"ments." He had, however, included "ideas" in the same declaration. But Locke does not appear to have appreciated the difference.

7. Locke Recognizes the Fact of Insight.

Now it will be borne in mind that I have claimed and attempted to show in the last Lecture that over and above Sensation and Consciousness, which Locke recognizes, there is an Insight also, which in all human beings, except the most complete idiots, goes along with sense-perception-sensation, in Locke's use of the word-and consciousness, giving us an element of knowledge, or ideas, which neither sensation nor consciousness can give.

Insight, as I have explained it, gives us (1) elements of knowledge-that is, simple ideas-or knowledge of properties, and (2) judgments, or affirmations of relation between properties, as for example that between extension and divisibility.

Locke recognizes something of this latter kind of insight. He says, B. IV., Chap. II., § 1, "All our knowledge consist“ing, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, I which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it may ,"not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. "The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie "in the different ways of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will "reflect on our ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes "the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two "ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of "any other; and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this, the mind is at no pains in proving or ex"amining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth the light, "only by being directed towards it." "Such kind of truths "the mind perceives at the first sight of the two ideas together,

by bare intuition without the intervention of any other idea; "and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain "that human frailty is capable of."

Cousin accepts this view of "intuition." He says (p. 338), "Intuitive knowledge is not grounded upon the senses, nor "upon consciousness, but upon the reason, which, without the "intervention of any reasoning, attains its objects and con"ceives them with certainty. Now it is an attribute inherent "in the reason to believe in itself." "If then intuitive reason "is above inductive and demonstrative reason, the faith of reason in itself, in intuition, is purer and more elevated than "the faith of reason itself in induction and demonstration. "Reccollect, likewise, that the truths intuitively discovered by reason are not arbitrary but necessary; that they are not rela"tive but absolute.

He goes on to say, "Reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not ourselves, and can in no way be confounded "with our humanity. Reason is impersonal."

After reading this one can hardly think that the author did not regard and assume it as essential to his theory that reason, "the Reason," as he calls it, is something more than either one of the mental faculties, or a mere mode of mental operations.

Both Locke and Cousin, however, use the word intuition in the German and French sense, as a looking upon things, which may be only an act of imagination or fancy, and does not discriminate it from that insight which goes along with intuition. By looking upon the two ideas or objects, we see into the relation between them, that it is, in some cases, necessary and founded in the nature of the two things, or, if Locke prefers the expression, "the two ideas." But without insight into the nature of the things which the ideas represent, I cannot see how intuition would be worth more, in this relation than any other act of pure fancy. And neither Locke nor Cousin relieves us of the difficulty.

Cousin, as has already been intimated, joins issue with Locke. He holds, as has been said, that there are certain a priori ideas in the mind before observation or experience, as its "logical "antecedent and necessary condition."

Locke had started with the supposition that "the mind is as "white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas," contrary to "the received doctrine that men have native ideas and original characters stamped upon their minds in their very "first being." Book II., Chap. I., §. 1.

8. Cousin Accepts the Issue.

Cousin accepts the challenge with alacrity. He quotes (p. 125) Locke, B. II., Chap. XII., §. 8. "If we trace the prog

ress of our minds and with attention observe how it repeats, "adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sen"sation and reflection [consciousness], it will lead us further " than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote so"ever they may be from sense or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames "to itself by repeating and joining together ideas that it had "either from objects of sense or from its own operations "about them; . . . this I shall endeavor to show in the ideas we have of space, time and infinity, and some few others that seem most remote from their originals." "Well and good, then," says Cousin, (p. 126) "this has a "little the air of a challenge. Let as accept it, and let us see, "for example, how Locke will deduce the idea of space from "sensation and reflection."

As I have already remarked, I accept the doctrine, or assumption, rather provisionally, that all knowledge is made up of ideas, and shall proceed with my discussion of the subject on that basis, or rather in the use of phraseology that has

been derived from it; taking good care all the time not to make an assertion or assume a premise that would not be just as true on the ground that ideas are merely modes of mental activity, and cannot be called or regarded as elements of anything.

9. Some Preliminary Statements.

Before proceeding further it will be well, however, to make a few more preliminary statements.

On either theory, complex ideas, whether (1) denoting the essentia of a genus, and expressed by common nouns, as man, horse, etc., or (2) denoting individual objects by their mere properties and expressed as before said,-by proper nouns or common nouns with an article or pronoun pointing out the individual referred to-can in all cases be reduced, by logical analysis, to simple ideas that may be expressed by adjectives when used as predicates. Thus, to use Locke's view, my idea of this piece of paper is complex and made of the simple ideas of whiteness, hardness, etc. Hence I can say the paper is white, the paper is hard, etc.

10. Four Classes of Simple Ideas.

With this law or fact in view, we divide all simple ideas—all the properties or modes of things, into four classes-with reference to the use we wish to make of them in the following discussion.

(1.) The adjectives that denote sensible or objective propertie. Of these, as we have seen, .we may have six species, one for each of the special senses, sight, touch, taste, smell and hearing, and one for the general sense, as for example, the hardness of objects. Although we may be indebted to either of these six senses for information or knowledge concerning objects, we are dependent on two of them alone and exclusively

for a knowledge of the fact that any one of the objects of that kind exists, namely, as before said, (Lect. IV, § 13), sight and touch.

(2). We have adjectives that we may call subjective or emotional. They represent our feelings towards objects, and arise from the emotions which they excite; such are beautiful, horrible, frightful, etc. They really give us no knowledge of the objects of which we predicate them; but only of ourselves-of the feelings they excite in us, whenever we see them or think of them. Such adjectives scarcely enter into science or knowledge at all; they belong rather to æsthetics.

(3.) We have a class of adjectives that denote what we may call the relative properties of objects. Of these there may be several kinds. (a.) Adjectives of place, as far, distant, near, etc. (b.) Adjectives of time, as early, late, primeval, etc. (c.) Adjectives of quantity, as great, small, etc. (d.) Adjectives that denote the relations of objects in a chemical or physical point of view. Thus, weight is of this kind, denoting as it does the intensity or force with which the earth attracts an object towards itself. Perhaps we should include heat, light, electricity, etc., in this class.

(4.) Then fourthly there is a class that we may call metaphysical or transcendental, because they do not belong to either of the other classes, and because, moreover, they imply an insight into the nature of the objects of which they may be predicated.

That properties of the first class depend upon and are derived from sensation alone, no one will deny. That the second come from the feelings or emotions which are responsive to objects seen or thought of, will be readily understood and admitted. The third come from observing the actions or effects of objects on one another, or from observing and comparing them in relation to time and place. In case we observe the actions of one object on another we ascribe to the one which we take to be the cause, a property or force by which it is able to produce the effect. We see bodies fall to the earth, and we say it