sequently, every instance of love or hatred is not to be referred to association as its cause; and, since it is the dictate of nature that we should believe an object which we love, to be agreeable in its own nature, when our love appears to us to rest on what it is in itself, and not on the effects which it may be adapted to produce; and the suspicion, that our attachment to it arises from associating it with its effect, or with some other object, is the refinement of philosophy; it is incumbent on those who ascribe any> given instance of affection to association as its origin, to show that such reference is correct and well founded. In doing this, it is necessary for them to prove, not only that association has an influence in the case in question, but that it has an influence sufficiently powerful to produce the effect ascribed to it, in the absence of all other causes. To say that the love of virtuous conduct may originate in the same way as the love of money, is only to affirm that the contrary cannot be demonstrated, or that the supposition does not involve a contradiction. This is an affirmation which few would venture to deny, as demonstration, strictly so called, is not to be expected in matters of this kind. But there is a wide difference between possibility and certainty. The arguments which prove the former are, by no means, sufficient to establish the latter. We must wait for further evidence, after we have admitted that a thing is possible, before we believe it to be fact.

2. Among objects which are agreeable or disagreeable to us in their own nature, the moral actions of intelligent and accountable agents are included. As, in the physical world, there are some colours, figures, and proportions, which are pleasing, and others which are displeasing; so in morals there are some actions which, in the contemplation of them, are pleasing, and others which are repulsive. We perceive a suitableness between them and the character and situation of the agent, which appears beautiful, and which excites in our minds a sensation of pleasure, similar to that which is produced by the perception of proportion, or any other beauty in natural objects; or we discover the want of it, and the perception awakens an opposite sensation. The sublime and beautiful belong to conduct as well as to objects of sense; and the man whose moral taste is correct, delicate; and vigorous, will see greater loveliness in an act of tenderness and compassion, than in forms and colours, and higher sublimity in an act of forgiveness, where a heinous and provoking injury has been received, and revenge is easy to

be taken, than in all the majesty of nature. Now, if conduct be agreeable to us as it is sublime or beautiful, it follows, (unless taste also be founded in utility *,) that actions possess some essential properties by which they immediately affect our minds; and, if they do, it is not true, without exception, that they are distinguished only by their tendency. It becomes necessary to limit this assertion to their moral nature, and, even taken with this limitation, some doubt is, by this circumstance, thrown upon its truth. It would not, indeed, be logical to affirm, that because an object possesses one property, therefore another also belongs to it, unless such a connexion were pointed out between them, as would warrant us to infer the one from the other; but if actions are objects of taste on the ground of their essential qualities, it is not antecedently improbable, that it may be something in their own nature which excites in our minds the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, merit and demerit. It appears, on the contrary, quite as probable that these sentiments are founded on their own essential nature, as that they originate from association.

The phraseology of this argument is more strictly in accordance with the principles of taste adopted by Blair and others, than with those of Alison; but the argument itself is fully sustained even by his views. If he be right in maintaining, that the qualities of mind only possess the power of exciting the emotion of beauty or sublimity, and that material objects acquire this power merely by association; still the qualities of mind must, in some way or other, be exhibited to our attention before they can produce that effect; and actions, while, morally considered, they are not material, are the natural exponents of mental properties.

3. Association is not sufficient to account for our moral sentiments. They include an effect which never flows from it, and which the contemplation of its nature leads us to conclude that it is incapable of producing. The instances which have been mentioned, do not furnish an adequate analogy. Although a miser loves money, and a literary man books, merely for their own sake; they do not conceive of them as possessing such merit as to entitle their owner to any happiness in addition to that which they are adapted to afford. The mere circumstance of possessing, or of being

Although this supposition has been made, and ingenuity employed to give it a degree of plausibility, as it has never been adopted to any considerable extent, or embraced by any of our more popular writers on the subject of taste, it is not necessary to attempt its refutation.

destitute of them, does not render a person, on account of his personal character, the object of praise or blame, or the subject of reward or punishment: but virtue and vice always do this; and, consequently, there must be something in their nature, distinct from their tendency to produce happiness or misery. As the want of books or money has a tendency to produce suffering, the person who sustains it would be regarded as equally entitled to blame and punishment with a vicious man, if vice possessed no other property than the same tendency. A vicious man, it is true, may hurt others as well as himself; but, in estimating guilt according to the standard of utility, it is of no consequence who suffers, the guilty or the innocent; the only consideration is the quantity of suffering; and there are some cases in which the want of books may be as hurtful to others, as a considerable quantity of vice; so far, at least, as the injuries actually resulting from vice, come under our observation. Ignorance, arising from the want of books, may, in a physician, kill many of his patients; in a lawyer, ruin many of his clients; and, in a minister of religion, drown many of the souls committed to his care, in perdition and destruction.Association is certainly a powerful principle, and often operates where it is not suspected to exist. But it is not omnipotent; and we have no instance of its inducing us to ascribe qualities, either to effects or causes, on account of their connexion with each other, which belong to neither of them; nor does its nature warrant the expectation that such an instance will ever be found.

