contain of the character and office of the Christian minister is drawn with great strictness and truth, and with an energy, as well as discrimination, suited to the present state of the church. It is every way well worthy of our consideration, and we rejoice to have been able to present it, even in this imperfect copy, to the admiration and study of those whom it may concern to contemplate it. We are sure that neither the advanced minister, nor the inexperienced and diffident student, can give to it serious thought, without receiving some salutary suggestion, perhaps some quickening and invigorating impulse.

ART. V. On the Improvement of Society by the Diffusion of Knowledge: Or an Illustration of the Advantages which would result from a more general Dissemination of Rational and Scientific Information among all Ranks. By THOMAS DICK, LL. D. [Family Library, Vol. LIX.] New York. J. & J. Harper. 1833.

THIS is a plain and sensible book, well fitted to sustain an interest in scientific pursuits. The writer is evidently master of his subject, and has the rare merit of fulfilling what he promises. In one respect, however, his work seems to us defective. He dwells hardly at all upon the importance of speculative knowledge. It is our purpose in this article to make some remarks upon this much abused branch of learning.

All understand the utility of scientific pursuits. They come home to our every-day interests. They are brought to bear upon our dearest concerns, upon our domestic comforts and sensual enjoyments. The language of Lord Brougham, though strong, is hardly extravagant. "In truth," says he, "though a man be neither merchant nor peasant, but only one having a pot to boil, he is sure to learn from science lessons, which will enable him to cook his morsel better, save his fuel, and both vary his dish and improve it." Hence scientific pursuits have become a leading object of the age. They are its glory and its boast. The zeal, with which they are cultivated, is in all respects just and commendable. It is neither misdirected nor extravagant.

But is there no danger in the way? Man is an intellectual, as well as a sensual being. He has intellectual, as well as physical wants, comforts, luxuries. The mind has objects of its own. Mental improvement is valuable for its own sake. But while constituted as we are; while cased up in this manifold envelope of flesh, and surrounded by this material universe, with which we have no other means of intercourse than through the senses; while our apparent good or bad fortune, the rank that we hold in society and our influence upon it, seem so intimately connected with what is visible and tangible, is there not danger that merely intellectual attainments will be undervalued or despised? We know that the body must have food, and shelter, and wherewithal to be clothed; but, that the mind, independently of the body, has wants as urgent and incomparably more important, is a truth upon which our attention seldom rests, and from which all our pursuits have a tendency to withdraw our thoughts. And as bad practice, when it does not proceed from bad principles, usually produces them, it is not uncommon among us, for men of excellent sense to sneer at subjects as useless and visionary, upon which more than upon any thing else the dignity and happiness of man depend. It would even seem as if those, who have been most active in the cause of improvement, through whose exertions popular education has become a leading feature of the times, have done something to encourage this error. The preference which they give to scientific pursuits, and the grounds on which that preference is given, have in no contemptible measure contributed to the mistake.

"What is the chief end of man?" is the first question of a catechism which we studied in childhood. It should be the ruling question of our lives. "What is the chief end of man? We cannot so blaspheme our Maker as to reply that in any particular case, man's chief end is to make money, to be a mechanic, lawyer, merchant, or physician. Yet what else do we mean, when we shrewdly question the utility of speculative knowledge to an individual, because it is foreign to his profession? He is a man, and whatever tends to purify, exalt, and enlarge his mind; whatever widens the sphere of his rational pleasures, or extends his views of man, nature, God; whatever gives him new insight into the workings of his own heart, into the constitution of his own mind, into the

rights, duties, and privileges of man, is, in the highest sense of the word, useful to him, if not to his profession. Knowledge, truth is his natural aliment. Intellectual advancement is one great end of his existence. Though his studies make him neither a more useful nor a more enlightened citizen, still, if they open to him new mines of truth and new fields of knowledge, they accomplish a great and good work. Each man has duties which relate to himself alone, and he must never forget them. His mind has claims upon itself, which are superior to all other claims. He has a destiny of his own to fulfill. With these duties, these claims, and this destiny, no foreign power, public or private, has a right to interfere.

