at the beginning of both they were very near an equal match at fea for the Dutch and us united together. Every one knows, that in the year 1690, they obtained a compleat victory over the combined fquadrons of England and Holland near Beachyhead, by our court's fending a rath and ridiculous order to our admiral the lord Torrington, to engage the enemy, tho' greatly fuperior to him in ftrength. But luckily for us the French court committed the fame mistake in 1692, by which means we got an opportunity to pay them back with ufury at La Hogue, the little advantage they had gained over us at Beachy-head; and as they were then vigorously attacked by our allies at land, they could not fpare money for repairing, much lefs for increafing their navy before the end of that war. re that there was no fupporting a fpectable navy, without a great number of thorough-bred feamen, which no country can have without an extenfive commerce or great fisheries. For this reafon they applied themfelves chiefly to thefe two improvements and had brought both to a very great height before the beginning of laft war, but had neglected to re-establish their navy, which neglect they were foon made fenfible of, as neither commerce nor fisheries can be protected in time of war without an equality at leaft of naval power. This they faw they could not aim at whilft they were engaged in fuch a heavy war at land, and therefore they endeavoured to put an end to it as foon as they could. Thus, Sir, we may fee, that in all the wars we have been lately engaged in against France, our preferving a fuperiority at fea did not proceed from our preventing their getting a fufficient fupply of naval ftores, but from our preffing them fo hard at land, by means of our allies upon the continent of Europe that they could not spare money enought for purchaling that supply; and to fuppofe, that the other nations of Europe, or even thofe who are our firmeft allies, would bear our telling them, that they must not trade with France, or any of the French dominions, because of their being all blockaded by us at fea, is really, in my opinion, a fuppofition too chimerical to be entertained by any fober mind. The very attempt would unite most of the ftates of Europe in a confederacy for pulling down the overgrown naval power of England; and I hope it will not be fo much as fuppofed that we are able to carry on even a naval war against all the maritime powers of Europe; for every nation that borders upon the fea, may in fome degree be called a maritime power, as every one of them has Again, Sir in queen Anne's war, at the beginning of it, they appeared formidable even at fea, and in 1704, engaged the united fquadrons of England and Holland in the Mediterranean near Malaga. Here, indeed, they did not obtain any victory, as the Hon. gentleman feemed to infinuate; tho' they were fuperior in ftrength, as I could prove by an old ballad, which fhews that it was a drawn battle; but they might have continued to be formidable at fea, if the glorious victory which the duke of Marlborough obtained that fummer at Blenheim, had not put an end to all their naval projects; for from that time they were under fuch difficulties to defend themselves at land, that they were obliged to leave their men of war to lie rotting in their harbours and thought of nothing but annoying our trade by their privateers. As they fuffered fo much in that war, and as it was foon after followed by a long minority, they could not for many years think of re-eltablishing their navy; and their minitters probably judged very wifely at at least some feamen, if not fome ships of war; and even our navy formidable as it is, would be in a most difmal and dangerous fituation if it had not a port in Europe to retire to upon occafion, except thofe belonging to ourselves alone. The next that spoke was T. Sempronius hope they will not ftand in need of much affiftance from us; but if they fhould we must give it. Even for them we must fight as if we were fighting pro aris et focis; for it is to them we owe our wealth and our naval ftrength. Our trade From what I have faid, Sir, I thither is the cheif nursery for our think it is evident, that if we fhould feamen; and the imports from thence, ftand fingle and alone in a war a- by being again exported, is what gainst France, they might in three alone keeps the general balance of or four years become fuperior to us trade in our favour. These imports at fea, and the moment they did have been increasing for many years: so we must submit to a Carte Blanche, I hope they will continue to increase because they could then bring their both in quantity and kind; and I numerous land armies into this ifland, am glad to find, that we have lateand might make a conqueft of it in ly had a new fort of import fent us one fingle campaign. For preventing from thence: I mean, that of conthis we have no way left but fummmate politicians, tho' I am afreforting to that which is now raid we shall never get much by the and, I hope, will always be at our export of this commodity. command, a powerful confederacy upon the continent of Europe; and whatever the melancholy apprehenfions of fome gentlemen may fuggeft, I make no doubt of our being able to fupport it as long as we fhall have occafion; for France is involved in debt as well as we are, and the people of France do not feem to be fo unanimous or fo zealous for a occafion, as the people of this country appear to be; and I muft fay, that both are very much in the right, because the people of France know, that they are contending for boundless waftes, from whence neither they nor their pofterity can draw much advantage for ages to come; whereas we are contending for the preservation and fecurity of a well cultivated country, inhabited by our countrymen, and of infinite prefent advantage to the people both of Britain and Ireland: Nay, of fuch advantage, that many thousands in both Iflands, owe the whole of their fubftance to our colonies and platations in America. Mr. Prefident, SIR, war upon the prefent AMONG the many paradoxes I For this reafon, Sir, I was glad to hear that our colonies were able to fupport