stood, we cannot do better than to lay before our readers the greater part of the memorandum by Mr. Morier to which Lord Odo Russell frequently referred in his evidence.

The so called "block" in the Diplomatic Service must be considered from two points of view :—

1. As resulting from permanent defects in the constitution of the Service.

2. As arising from temporary and accidental causes.

'I. Under the first head the evil can be traced to the attempt to apply a strictly professional system to a service to which, from its being in the first place numerically too small, and in the second place from the posts which require the higher qualifications being out of all proportion to the posts requiring mere routine qualifications, such a system is inapplicable (e. g. a system of seniority can be applied to the naval service, but could hardly be applied to an individual man-of-war). Out of about 122 persons composing the Diplomatic Service, some 64 are either heads of missions (or in some way have independent posts), or are first secretaries of legation, i. e. persons who at any moment can be placed in the position of heads of missions. Any one of these 64 individuals may be called upon by his tact, knowledge, and presence of mind, to do invaluable service to his country, or may, by his deficiency in those qualities, run the risk of plunging the country into unforeseen difficulties.

A remedy very generally recommended for getting rid of this defect is, altogether to unprofessionalise the Service, i. e., to appoint eminent men who have had no diplomatic training to the posts of envoys, and to assist them by an inferior class of officials trained abroad, but who are not to rise to the higher posts of the Service.

'The objection to such a system appears to me to be, that although, for the reasons above given, diplomacy ought not to be strictly considered as a profession, it is yet a service which more than any other requires a very high kind of professional training. To translate the political life of a foreign nation into the political language of one's own country is one of the highest and most difficult of the political arts, and an intellectually superior class of men cannot be expected to devote themselves to the acquisition of this art, unless they have the prospect afforded them of rising to the highest posts.

'On the other hand it is not only necessary to leave the Foreign Secretary free to select the agents whom he requires to carry out his policy, which necessarily implies the employment of outsiders, but it appears to me very desirable that outsiders should in part at least be employed. The most efficient means for developing international knowledge and international sympathies in the quarters where this knowledge and these sympathies should exist, would be that members of either House of Parliament should serve for a few years abroad and then return to Parliament.

It is, however, clear that the combination of outsiders, with a seniority system, constitutes a very real injustice to the non-outsiders. As regards the individuals themselves this may be a matter of little

moment. A great public good may be cheaply bought by a good deal of private discontent. But the injustice is bad on public grounds, because such a system must necessarily drive the good men out of the Service, or so entirely paralyse them as to prevent their becoming useful public servants.

'Such is the problem to be solved. I do not pretend to solve it, but I think it possible to point out where the evil lies. Justice or injustice in the matter of professional advancement can only be predicated where a contract exists. Before the recommendations of the Committee of 1861, the number of persons with whom the State had entered into contract was comparatively small. They were the heads of missions and the secretaries (now called first secretaries) of legation. Neither with the unpaid nor the paid attachés was there any manner of contract. The latter received pay in the form of a gratuity, but had no commission. By the action of the Committee, the whole service was made one of contract, for though the unpaid attachés now have no commission, they engage themselves under the distinct pledge that at the end of four years they shall receive a commission and be paid.

'In my opinion, any radical reform of the Service must be based on reducing the number of persons with whom the State concludes contracts to a minimum, and then strictly fulfilling the contract. If there were a tabula rasa to start from, I would suggest some such plan as the following, not as the best possible plan, or one that I have carefully elaborated, but as one which would circumvent the principal difficulties. I would have three classes of diplomatic servants. A first class, consisting of Heads of Missions, not necessarily professional, though largely, possibly wholly, consisting of professionallytrained persons.

'A second class, consisting of Secretaries, wholly professional.

'A third class, consisting of unpaid attachés, from whom the second class should be selected by a very severe test examination. I subjoin a rough sketch of the kind of examination I would propose. All unpaid attachés would have the right to present themselves yearly or biennially for examination. If they passed the examination they would have the right to be selected for the vacant secretaryships.'

Mr. Morier then goes into some further detail of secondary importance, and adds:

'II. As regards the momentary causes of the block, some means should be found of retaining the good men and getting rid of the bad men. This might be done, either by the Foreign Secretary selecting such men in the three lower classes of the profession as had exceptionally distinguished themselves, and bracketing them at the head of the second secretaries as first for promotion to the rank of first secretary, or by a high test examination mostly in subjects chosen by the candidates themselves, and connected with countries in which the individuals have been employed, but which should include a real knowledge of international law and political economy, to which all unpaid attachés and second and third secretaries might voluntarily offer themselves within the next two years. Those who passed it would be placed at

VOL. CXXXIX. NO. CCLXXXIII.

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the head of the list of second secretaries, and receive additional salary, till they became first secretaries. Those who did not pass it, or did not present themselves, would have the option of remaining where they were, or leaving the Service with a fair compensation sum. haps both systems might be combined, i.e. selection by the Foreign Secretary and by examination.

Per

'In the next place, I would grant larger pensions than they would be otherwise entitled to, to some of the older servants in the various categories.

'Lastly, if any missions are abolished, which, however, I altogether deprecate, I would not abolish them altogether, but reduce them to chargé-d'affaireships for secretaries of embassy, which would at once relieve the block where it is most felt.' (Appendix, No. 17, 1870.)

