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piness were our misery: as that pillar which was light unto Israel, to guide them, was darkness unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them; which is called Envy. Grief of fretfulness at the prosperity of evil and unworthy men; which is called Indignation; Grief of indigence, when we find ourselves want those good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but desire to enjoy them ourselves too, which is called Emulation; Grief of guilt, for evil committed, which is called Repentance ;-and Grief of fear for evil expected, which is called Despair of which to discourse would be over tedious, and many of them are most learnedly handled by Aristotle in his Rhetoricks ;-and, therefore, I shall here put an end to this passion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the affections of Hope, the object of it, good future, possible, difficult: Of regular and inordinate Despair.

THE next rank and series, is of irascible passions, namely, those which respect their object, as annexed unto some degree of difficulty, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it: the first of which is Hope; whereby I understand an earnest and strong inclination and expectation of some great good apprehended as possible to be obtained, though not by our own strength, nor without some intervenient difficulties. I shall not col. lect those praises, which are commonly bestowed upon it; nor examine the contrary extremes of those who declaim. against it, making it a means either of augmenting an unexpected evil, before not sufficiently prevented; or of deflouring a future good too hastily pre-occupated;—but shall only Successus hominum; carpitque et carpitur una, Suppliciumque suum est, Ovid. Met. 2.-Insita mortalibus natura, recentem aliorum felicitatem ægris oculis introspicere, Tac. Hist. 1. 2.-Aut tibi malum quid, aut alteri bonum, evenit. Bion ad malevolum quendam, quem tristem aspexit. Apud Laert.-Prov. xxx. 21, 22. Psalm lxxiii. 12, 13. Job xxi. 7. Eccles. x. 5, 6, 7. Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, et Cato parvo, Pompeius nullo.-Patricios omnes opibus cum provocet unus, Quo tondente gravis juveni mihi barba sonabat, &c. Difficile est satiram non scribere, Juvenal. Satir. 1.—Vid. Aristot. Ethic. 1. 2. et Mag. Moral. 1. 1.-Vid. Suidam in Voc. Znλós. • Iliad. ζ. 794. προσδοκία ἀγαθῶν.

Suidas.-Пpoodokia kтhoews dyaboû. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2.-Spes quasi pes animi. Isid. Hispal. Orig. lib. 7. cap. 2.

touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with references to its objects, causes, and effects. Concerning the object or fundamental cause of hope, it hath these three conditions in it, that it be a future, a possible, a difficult good.

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First, Future; for good present is the object of our sense, but hope is of things not seen. For herein is one principal difference between divine faith and divine hope, that faith being ὑπόστασις τῶν ἐλπιζομένων, that substance of things hoped for,' hath ever respect to its object, as, in some manner, present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it; so that the first effect of faith is a present interest and title; but the operation of hope is waiting and expectation. But yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the presence of an object, the less he hath of hope towards it: for though hope be swallowed up in the complete presence of its object, yet it is not at all diminished, but encreased rather by a partial presence. And as in massy bodies, though violent motions be in the end weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them, yet natural are ever swiftest towards the center, as nearest approaching unto the place that draws them :-so in the hopes of men, though such as are violent and groundless, prove weaker and weaker, and so break out at last into emptiness and vapour; in which respect philosophers have called hope the dreams of waking men ;' (like that of the musician, whom Dionysius deceived with an empty promise, of which I spake before ;) yet those that are stayed and natural, are ever more strong, when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their object. "Quo propius accedimus ad spem fruendi, eo impatientius caremus:" the nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.'

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And the reason is, because goodness is better known, when it is in a nearer view of the understanding, and more united thereunto: and the more we have of the knowledge

Contemplatio est spei in hoc spatio per fidem, non representatio: nec possessio, sed expectatio, Tertul. de Resur. cap. 23. e Rom. viii. 24.

d Heb. xi.

• Arist. apud Laertium 1. 5.—Plato apud Col. Rhod. 1. 12. c 2. Arist. Ethic. lib. 9. et Plutarch de Audit. Plin. Epist. 1. 6. Epist. 1. προσδοκῶντας καὶ σπεύδοντας.—2 Pet. iii. 12.

of goodness, the more we have of the desire of it, if any part be absent. Besides; all greediness is attractive; and therefore the more we know it, the faster we hasten unto it: and it is the nature of good to increase the sense of the remainders of evil. So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good we have attained unto; yet the burthen and molestation of them is increased; and, therefore, the more possession we have of good, the greater is our weariness of evil: and the more Nature feeleth her defects, the more doth she desire her restauration.