themselves. I therefore have heard upon different occafions from the mouth of the Hon. gentleman who spoke laft, no one ever furprized me more than to hear that we had no fixed conftitution before the revolution. I fhall readily grant, that almost every adminiftration has in some respects acted contrary to our conftitution; but a breach of our conftitution is not furely to be called an alteration of our conftitution; for if it were, I am afraid, it could not be juftly faid, that we have had a fixed conftitution fince the revolution any more than before, as minifters have fince frequently acted contrary to our conftitution, which the Hon. gentleman from his long and great experience must be fully fenfible of. This doctrine has indeed prevailed great deal too much of late years; but but I am very much furprized to hear it maintained or propogated by one who pretends to be a friend to the revolution, and to the royal family now upon our throne. What was the caufe of the revolution? Was it not becaufe the prince then upon the throne had aced contrary to, and was endeavouring to fubvert our conftitution. How could this be true if we had then no conftitution? Thus, Sir, fome gentlemen are ignorantly or very unadvifedly endeavouring to undermine the very foundation of the revolution; for if we had then no conftitution, the king upon the throne muft have been abfolute, and confequently the revolution could have been nothing but a rebellion. But it is certain, Sir, that we had a conftitution, and a most regular and wife conftitution, not only before the revolution, but ever fince we had a monarchy; and the end of the revolutions was to reftore and fecure that conftitution for which our ancestors had so often facrificed their blood, and I hope their lateft pofterity will always be ready to follow their example. This, I fay, Sir, was the end of the revolution, and a great many good confequences have enfued, amongst which I must reckon the eftablishment of our prefent royal family the chief; but, as in all human affairs, among thefe good confequences fome bad ones have crept in, and among these I must reckon this complaifant method of addreffing at the beginning of every feffion; for however much it may be fanctified by cuftom, it would look very odd in the eyes of all foreigners to fee the commons of England, in their address to their fovereign, approving by the lump of all the measures pursued by his minifters, and in a week or two afterwards impeaching thofe minifters for thofe very measures, which may happen to be the cafe in fome future fellion of parliament, if this complaifant method of addreffing fhould be continued; for at the opening of a feffion, and before any lights have been laid before par liament, no one can fay, whether the minifters may, or may not deferve to be impeached, for fome of the meafures hinted at in the speech from the throne, and perhaps hinted at on purpole to obtain the ufual lumping approbation. For this reafon, Sir, tho' I highly approve of the revolution, and upon a more folid foundation than any gentleman can have, who thinks we had no conftitution before that time, yet I cannot approve of this method of addrefling; and as little can I approve of another doctrine now advanced by fome amongst us, and ftrongly inculcated by the Hon. gentleman who fpoke laft, which is, that we can by no means be able to ftand fingle and alone in a war against France, because, faid he, tho' we be at prefent fuperior to them in naval power, yet during the courfe of the war they would increase their navy, and if not diverted by any war upon the continent of Europe, they might in three or four years increafe it fo much as to become fuperior to us at fea. Sir, if there were the leaft foundation for this doctrine, I fhould think this nation in a most wretched and lamentable fituation; for if the French could in the time of war with us so much increase their navy, furely they could with more eafe and conveniency increafe it in time of peace, and confequently, if they continue at peace with us, and all the rest of their neighbours, we have but three or four years to continue matters at fea, at the end of which short term we muft, according to this gentleman, fubmit to a Carte Blanche, if the French fhould then pleafe to demand it, or purchafe a confederacy upon the continent at any price our allies might then think fit to infift on, which in fuch a cafe would, I fear, be much higher than we could poffibly pay. Nay, as the Dutch have of late years fo much neglected their marine no fuch confederacy could protect us; for the French, by being matters at fea, would prevent their landing any troops in this island. and if they could, as the Hon. gentleman fays, make a conqueft of this island in one campaign, they would compleat that conqueft before any confederacy upon the continent could penetrate far into their frontiers, which are upon all fides guard ed by fo many well fortified cities and towns, nd fuch a conqueft would not only put an end to any fupport we could give to such a confederacy, but would turn the wealth and the power of this nation against it. What a wretched condition, Sir, are gentlemen reduced to, who, in order to prove that we are not able to stand fingle and alone in a war against France, muft grant, that we have but three or four years to continue a free and independent nation; for this is the unavoidable confequence of their argument, unless we could now purchafe at fuch a price as we are able to pay, fuch a confederacy upon the continent as would not only enable us to prescribe, but join with us in prefcribing fuch terms of peace to France as the Romans prefcribed to the Carthaginians at the end of the fecond Punic war, that is to fay, that they fhould deliver up all their fhips of war, and promife never to build any more; but fuch a condition I believe, no confederacy we can purchase could enable us to obtain, nor would any confederacy support us in demanding, for a mong many other misfortunes attending a confederated war this is always one, that none of the parties concerned can push their fuccefs further than the reft will give them leave, nor