doubt, is a good criterion; but I believe out, was to add 100 members by a more popular election of the householders in the different counties. This plan was opposed, as being too popular in the mode of election. But, upon the discussion of that motion, the right hon. gentleman, though he objected to the particular plan in several respects, professed himself friendly to the general question of reform, and promised, on a fit opportunity, to promote that reform which he now confesses to have abandoned for ever. If, then, the introduction of 100 new members, either upon the plan of Mr. Flood, or that of the right hon. gentleman, was considered so great an alteration in the composition of the House of Commons, surely the introduction of 100 Irish members cannot be indifferent. The right hon. gentleman seemed to consider the number of members which the Irish people were to have as a matter of no importance. Without considering, indeed, what is the precise number of Irish representatives, it may be said generally of the number of the representative body, that it ought to be analogous to the population of a country, and embrace all ranks and classes in the community. As to that number which may be convenient for a deliberative assembly, I should consider 558 a number as great as would be consistent with order. The human voice even may afford some criterion, as the number ought not to be greater than could be able to hear the discussions. It has rarely happened of late, indeed, that the attendance has been great, or that parties have been very nicely balanced: if, however, the attendance were to be regular, and an additional 100 members were to be introduced, it would be quite impossible for you, Sir, with all that wisdom, dignity and firmness by which you are distinguished, to preserve order amidst the conflict of nicely balanced parties. But, since an addition of mem-strued into any disrespect for the members is proposed, I should beg leave to suggest, whether any means could be devised for giving the Irish their proper share in the legislature, without increasing the number beyond what would be consistent with the purposes of deliberation. I have stated, that there was reason to apprehend that the influence of the crown would be increased by the Irish members. It is proposed that 31 of the principal towns should return a member each to the united parliament, and these to be selected from their population. This, no The peerage, besides the acquisition of strength, would be another source of influence. Advantages in hope are known to be little less powerful incentives than those in possession; and Irish peers being allowed to continue members of the House of Commons, the expectation of being raised to the peerage as members of the other House would no doubt have a strong influence on their conduct. The situation of the Irish members in regard to property, too, deserves consideration. In that country property is divided into smaller shares than it is in this country; what would be an adequate provision to enable a man to enjoy all the luxuries of rank in Ireland, would not be sufficient here: men are not in this age much disposed to give up those luxuries to which they have been accustomed. These circumstances, the expense of the journey between the two countries, and other matters of this kind, might render the favours of government desirable to many members from the sister kingdom. These observations will not, I trust, be con bers of the Irish parliament; many may be superior to this species of influence: but, in the discussion of a general question of so much importance, we are entitled to augur, from the nature of mankind, what is likely in a number of instances to take place. The Irish members may be exposed to a species of influence less objectionable in its principle though to the purposes of dependence it may not be less dangerous; they may attach themselves to the side of ministers, from a desire to obtain greater advantages for, and securing the Independence of Parliament." The motion being seconded by Mr. Tierney, for their country. That this may be the case, we have an example in the members for Scotland. It certainly is a matter of fact, that the Scots members have generally attached themselves to the party of every minister; and, doubtless, the hope of thus better promoting the interests of their country may have contributed to this effect, as well as more private influence. Upon the whole, therefore, it appears to me evident, that ulti mately at least the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration. Having thus stated my objections to the number of new members to be introduced into the House, and pointed out the mischiefs which that change is likely to produce; it may perhaps be thought, that I should be prepared to offer some plan, to supersede a project which I disapprove. Although I do not agree that it is necessary for those who disapprove of a specific plan, to propose a substitute, I am ready to state what I consider calculated to remove some part of the inconveniences which we apprehend, The plan I shall throw out for reducing the number of the House is pretty nearly that which the right hon. gentleman proposed for the reform of parliament. I would suggest, then, that 40 of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off; which would lead to a vacancy of 28 members. I should then propose that the ratio on which Ireland at present is to have 100 members should be preserved. Thus the proportion to the remainder 478 would give us 85 members for Ireland. The county elections I should propose to leave as they are, which would give 69 members; so that 16 would remain to be chosen, by a popular election, by the principal towns. This change, no doubt, would be more favourable to popular election; but seeing the tendency of the new members to fall under the influence of the crown, the corrective proposed ought to be considered an additional recommendation to the plan. Such an arrangement would contribute, in some degree to maintain the independence of parliament, now doubly threatened by the preservation of all its existing defects, and the introduction of so great an addition of members who would be subject to the influence of the crown. I move, therefore, "That it be an instruction to the Committee, to take into their consideration the most effectual means of providing Lord Hawkesbury said:-Mr. Speaker; I entirely agree with the hon. gentleman, that this is a practical question; that it would be mischievous and absurd to ground a reform in parliament on any fanciful idea of proportion, or on a dispo sition to acquiesce in the wild projects of men of speculative minds or heated imaginations; yet though he enforces this proposition in the commencement of his speech, I cannot help thinking that, when he comes to the detail, he falls into the very error which he condemns. The hon. gentleman