The next condition in the object of our hope, is possibility. For though the will sometimes, being inordinate, may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicit condition if they were not so; yet no hope, whether regular or corrupt, can respect its object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, hatred and despair; the one being a proud opposition; the other, a dreadful flight from that good, in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true means unto an end hoped, and the strength of those powers which are to work or bestow them: or if they be such ends, as are wrought without any such means, by the bare and immediate hand of the worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the will and power of him that bestoweth it.

Here, then, because I find not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion, (unless we would pass from natural or moral, unto theological handling thereof) we may observe what manner of despair is only regular and allowable. I mean that which, in matters of importance, drives us out of ourselves, or any presumption and opinion of our own insufficiency. But that despair which riseth out of groundless unbelief of the power, or distrust of the goodness of a superior agent, (especially in those things, which depend upon the will and omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruins Nature: defiles, in that it conceives basely of God himself, in making our guilt more omnipotent than his power, and sin more hurtful than he is good: ruins, in that the mind is

thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.

Of this kind of despair, there are three sorts: The one sensual, arising out of an excessive love of good, carnal, and present and out of a secure contempt of good, spiritual, and future; like that of the Epicures", "Let us eat and drink," while we may; "to-morrow we shall die:" The other sluggish, which dishearteneth and indisposeth for action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude beforehand that they shall not succeed. The third sorrowful, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of fear, which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which hope should be sustained: as in the great tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwreck; when the sun and stars were hid, and nothing but terror to be seen; "all hope that they should be saved, was taken away." c

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The last condition of the object of hope, was difficulty;I mean, in respect of our own abilities, for the procuring of the good we hoped for; and therefore hope hath not only an eye to Bonum,' the good desired; but to Auxilium' too, the help which confers it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow on himself; 'Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco;' all hope is an attendant passion, and doth ever rely upon the will and power of some superior causes, by dependance whereupon it hath some good warrant to attain its desires."

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And thus in divine hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both per modum Boni,' as the good desired; and modum Auxilii,' as the aid whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those hopes are corrupt and foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the power to help in some assistants; or concerning will in others; as indeed generally a blind and misled judgement doth nourish passion. Of the former sort, are the hopes of base and degenerous minds in their dependance upon second and subordinate means, without having recourse to the first supreme

a 1 Cor. xv.

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b Desperatione debilitati, experiri nolunt, quod se assequi posse diffidunt. Cic. in Orat. ad Bru. Acts xxvii. 20. perficiendi, si vires, pecunia, consilium, scientia, apparatio videbitur esse. Cic. de e Job xxxi. 24. Jer. xvii. 5. Psalm lxii. 9.

Invent. ad Heren. li. 4.

Rom. iii. 4. Job vi. 15, 16.

Cause; which is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a liar, either by impotency, whereby he may fail us; or by imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Of the other sort, are the hopes of those, who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground and warrant of such a confidence:--whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly reposing itself upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to themselves.

And this is the difference between despair and presumption; hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in itself; but withal, as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now despair leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh only on the hardness: on the other side, presumption never regardeth the hardness, but buildeth only upon the possibility. And this isspes mortua,' that dead hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of hope, spoken of by Saint Peter. For a lively hope worketh such a tranquillity of mind, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is 'Pax Luminosa,' a peace springing out of light: but dead hope worketh a rest, grounded only on ignorance; such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senseless than peace: and this is Tenebrosa Pax,' a peace springing out of darkness. For a true peace is quies ex fide,' a believing rest: but counterfeit is only quies ex somno,' a sleeping or dreaming rest. The peace which comes from a living hope, must have these two properties in it,-tranquillity, and serenity: otherwise it is but like the rest of Mare Mortuum,' whose immovableness is not nature, but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, want, and weakness together, experience and knowledge. In what sense ignorance may be said to strengthen, and knowledge to weaken hope: examples quicken more than precept. Provision of aid. The uncertainty of outward means, to establish hope, goodness of nature, faith and credulity, wise confidence.

THE next things to be considered, are the causes of this passion: The first impulsive cause of hope is our want and

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