demand any condition from the enemy which the reft will not concur in. I perfuade myself, Sir, that it will now appear evident, what a lamentable fituation we should be in, were there any foundation for the doctrine, that we cannot ftand fingle and alone in a naval war agaiuft France; I fay, a naval war, Sir, because tho' carried on upon the continent or in the iflands of America, yet it is neverthelefs to be deemed a naval war. What thanks the broachers of this new doctrine may deferve from their country, I leave to others to judge; but for my own part I always was, and fill am of opinion, not only that we may with hopes of fuccefs engage by ourselves alone in fuch a war, but that the longer we continue in fuch a war the more we fhall add to our own ftrength, the more we shall diminish that of the enemy; for it is impoffible for France ever to render itfelf equal to us at fea, if we make the proper use of thofe advantages which nature has beftowed upon the dominions we are now poffeffed of, and thofe dominions by the Hon. gentleman's own acknowledgment, would be confiderably increafed during the firft three years of the war. For proof of this, Sir, I fhall first take for granted, that we could not prevent neutral powers from furnishing the French with all forts of naval ftores, and that by this means they had in three years built fuch a number of fhips of war, as to have a greater ftrength in fuch fhips than we now have, or could then have. What could they do with fuch fhips? They could not in that three years increase their number of feamen, nor could they get any of their landmen feafoned to the fea; for if they fent out any fhips for this purpose, they would probably fall into the hands of our fquadrons or our cruizers. This formidable navy therefore must upon its firft appearance at fea be manned with landmen, who for the firft week or two could neither keep their feet nor their health at fea, and with feamen who had been for three years continually at land, and who confequently would for the firft week or two go very awkwardly about their bufinefs. Such a navy we might attack with half the number of fhips, and with almost a certain affurance of fuccefs; and the confequence of our victory would be the deftruction or capture of most of their fhips, for fuch men could not manage manage their fhips fo as to make their efcape. I am therefore fully convinced, Sir, that if we should begin the war with a fuperiority at fea, we fhould increase in that fuperiority during its continuance, even granting that we could not prevent neutral powers from furnishing our enemies with naval ftores fit for building or equipping fhips of war; but this no man will grant who knows any thing of the law of nations; for a country blocked up by fea is certainly in the fame ftate as to the laws of war, with a town blockaded by land, and confequently neutral powers may be prevented from carrying in any thing that may contribute towards its holding out, notwithstanding any former ftipulation for determining what fhall be deemed contraband goods; for in all fuch ftipulations there is an exception as to towns or places befieged or blockaded; and Grotius cites with a feeming approbation the story of Demetrius, who hanged up the mafter and pilot of a neutral fhip for attempting to carry corn into Athens, after he had blocked it up by fea. No ftate in Europe could therefore juftly find fault with our intercepting any naval ftores debe carried to France by their fubjects, a few of them would incline to do fo, if they had juftice on their fide, as most of them are jealous of the power of France, and would be glad to fee that monarch humbled, without their being at any hazard or expence. Thus, Sir, it must appear, that during a war with France we can never have any reafon to fear that nation's gaining a fuperiority over us at fea, but during a long peace we have fome reafon to fear fuch a misfortune, because in time of peace our parliaments are but too apt to grudge every publick expence, and from a fpirit of economy or jealoufy may refuse to increafe our navy, or the number of feamen we keep in continual pay, in proportion as the French increase their naval ftrength; for otherwife it will always be easy for us to increase our naval ftrength, as faft as the French can increase theirs. After having now fhewn, Sir, that we have no reafon to dread engaging by ourselves alone in a naval war againft France, I must add, that we ought never upon any fuch occafion to reject a propofal for making a powerful diverfion against that nation by land, provided our allies upon the continent of Europe are willing to undertake it, without putting us to fuch an axpence as muft interrupt or interfere with the profecution of the war by fea or in America; therefore I muft obferve, that the question, whether the prefervation of the peace of Europe be a right or a wrong meafure; muft always depend upon the nature and circumftances of our difputes with France: When thole difputes are fuch as we can have no profpect of getting fettled to our liking without a war, it is then our intereft to fow the feeds of difcord, and to bring them to maturity as foon as poffible, that our allies may be thereby induced to apply to us for alliftance, inftead of our applying to them; and as there feems to be a hint in the fpeech of fome new alliances, I fhall take this opportunity to declare, that I fhall not be against them, provided they be with fuch ftates as I fhall think proper. Even fubfidies, tho' I think they ought never to be granted in time of peace, yet in time of war, or when there is a near profpect of it, I think we muft grant fome, but then they ought to be granted only to fuch as can affist us effectually, and not to fuch as cannot grant us any fuch affiftance as will of itself be effectual. To conclude, Sir, tho' I wish we could alter the prefent mean way of addreffing upon every fuch occafion, yet as we have at present some reason to be more complaifant than would otherwise be neceffary, I fhall not be againft the addrefs which my Hon. friend has propofed, nor do I think it abfolutely neceffary, to offer any a mendment |