The chief cause of the block' is undoubtedly a reduction in the number of missions combined with an increase of business. This may be called a temporary or incidental cause,' but it is also the result of a state of affairs which necessitates the employment of fewer heads and more hands, and is therefore certain to become one of the permanent defects in the con'dition of the Service.' To apply the rules of a regular seniority service to 122 individuals distributed among posts affording every variety of advantage and disadvantage, from the terrestrial paradise to the hell-upon-earth, is absurd, and until that absurdity is fully recognised and acted upon, it will be impossible to put the diplomatic profession upon a proper footing. Mr. Morier, like all radical reformers, longs for a tabula rasa to work upon; and we believe his principle of reducing the number of persons with whom the State concludes con'tracts to a minimum,' to be the proper basis of the desired reform; but any attempt to apply a new system to men who have enlisted upon the old terms would entail many hardships to individuals, and would inflict serious damage upon that character of the State for good faith by which it is mainly enabled to purchase skilled labour at very low rates. Such a change should be effected gradually by means of rules, carefully framed and carried out with a view to the desired reform. The operation might not be a long one-it would certainly be beneficial; it has, however, we believe, the serious defect of being impracticable.

The first great object of the Committee was, if possible, to remove the block. They stated in their report

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That the altered condition of the Service, while adding in some degree to the efficiency of those who enter it, has rendered promotion very slow, although in the main regular, and has made the prospect of obtaining the higher posts in the profession much more distant than it formerly used to be. . . . That in late years, owing to the abolition

of several missions, this prospect has been rendered yet more remote. That this result is likely to prove injurious to the public service, and has created discouragement among the junior members of the profession, and it is desirable to improve their position.'

The sad administrative bathos of this last sentence shows that the Committee did not feel themselves equal to the task of suggesting any remedy for the state of things which they so much deplored. They did, it is true, make two suggestions bearing upon the block.' 1. That seniority should be disregarded in appointments to the higher posts, and that the Secretary of State, while paying proper regard to the due 'claims of those in the Service, should not be confined in his field of choice, in filling up such appointments to the Service ' alone.' This is much as though a Curates' Aid Society were to propose that while paying proper regard, &c. &c., the Crown should bestow bishoprics and deaneries upon laymen. It might be very right and wise, but it would not remove the grievance under consideration.

2. That the duration of the appointments of the heads of missions at any foreign Court should not exceed five years without conferring any claim for employment for the whole period; and that while the Secretary of State should have it in his power to reappoint any such head to the same or another mission, if he thinks fit, it should be his duty to consider, at the expiration of each period of five years, whether such reappointment is, or is not, for the public service.'

This suggestion has been adopted in the new Regulations, and its appearance there might well cause the heads of many missions to lie uneasily, were it not for the general conviction that it has no more reality than a bad dream. Such a termination of a diplomatic career would be considered almost equivalent to a dismissal; and we venture to predict that, in spite of some exceptions who may be sacrificed to prove the rule, this new regulation will be practically inoperative.

The system has no doubt been constantly enforced with respect to Indian and Colonial Governorships; but their case is very different. The holders of these offices have not been trained up for them from their youth, nor have they had to pass through the lower grades of a regular profession. They require no special education or habits to fit them for their duties, and they accept their posts upon the distinct understanding of a limited term of office. The rule might be very properly applied to the 'outsiders' who are to be occasionally appointed to missions, but we are persuaded that the justice and good nature of our Foreign Secretaries will forbid their cutting off the leg

of mutton just as the struggling diplomatist reaches the top of the tree. So far then as the removal of the 'block' is concerned the Committee have only made one suggestion, which is likely to be useless, accompanied by another which would make the 'block' worse than ever.

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We must not, however, be hard on the Committee. The truth is that they had an impossible puzzle set before them, and that, after twisting and turning it in every way, they gave it up.' We have quoted Mr. Morier's scheme at length, because its author's talents and judgment demand that it should be fairly considered, because it was recommended upon the high authority of Lord Odo Russell, and because it gives the best theoretical view of the Diplomatic Service to be found in the volumes before us. But there are a few practical objections to it which were probably seen by the Committee and which would render its adoption impossible. His scheme is to have a diplomatic army composed of generals, colonels, and volunteer privates, and he seems to forget that one of the most difficult problems was how to supply and deal with the captains. The cause of the block' is, as we said above, the employment of fewer heads and more hands, and it is the consideration of the work to be performed, and of the just demands of the men who perform it, which has produced the classes of second and third secretaries which he proposes to abolish.

These two classes were created upon the recommendation of the Committee of 1861, partly because it was found to be an inconvenience and a grievance that men who had been long in the Service, however slight their claims to future promotion, should have only the title and position of attachés, and therefore rank below many of their juniors in the missions of other countries, and partly because there was a great deal of work to be done, such as the legalisation of documents, which according to Act of Parliament could only be performed by a person holding a commission as Minister or Secretary. This latter reason for the creation of secretaryships might of course be removed by amending the Act and conferring the power of performing such duties upon attachés or upon a permanent officer like the chancelier of some foreign legations; but it would be impossible to throw all the work again upon the Minister and first secretary, and it would not be right that it should be executed by persons holding no official position and who are merely waiting for employment. This difficulty might perhaps be overcome, but it would be hard to deal with. As for the other difficulty respecting the position of attachés of some years' standing, we