and uniform interest which he can raise in a single scene, nothing of that perfection would have been wanting, of which we may conceive this sublime art to be capable.

Of the necessity of this unity of emotion, Corneille is the first tragedian of modern Europe who seems to have been sensible; and I know not whether the faults of this poet have not been exaggerated by English critics, from their inattention to the end which he seems to have prescribed to himself in his works. To present a faithful picture of human life, or of human passions, seems not to have been his conception of the intention of tragedy. His object, on the contrary, seems to have been, to exalt and to elevate the imagination; to awaken only the greatest and noblest passions of the human mind; and, by presenting such scenes and such events alone, as could most powerfully promote this end, to render the theatre a school of sublime instruction, rather than an imitation of common life. To effect this purpose, he was early led to see the necessity, or disposed by the greatness of his own mind to the observation, of an uniform character of dignity; to disregard whatever of common, of trivial, or even of pathetic in the originals from which he copied, might serve to interrupt this peculiar flow of emotion; and instead of giving a simple copy of nature, to adorn the events he represented, with all that eloquence and poetry could afford. He maintains, accordingly, in all his best plays, amid much exaggeration, and much of the false eloquence of his time, a tone of commanding, and even of fascinating dignity, which disposes us almost to believe, that we are conversing with Beings of an higher order

than our own; and which blinds us, at least for a time, to all the faults and all the imperfections of his composition. I am far from being disposed to defend his opinions of tragedy, and still less to excuse his extravagance and bombast; but I conceive, that no person can feel his beauties, or do justice to his merits, who does not regard his tragedies in this view; and I think that some allowance ought to be made for the faults of a poet, who first shewed to his country the example of regular tragedy, and whose works the great Prince of Condé called "The Breviary of kings."

In the former section I have endeavoured to show, that no objects are in themselves fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, which are not productive of some simple emotion. In this, I have attempted to show, that no composition of objects or qualities is in fact productive of such emotions, in which an unity of character is not preserved. The slight illustrations which I have now offered, are probably sufficient to point out the truth of the general principle; but the application of it to the different arts of taste, and the explanation of the great rules of composition from this constitution of our nature, are objects far beyond the limits of these Essays. I must satisfy myself, therefore, with observing in general, that, in all the fine arts, that composition is most excellent, in which the different parts most fully unite in the production of one unmingled emotion, and that taste the most perfect, where the perception of this relation of objects, in point of expression, is most delicate and precise.

CONCLUSION.

I.

THE illustrations in the first chapter of this Essay are intended to show, that whenever the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt, that exercise of imagination is produced which consists in the prosecution of a train of thought.

The illustrations in the second chapter are intended to point out the distinction between such trains, and our ordinary trains of thought, and to show, that this difference consists, 1st, In the ideas which compose them, being in all cases ideas of emotion; and 2dly, In their possessing an uniform principle of connexion through the whole of the train. The effect, therefore, which is produced upon the mind, by objects of taste, may be considered as consisting in the production of a regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion.

II.

The account which I have now given of this effect, may perhaps serve to point out an important distinction between the emotions of taste, and all our different emotions of simple pleasure. In the case of these last emotions, no additional train of thought is necessary. The pleasurable feeling follows immediately the presence of the object or quality, and has no dependence upon any thing for its perfection, but the sound state of the sense by which it is received. The emotions of joy, pity, benevolence, gratitude, utility, propriety, novelty, &c. might undoubtedly be felt, although we had no such power of mind as that by which we follow

out a train of ideas, and certainly are felt in a thousand cases, when this faculty is unemployed.

In the case of the emotions of taste, on the other hand, it seems evident, that this exercise of mind is necessary, and that unless this train of thought is produced, these emotions are unfelt. Whatever may be the nature of that simple emotion which any object is fitted to excite, whether that of gaiety, tranquillity, melancholy, &c. if it produce not a train of thought in our minds, we are conscious only of that simple emotion. Whenever, on the contrary, this train of thought, or this exercise of imagination is produced, we are conscious of an emotion of a higher and more pleasing kind; and which, though it is impossible to describe in language, we yet distinguish by the name of the emotion of taste. If accordingly the author of our nature had denied us this faculty of imagination, it should seem that these emotions could not have been felt, and that all our emotions would have been limited to those of simple pleasure.

The emotions of taste may therefore be considered as distinguished from the emotions of simple pleasure, by their being dependent upon the exercise of our imagination; and though founded in all cases upon some simple emotion, as yet further requiring the employment of this faculty for their existence.

III.

As in every operation of taste there are thus two different faculties employed, viz. some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train of thought corresponding to this emotion, the peculiar pleasure which attends, and which constitutes the

emotions of taste, may naturally be considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the exercise of these faculties, or, in other words, as produced by the union of pleasing emotion, with the pleasure which, by the constitution of our nature, is annexed to the exercise of imagination. That both these pleasures are felt in every operation of taste, seems to me very agreeable to common experience and observation.

1. That in every case of the emotions of sublimity or beauty, that simple emotion of pleasure is felt, which arises from the peculiar nature of the object perceived, every man, I conceive, may very easily satisfy himself. In any beautiful object, whose character is cheerfulness, we are conscious of a feeling of cheerfulness-in objects of melancholy, of a feeling of sadness-in objects of utility, of a feeling of satisfaction and complacence, similar to what we feel from objects of the same kind when the emotion of beauty is not excited. Insublime objects, in the same manner, whatever their character may be, whether that of greatness, terror, power, &c. we are conscious of the feelings of admiration, of awe, of humility, &c. and of the same pleasures from the exercise of them, which we feel in those cases where the emotion of sublimity is not produced. In the trains of thought which are excited by objects either of sublimity or beauty, every man knows, that the character of those trains is determined by the peculiar nature of the object; and instead of the emotions of taste being attended with one uniform species of pleasure, every man must have felt, that the sum of his pleasure is in a great degree composed of the peculiar pleasure which the exercise of different affections brings.