These observations, it is conceived, not only refute the notion, that utility and association together, are sufficient to account for our moral sentiments, but supply some additional evidence, to corroborate the arguments contained in the former part of this essay. Indeed, the refutation of objections is always a confirmation of the principle against which they are brought; especially when they consist of conflicting hypotheses. A supposition to which no objection can be made, is either self-evident, or needs but little evidence to prove it to be true. Truth must lie somewhere; and in portion as plausible hypotheses are shown to be without foundation, the field of investigation is narrowed, and increasing probability attaches to any particular spot, which may be assigned as its place. The hypothesis which we have just been considering, carries with it an air of great plausibility. The tendency of actions is often insisted on by moralists and divines, because it is an argument which ap

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peals to the selfishness of man, and the force of which may, therefore, be felt by the most depraved; whilst association is a power to which so many surprising effects have been ascribed, that its nature has been rendered, in some measure, vague and indefinite. Hence this hypothesis has been embraced by many persons of acute, intelligent, and philosophical minds; and if our attempt to disprove it has been successful, the true theory of the foundation of morals, will be adopted to a wide extent, almost as a matter of course.It might, perhaps, with equal plausibility, be maintained that truth, or justice, or wisdom, is the primary foundation of morals, as that this honour belongs exclusively to the principle of utility. The error of all such suppositions is, that they are not sufficiently comprehensive. A desire to simplify the theory of morals, may dispose us to fix on some one principle as the cause from which all moral phenomena originate; and it is strictly philosophical to admit no more causes of any given effects than are sufficient to account for them. But, while due attention is paid to these considerations, it is not unnecessary to be upon our guard, lest a mistaken pursuit of simplicity should lead us to exercise our ingenuity, in bending and colouring facts, till they appear subservient to a preconceived and favourite hypothesis.

It follows from the doctrine here maintained, that a regard to utility is not to be set up as the only rule of human conduct. It is evidently the dictate of nature, the first law of which is to seek our own welfare, that we should regulate our conduct by our moral sentiments. For we cannot act inconsistently with them, without subjecting ourselves to the pain of self-condemnation, and it has been shown that they are excited by the rectitude and propriety of actions as well as by their tendency; or, to speak in the language of the ancient moralists, by the honestum, as well as by the utile.

This inference is confirmed by other considerations. Even expediency, when fairly consulted, declares that such a creature as man ought not to make it his exclusive, or even his primary guide. For, on account of the weakness of his understanding, and the imperfection of his knowledge, he is liable to fall into mistake in calculating the future consequences of his conduct; particularly when he is agitated by strong passions, and under the influence of powerful temptations. He is naturally disposed to grasp at a good which is near, although it be but small, in foolish preference of it to one that is more remote, although its cer

tainty should be complete, and its value immense; and to prefer the low and grovelling pleasures of sense, to those which are of a more refined, dignified, and spiritual nature. He is not possessed of sufficient benevolence to induce him, of his own accord, to pay a suitable regard to the welfare of others; and even were he to judge correctly respecting his own interests and the interests of others, he is not possessed of sufficient power to accomplish the objects which he has in view, but is often baffled and disappointed in his efforts to attain them. Hence, it is plain that, were utility a perfect rule of action considered in itself, still it is not fit for him. His deficiency in goodness, wisdom, and power, renders him incapable of using it with advantage. Were he to commit himself to its guidance, the most pernicious consequences would inevitably ensue. Even Paley's morality is defective, although he appears to have pushed the principle of expediency as far as it could be fairly carried, without employing it to prove that it ought not to be made the primary rule of human conduct; and has, perhaps, inferred from it some rules, for which, though good in themselves, judged of by the standard of moral fitnesses, expediency will be regarded by less intelligent and less cautious moralists, as supplying a very slight foundation. It is far more safe and beneficial, that man should observe the principles of justice and veracity as far as they go, not permitting himself to deviate from them, in any instance, or on any account, as they are, in general, plain and of easy application, and the practice of them is of the most beneficial tendency; and that he should commit himself to the guidance of utility only in cases to which they do not extend. This course of action may occasion him, in some extreme cases, a little more self-denial and suffering, than a large and comprehensive expediency would impose; but it will also enable him to escape the still greater evils, which would probably result from mistake, in the application of that difficult and dangerous principle.

The language of Scripture leads to a similar conclusion. It frequently recommends a regard to utility; for this is the object of all its exhortations to secure our own best interests, to do good to all men, and to promote the divine glory; but it never intimates that we are at liberty to violate the laws of justice or veracity, in order to attain these ends. Its precepts which enforce the practice of these virtues, are expressed without reserve or limitation; and are, therefore, most naturally interpreted to be of strictly