Roberts vs. The State of Georgia. clusive was that celebrated argument, that it is now looked upon by the profession as authority. In the records of forensic eloquence, ancient and modern, nothing is to be found surpassing Erskine's defence of Hadsfield, for condensation, perspicuity and strength of reasoning, as well as for beauty of illustration, and purity of style. In that case, he assumed the position, that a man might have reason sufficient to distinguish between the right and the wrong of the act about to be committed, and yet be irresponsible; that the mind might be cognizant of the distinction between right and wrong, as regards the act, and yet by reason of some delusion, overmastering the will, there might be no criminal intent. To apply this proposition, it was admitted by Mr. Erskine, that the act itself must be connected with the peculiar delusion under which the prisoner labours. This doctrine can be best understood by illustration, and it is illustrated by Hadsfield's case. He had been a soldier in the British armies, and had received several severe wounds, one of which, on the head, it was thought, had injured the brain, and caused the derangement under which he suffered. He imagined that he had constant intercourse with the Almighty, that the world was coming to a conclusion, and like our blessed Saviour, he was to sacrifice himself for its salvation. Unwilling to commit suicide, it was argued by Mr. Erskine, he sought to do an act which would forfeit his life to the law, and thus bring about the sacrifice, which, in his morbid imagination, he held necessary to the salvation of the world. Under the influence of this delusion, he shot at the king, in the theatre. Now, in this case, it was not pretended that Hadsfield was a raving madman, or an imbecile idiot; nor was it contended that he was incapable of knowing that shooting a pistol at the king, would, or might kill him, or that if he should kill the king, that he would deserve death for the act; (for that really was what he desired,) or that he was incapable of distinguishing between the right and the wrong of the act; but it was contended, that the delusion under which he laboured had so shattered his intellect, as to control his will, and impel him resistlessly to the commission of the act, and therefore there was no criminal motive, no wicked or mischievous intent, and if these were wanting, he was irresponsible. To use the language of Mr. Erskine, "Reason is not driven from her seat, but distraction sits down upon it, along with her, holds her trembling upon it, and frightens her from her propriety." Hadsfield was acquitted; and since that day, the exception which his case established has been Roberts vs. The State of Georgia. recognised. See Erskine's speech, in appendix to Cooper's Medical Jurisprudence; 29 Howell State Tr. 1281. Thus far with safety we may assert, that certain principles have been established; yet it is true that these rules do not govern all cases. It is conceded by the courts in England, practically if not in terms, that no rules can be so specific as to embrace the infinite variety of forms in which insanity, or derangement, may show itself; and that each case must depend very much upon the circumstances, facts and developments which attend it. Thus, Lord Hale says, "It is very difficult to define the. invisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity. But it must rest upon circumstances, duly to be weighed and considered by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defect of human nature, or on the other, too great indulgence be given to great crimes." So Taylor declares, "There are no certain legal or medical rules whereby homicidal mania may be detected. Each case must be determined by the circumstances which attend it." Taylor Med. Jurisp. 649; see also 5 Car. & Pay. 168; 9 id. 525. In the opinion which C. J. Denman gave before the House of Lords, in 1843, although adhering to the old rules, he says, "It is difficult to lay down any abstract rule on the subject, applicable to all cases, and each case must be decided, in great measure, upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to it, under the discretion of the court." In the case at this bar, the evidence shows no particular delusion to control the will, sitting upon reason's seat and holding her trembling, and frightening her from her propriety." It does not come within the exception to the rule laid down by Judge Floyd, which was established in Hadsfield's case. This case is embraced within that rule, and we think the Court below correctly gave that rule in charge to the jury. If there was partial insanity in this case, about which we express no opinion, it was the effect of melancholy, growing out of disappointed love. There was no proof of raving madness, nor of peculiar mania. The prisoner had addressed Mrs. Julian, and been rejected; afterwards he talked occasionally incoherently, looked vacant in the face, sat up late at night, and wrote some silly letters, and all attended with a habit of intemperance. At the time he committed the assault, and previously, he was violent, rude towards Mrs. Julian and her mother, and indecent in his conversation. He seems to have been on that day the very person to whom Mr. Erskine denies the protection of insanity, one "who exhibits only violent passions and malignant Mims vs. Macon & Western R. R, Co. resentments, acting upon real circumstances, who is impelled to evil from no morbid delusion, but who proceeds upon the ordinary perceptions of the mind." Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed. No. 49.