states, that the tendency of his motion to bring back the constitution to its original principles and practice. Before we can form our opinion upon this part of the subject, we ought, I contend, to have some period fixed to which we can refer for these principles and this practice. I wish to know what is the æra of our history to which the hon. gentleman would direct our attention, that we may judge of the representation of the Com mons of England in its pure and unadulterated state. If he will come fairly to that inquiry, he will find that the popular influence in our government, so far: from having decreased, has been gradually increasing. The inequality in our representation, of which the hon. gentleman complains, is not of modern date; it has. subsisted at all times. If we recur to the early periods of our history, we shall find that there were some places of great extent, of large population, and in a very flourishing condition, which did not return any members at all; and that there were other places proportionably small and inconsiderable, which were allowed to send representatives to this House. It may be true that, in some instances, towns which once were populous, and sent representatives to parliament, may have fallen into decay; and that some villages, to which this privilege was not accorded, may have become great and populous towns. But, are these the only innovations which time and circumstances have made in our constitution? Let the hon. gentleman take into the account what alterations have occurred in the distribution and division of property. We all know that the right of voting at elections for counties is vested in every person possessing a 40s. freehold: that right has under gone no change since it was first establish- | king James 1st, commanding the sheriffs but the difference between the value of not to summon members from decayed money then and now is so great, that 40s. boroughs. The conduct of king James, in a year at that time is equal to 201. a year the case alluded to, has, I believe, always at present. Besides, from the increase of been considered to have been unconstipopulation, of commerce, and of wealth of tutional: it was the opinion of lord chief every description, many towns which did justice Coke, and it has been the opinion not contain 100 electors formerly, contain of every great constitutional authority at present some thousands. I state from his time to the present, that though these things to show, that if the popular the crown could give the right of repreinfluence has lost in some instances, it has sentation, it could not afterwards take it gained in a much greater proportion in away; that all political rights existed others. There are, I know, many persons pro bono publico; and that, though they who entertain very erroneous notions as might originate from the Crown they to the origin of this House. Representa- were ever after independent rights-and tion was originally no part of our consti- no act of the crown, no act of the parties, tution. The Grand Council of the nation no usage even could affect them-nothing consisted solely of tenants in capite from short of an act of the whole legislature the crown.* When, in consequence of the could abrogate them. This was decided divisions of property, the lesser barons be- in a memorable instance in the peerage, in came too numerous to attend conveniently which it was maintained, that a peer could in person, they were allowed, out of their not resign his peerage, because it was a own body, to send representatives; this is right not granted to him for his indithe origin of the Commons of England; so vidual use, but that he held it pro bono that the principle of our representation is publico; and that the collective voice property. At a subsequent period of our of the community acting through the history, when commerce had in some de- legislature, could alone deprive him of it. gree revived, charters were granted by Sir, the hon. gentleman has stated, that the crown to corporations, and summonses it is not fair to condemn principles, such issued to certain towns and boroughs to as those which have of late been estasend members to parliament. This pre-blished in France, because they may have rogative was principally exercised for the been abused. I perfectly agree that there purpose of counteracting the influence of is no principle in morals or politics the great lords; but these charters do not appear to have been granted, nor these summonses issued, upon any uniform principle, but solely according to the will of the reigning monarch; and from the commencement of the borough representation to the present day, it does not appear, as far as we have any lights upon the subject, that the representation was more popular in principle at any period than it is at present. Sir, the hon. gentleman has alluded to a proclamation of * See Magna Charta. The twelfth article states, that no scutage or aid shall be imposed, except by the cmomon council of our kingdom, but for redeeming the king's body, for making his eldest son a knight, and for marrying his eldest daughter." The 14th article states, "that to have a common council of the kingdom to assess an aid or scutage otherwise than in the three before-mentioned cases, we will cause to be summoned the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and greater Barons, personally, by our letters; and besides, we will cause to be summoned in general, by our sheriffs and bailiffs, all those who hold of us in chief." which is not capable of abuse; but I cannot think this observation applicable to the principles of the French revolution. I contend, that the principles of that revolution, the rights of man, as conveyed and explained by the leaders to the people in France, and as afterwards acted upon, What were are fundamentally false. those principles? Equality was publicly held out to the lower orders of the people equality in rank and in power: equality even almost unlimited in property. Little indeed, has that person observed of human nature, who does not know that men are unequal in talents, strength, activity, and in short, in every quality of the mind and body. Government is not founded on the equa lity, but is a regulation of the natural inequalities of man. Artificial inequality has always been considered as the corrective of natural inequality. The object of government and of society, is not to Providence has established, and which, counteract that order of things which do what we will, we cannot avoid; but its object is, to prevent those convulsions which, in a state of nature, could not fail I to arise from the diversity of the characters, and the violence of the passions of men; to secure to every one the fruits of his own industry; to maintain all the gradations in life, from the prince to the peasant; to restrain the powerful; to assist the weak; to relieve the distressed; and