place produce Thinking, under any variety of Contexture in the Particles of Matter? Free-will is impoffible to be accounted for by Matter and Motion, as Epicurus found, who was therefore forced to have recourfe to his Declinationes Atomorum; for which he is fo juftly exposed by Tully. For neither can Matter determine its own Motion, nor can Motion determine it felf, but must be determined by fomething External; whereas all Men find it in their power to determine themselves by an Inward and Voluntary Principle.

It is true, indeed, that the Soul, in its Operations, depends very much upon the Temperament of the Body: yet the Soul, even in this state, has Thoughts, which have no Relation to the Body, or any Material Thing; as Thoughts of God and Spirits, its own Reflex Thoughts, or Consciousness of its own Operations. And if it were now capable of no Thoughts, but fuch

*

fuch as have some dependence upon the Body; yet this can never prove, that the Soul it felf is Material, or that Matter Thinks. A Man writes with his Pen, and cannot write without one; Is it therefore his Pen properly that writes, and not the Man? The Body is the Instrument of the Soul, in its Operations here; and as the Inftrument is fit or unfit, fo must its Operations be more or lefs perfect.

But it is ftrange, that the chief part of us should be of fuch a Nature, that we can form no Idea of it. We may form an Idea of it, though but an imperfect one: And do we not know, that the Eye, the nobleft part of the Body, cannot fee it felf, but imperfectly, and by Reflection? And let any Man try, whether he can form a better Idea of a Material Soul, than of an Immaterial one. But this Writer, by Idea, feems to mean a Material Idea, or Imagination: and we cannot, indeed, form a Material Idea of an Immaterial Spirit. Yet, after all which he, or any Man elfe, has faid, the Nature of the Soul is as clearly understood, as that of the Body: and there is nothing encumbred with greater Difficulties than Extenfion, if that be the Ef fence of Matter; and if that be not, it is as hard still to know what the Effence of Matter is. The Inftance which he brings of Brutes, is easily answered, Whether they can think, or not. If they cannot, the Objection falls of it felf: If they can, I fhould rather fuppofe, that their Souls may be annihilated, or may b 3

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transmigrate and pass from one Brute to another, than that the Souls of Men must be Material, that the Souls of Brutes may be Material too.

Another Gentleman, of late, has afferted, That it is impoffible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Idea's, without Revelation, to difcover whether Omnipotency hath not given to Some Syftems of Matter, fitly difpofed, a Power to Perceive or Think; and, That there is a Poffibility that God may, if he pleases, fuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking: which is what he likewife calls a Modification of Thinking, or Power of Thinking. But it seems not intelligible, how God fhould fuper-add to Matter this Faculty, or Power, or Modification, of Thinking, unless he change the Nature of Matter, and make it to be quite another thing than it is, or join a Substance of another Nature to it. But the Question is, Whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter? And we can have no more conception, how any Modification of Matter can produce Thinking, than we can, how any Modification of Sound fhould produce Seeing: all Modifications of Matter are the fame, as to this Point; and Matter may as well be made no Matter by Modifying, as be made to Think by it. This is just as if a Man fhould maintain, That though all Immaterial Subftances are not extended and

* Mr. Locke's Humane Understanding, 1. 4. c. 3. §. 6. Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 66.

divifible,

divisible, yet some of them may poffibly be, or Omnipotence may fuper-add to them a Faculty of Extenfion and Divifibility: for Immaterial Substances may become Divifible and Material by the fame Philofophy: by which we may conclude, that Matter may Think; which is the fame thing as to become Immaterial, and to furpass all the Powers and Capacities of Matter. He urges, that there may be capacities in Matter, which no Man can conceive, fince that Gravitating Power, which Sir Ifaac Newton has proved to belong to all Bodies, would before have been thought incredible. But there is nothing in this Power above the Nature of Matter, any more than there is in Motion. For Gravitation is only a determinate Mode of Motion: and it is very eafie to conceive, that Matter is as well capable of one Determination of Motion, as of another; fince Matter is herein only Paffive, and not Active, or enabled to move voluntarily, and determine it felf, as humane Souls do. That, which is capable of any one Determination of Motion, may be capable of all kinds of Determination; but that, which may be determined all ways, may not be capable of determining it felf any one way. Matter muft ever remain uncapable of Thinking, unless it could change its Nature, and become Immaterial, and then it would not be Matter, which would think, but fomething else. And it is of little Ufe or

Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter,

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P. 404, &c.

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Confequence to enquire, what Omnipotence can do by a Super-addition of Faculties to Matter; when, between thofe, who prove the Soul to be immaterial, and fuch, as fuppofe it to be material, the only Question in difpute is, not what a Divine Power can effect, (for these Men are unwilling to grant any fuch Power prefiding over Matter) but whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produc'd out of Matter, by any Modifications, or any Changes and Determinations of Motion. But tho' I have, upon this occafion, mention'd this Gentleman here; yet it would be a great Injury done him, to rank him with the Authors of The Oracles of Reafon.

There is prefix'd to thefe Pieces, an Account of the Life and Death of that unhappy Gentleman, Mr. Blount, with a pretence to vindicate his Murther of himself, because his deceas'd Wife's Sifter refus'd to be marry'd to him; by all the Topicks and Arguments of Reafon and Philofophy. Which is fuch an Undertaking, as I am confident was never heard of before, to prove, that a Man may very gravely and philosophically kill himself, if a Woman, whom he ought not to marry, will not be his Wife. It is ftrange to fee, that Men fhould think it fit to vent fuch things as thefe in the Face of the World: but this discovers the Reafon and Philofophy of these Men, and is a fit Preface to fuch a Book. This Wisdom defcendeth not from Above. Behold the Men in their Principles and Practices, the demure Pretenders to Humane Reason, and Moral Vertue, and the Enemies of Reveal'd Religion!

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