-NEEDHAM MIMS, plaintiff in error, vs. THE MACON & WESTERN RAIL ROAD COMPANY, defendant in error. [1.] Some general principles asserted, respecting the rights and remedies of land holders and stockholders, citizens and corporations, in reference to internal improvements. [2.] The lien of the vendor of real estate, attaches for the purchase money against the vendee, and all persons claiming as volunteers or with notice, under him. [3.] The vendor's lien applies to lands, the title to which has been transferred by operation of law, under our rail road and other corporation charters, as well as to voluntary sales, by the party himself. [4.] There is no fixed rule as to what amounts to a waiver; each case must be deter mined by its own circumstances. [5.] Even the taking of security for the purchase money, is not conclusive evidence that the lien is waived. [6.] The vendor's lien is not extinguished by the acceptance of the certificate of deposit of the cashier of the corporation, for the valuation of his land as assessed by the commissioners; provided the money is not paid when called for, owing to the insolvency of the company. [7.] A decree in equity, for the sale of the land, is the proper remedy to enforce the lien. In Equity. Bill to enforce vendor's lien. Tried before Judge FLOYD. In Bibb Superior Court. May Term, 1847. The facts and circumstances of the case, and the error assigned, are fully stated in the opinion delivered by the Supreme Court, to which the reader is referred. His Honour, Judge NISBET, having been of counsel below, gave no opinion. JOHN J. GRESHAM, for the plaintiff in error. A vendor of real estate has a lien upon it for the unpaid pur Mims vs. Macon & Western R. R. Co. chase money, unless the circumstances of the case show an intention not to reserve the lien, or unless separate and independent security be taken. Taking the bond or note of the purchaser does not waive the lien. Mackreth vs. Symmons, 15 Vesey R. 330; Nairn vs. Prowse, 6 id. 752; Stafford vs. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cowen R. 316; Garson vs. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 308; Hughes vs. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lefr. R. 132; Gibbons vs. Baddall, 2 Eq. Cas. abr. 682; Coppin vs. Coppin, 2 P. Wilms. R. 291; Brown vs. Gilman, 4 Wheat. R. 255; Deible vs. Barwick, 1 Blackf. R. 339; Cole vs. Scott, 2 Wash. R. 141; Story Eq. 462 to 482; ib. 544 to 549.. MCDONALD, and POE & NISBET, for the defendant in error. Private property not to be taken for public use without just compensation. Prince 900. In this case the money was tendered to the complainant, and he refused to accept it. That the tender was sufficient, see Norris' Peake 431, Johns. R. 474. 422; 8 *The acceptance of the certificate of deposit was payment under the circumstances of this case. But if it was not, the tender previously made and the refusal, vested the property in the defendant, and the defendant had a right to convey. Prince 316. The defendant having a right to convey, the sale, under the decree of the court of chancery, vested the same title in the purchaser that he would have received had he taken the conveyance direct from the Monroe Rail Road Company. By the refusal of the money when tendered, Mims lost his lien on the land, and only held a demand against the Monroe Rail Road and Banking Company, for the amount of the assessment, and was reduced to a footing with the general creditors of the company. 18 Johns. R. 110. By the Court.-LUMPKIN, J., delivering the opinion. In 1833, the legislature of Georgia incorporated the Monroe Rail Road Company, with the following clause in their charter, section 10: "In all or any case or cases, where land or private rights of way Mims vs. Macon & Western R. R, Co. may be required by said company, for the uses aforesaid," [meaning the construction of the road,]" and the same cannot, for want of agreement between the parties as to price, or for any other cause, be purchased from the owner or owners thereof, the same may be taken at a valuation, to be made by commissioners or a majority of them, to be appointed by the Superior court of the county where the land or right of way may be situated; and the said commissioners, before they act, shall severally take an oath before some justice of the peace, faithfully and impartially to discharge the duties assigned them. In making said valuation, the said commissioners shall take into consideration the loss or damage which may occur to the owner or owners, in consequence of the land being taken or the right of way obstructed, and also the benefit and advantage that he, she or they may receive from the establishment of said rail road, and shall state particularly the nature and amount of each; and the excess of loss or damage, over and above the benefit and advantage, shall form the measure of valuation of said land or right of way. The proceedings of said commissioners, accompanied with a full description and plat of said land, shall be returned under the hands and seals of said commissioners, or a majority of them, to the court whence said commission issued, there to remain on record; and the lands or right of way, shall vest in said company in fee simple, as soon as the valuation thereof may be paid, or, when refused, may be tendered.". Prince 316. Meaning of course, when tendered may be refused. By an amendment to the charter, passed in December, 1835, and accepted by the company, it is provided, section 2: "In all cases where by the 10th section of the original act, a valuation may have been made, or shall hereafter be made, of land through which the rail-road passes, by the commissioners, that either party may have the right of appeal to a special jury, at the ensuing term of the Superior court: Provided, that the progress of said road shall not be arrested by said appeal; and provided further, that said company shall give security to the party, for the payment of all damages that may be assessed by the speciál jury." Prince 345, 346. All of our rail road charters contain a provision similar to this; and it is inserted here to show the oft declared opinion of the legislature, that the 8th amendment to the constitution of the United States, which declares that, "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of |