We sometimes talk of the destiny of nations and the interests of government, as if they had a soul of their own; and we sometimes speak of men as subordinate parts of the great community to which they belong, all living, and toiling, and dying for the advancement of the public welfare. But this is reversing the process of nature. "Government," as has been truly said, "is made for man, and not man for government." The destiny of nations, the interests of government, are mere rhetorical nonentities, if by them we would imply any thing more than the advancement of individual interest and the perfection of individual character. Government has no higher purpose than the improvement of individuals. The influence of individual pursuits upon government is by no means a just criterion of their merit. All pursuits all studies are to be estimated by their influence upon the character and condition of individuals. If poetry, for instance, refine and elevate the feelings, and supply an exhaustless fountain of enjoyment; if deep philosophical works strengthen the reasoning powers and assist the mind in comprehending the abstract truths of morals, government, and religion, and enable it to see more clearly and penetrate more deeply into itself, that complicated power, at once the agent, object, and instrument of inspection; then poetry and philosophy have strong claims upon our notice, and that too, although their influence extend not beyond the particular minds upon which they directly act; although upon the daily pursuits of life, upon our daily intercourse with society, and upon the community at large, they have no influence whatever.

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Fortunately, however, no branch of knowledge, which acts

thus beneficially upon individual minds, is useless to the community. Whatever improves the character of the citizens, raises the character of the country, and lessens the difficulties of government.

Do we sufficiently bear this in mind? Are we not disposed to lay too much stress upon the external machinery of government, and to lose sight of the thousand secret springs, by whose unostentatious agency, the regular and consistent action of the whole is preserved? The outward institutions are indeed indispensable. The nice adjustment of laws and their skilful administration are of the utmost importance. It is right for us to boast of our free institutions, of the wise checks and counter-checks, which have been provided for our security. But these alone cannot save us. Reflect for a moment upon the threatening auspices with which the last year was introduced. Men, upon whose judgment and integrity we are accustomed to rely, told us, in accents of alarming eloquence, that a perilous crisis was at hand, that our institutions were tottering to their base; and our hearts sunk within us, as they painted in dark characters the dreadful storms, that were gathering. The danger is now over. We would take nothing from the just fame of those, who acted so conspicuous a part in calming the waves of public excitement. They are deserving of all praise. But shall we learn no lesson from the events of that period? Our present safety is incomparably more owing to the general good sense and virtue of the community, than to any public men or measures, or to any vital energy that may reside in the constitution itself. A kind Providence has not suffered the fate of a whole people to rest upon the character of a few public laws or rulers. Our weal or wo, Heaven be praised, rests upon principles of a deeper and more abiding character. So long as a sacred reverence for the truths of religion and morality is preserved, and sound learning receives the encouragement which it deserves, so long is our condition safe and prosperous. Political aspirants may tell us that our security and happiness depend upon the passage of this or that law, upon the election of this or that man. We cannot believe them. Our house

is built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Bad rulers and injudicious laws may injure, they cannot destroy it. No virtuous and enlightened nation has ever yet fallen a prey to a bad government, or to unprinci

pled rulers. It was not because the Roman government was bad, and the senate corrupt, and Julius Cæsar ambitious; it was because the people themselves were corrupt, that Cæsar gained over them an influence so great, that (to paraphrase the strong language of a Roman poet) they would rather be driven to hell by his command than sent to heaven by the voice of an honest man. It was because public opinion was rotten, that his power was unlimited and their liberties lost.

All this is admitted. The influence of public opinion is generally understood. The manner in which popular education acts upon public opinion is also understood. We hear from all quarters, that government rests upon the virtue and intelligence of its citizens, and our free schools are confidently pointed to, as the main supports of free government. But do we equally well understand the importance of the higher institutions and the more extended systems of education, to which few can resort? Is it not a common complaint against them, that they are too theoretical? As to great works of philosophy, surely they are useless to the community at large; for how can they benefit those who never read them? The learned men too, whose lives are spent in studying out principles, and in preparing these profound works, are but dead weights upon society. The country is filled with practical men, and they want practical books, practical instructions. Theoretical knowledge is thrown away upon them. Why should the whole community unite in the support of literary institutions, to which not one man in five hundred can resort, and which deal out to the chosen few little else than theories, which the great mass of mankind cannot understand, and which they do not wish to understand? What interest has the public in preserving libraries, which are plainly of no use to a ten-thousandth part of the people?

Remarks like these are not uncommon. Perhaps they are the leading opinions of the very respectable classes, who call themselves practical men. But have they any foundation? Because books are theoretical, or read by few, does it follow that they are useful to few? Newton's great work is almost entirely theoretical, and so difficult, that probably there are not ten men in the United States able to read it. Yet it is certain, that hardly a man, woman, or child exists among us, that is not in consequence of this work better clad, fed, and lodged. It did not act with its full power at once.