to afford to each class of the community the greatest degree of happiness which it is capable of enjoying, With respect to the question of parliamentary reform, we, who have been at all times most averse to it; have always admitted, that if a practical grievance to a considerable extent could really be proved; if it could be shown that this House, virtually representing the people, were not generally in unison with their sentiments and wishes, and that the popular feeling was not impressed upon it; we I say, have always admitted, that if all this could be proved, it would be a proper ground for some parliamentary reform, from the time of the Revolution; I see here, the strongest argument against parliamentary reform. If I consider the power of resistance and defence against an enemy, which our government possesses; if I review the energy which it has displayed in all wars, but more especially in the course of the present contest, if I reflect upon its great and successful efforts in defending its own territories and liberties, and its exertions for the salvation of Europe, surely I see, on this ground, a strong argument against parliamentary reform. If I look to the last point, to internal prosperity and wealth, I look at our situation in this respect, not only with satisfaction and pride, but with emotions of astonishment and surprise. Sir, no man's expectations however sanguineno man's hopes, however confident-could make him suppose that possible, which he sees verified by fact in the progressive wealth and prosperity of the country. cases where the expectancy of an evil argument against parliamentary reform. may be ground for reform, though the If the present constitution, practically evil itself has not been felt. But considered, secures internal tranquillity, such cases should be acted upon with civil liberty, the power of resistance and extreme caution, for by an unnecessary defence, and the wealth and prosperity of change we may frequently create an evil the country; if we have the evidence of where none exists, and where our only ob- experience, that it secures all these object ought to be to avoid one. The only jects in a higher degree, and on a more really safe ground of reform is a practical solid foundation, than has ever been done grievance, which, if it is not now conside- by any other government in any other rable in itself, should appear at least to be country, where or what can be the prac progressive. It will not, then,be thought sur-tical ground of argument for introducing prising when we consider all the effects of any change or reform in the constitution good government;'when we feel ard observe, of the country? that this country has, for so long a period, enjoyed every blessing which any country has ever enjoyed, and which perhaps any one is capable of enjoying, that we should entertain a strong prejudice against any alteration in the frame of our government. Sir, if I was called upon to state what in my idea constitutes a good government, I should say, that the best evidences of its excellence are, the existence of internal tranquillity, civil liberty, the power of defence against a foreign enemy, and progressive and increasing wealth and prosperity. If I look to the first point, internal tranquillity, and consider with how few interruptions this country has enjoyed this blessing for a century, I see on this ground, no plea for reform. When I look to civil liberty, and observe that no country in the world ever enjoyed it in such a degree, or to such an extent, so pure, so unrestrained, as this country has done The hon. gentleman has asked us, whe ther the House of Commons, in point of fact, has been found to be in unison with the sentiments and feelings of the people? In answer to this, I will aver, that, with very few exceptions, it will be found that the parliament for the last century has spoken the sentiments of the nation; and that, during no period of the century, has the parliament been so completely in unison with the feelings and sentiments of the country, as during the last eighteen years. Sir, I will not go into any detail of any former period; but I will contend, that all the wars in which we have been engaged have been popular in the commencement; that the American war in the beginning was unequivocally approved of by the nation; and that when the ill success which attended it created a change in the public opinion, that change was communicated to this House. With re was increasing, and ought to be dimi nished;" a vote which the hon. gentleman seems to think was not attended with those consequences which ought to have resulted from it. In 1782, however, & bill was introduced into this House, and passed by the legislature, for reducing the influence of the crown; and a spirit of internal reform has prevailed in the government from that time to the present. hold in my hand a paper, which shows that, in 1778, the number of members in this House possessing places under government, including contractors, amounted to 118: in 1800, the number of members holding places amounts only to 52: so that, within these twenty years, there has been a diminution of the influence of the crown, in this House, arising from places and contracts, of more than one-half. spect to the present war, the hon. gentle- I come now to the application of this question to the union with Ireland; and I am ready to agree, that I should act inconsistently with the principles I have stated, if I did not confess, that, looking to the subject abstractedly, I regret the necessity of making any change at all in the constitution of this House. As long as the question respected Great Britain alone, no man could be more hostile to any innovation in the constitution of parliament than myself: but the peace and security of Ireland, the integrity and strength of the British empire, make it necessary to have recourse to measures which, on any other ground, I should think highly objectionable. If, then, to incorporate the two countries, it becomes indispensable that some change should take place in the constitution of parliament, it is important to provide that that change should be as small as possible, and should be made on the least objectionable grounds. It is a strong presumption in favour of the resolution now proposed, and the principles on which it is founded, that many great authorities, who had been inimical to every other species of parlia mentary reform, have been of opinion that it was advisable to increase the number of county members, or landed representatives; and I have never talked with any person who was the greatest enemy to reform, who did not prefer, of all the plans suggested, that which tended to increase the number of county members. without affecting the present state of the borough representation. Parliamentary reform, ist certainly a wide expression; it may sig nify, when used by some, only a small |