SIR,

IN

Stapleton, near Bristol,
Sept. 4, 1823.

N reply to the remarks of your correspondent Mr. Eaton, in your last Number, (p. 465,) upon the subject of my communication, on the Introduction of Evil," in your Number for July last, (pp. 378-380,) I beg leave to state, that he is mistaken in supposing that in proposing my hypothesis, which asserts that evil is the necessary inheritance of all created intelligences, and that every being not infinite must be liable to error and evil, I had not "foreseen or provided for a consequence of the greatest magnitude," which results from it (i. e.) the existence of evil in heaven itself. The fact is, that I had in the original composition comprising this hypothesis both foreseen and asserted this inference, and in the conclusion of my letter to you on this subject I gave an intimation, that "there were some other inferences drawn from the foregoing hypothesis which I did not think necessary to set forth," and the necessary existence of evil in a future state formed one of these suppressed inferences: my reason for suppressing which, was the fear that it might shock minds unused to metaphysical inquiries, and thus with many other novel truths do injury upon its first promulgation, although I am fully persuaded that every truth, however shocking to existing prejudices, must eventually produce good. I did not, however, wish to risk the production even of temporary injury, if it could be avoid

ed; but our worthy friend having now forced this inference to come unwillingly from its concealment, I will give it in the words in which it stands in the original composition, and shall fearlessly enter on its justification, as I am not in the habit of shrinking from any conclusion whatever to which truth appears to lead (i. e.):

4thly. The foregoing hypothesis

shews that though the perfection of the righteous in a future state may be far more exalted than perhaps even the highest created intelligence can now possibly conceive, yet must it fall short of infinite perfection, which belongs alone to God; since the attributes of created intelligences can never become infinite by future glorification, though thereby they will doubtless be matured and improved far beyond all present calculation or conception. Some small degree of alloy must be admitted, since it is contrary to the hypothesis upon which these inferences are drawn, that any created intelligence can exist without some portion of evil; although the portion of evil which may then be necessary by its counteraction to produce pleasure, may be so almost infinitely refined, as not at present to be capable of conception, as distinct from purity and bliss: and thus constitute the highest happiness of which created beings can possibly be susceptible."

Mr. Eaton's feelings are alarmed, as I confess mine were, when this last inference first arose in my mind, at the thought of casting "a doubt upon the unmixed happiness promised to the righteous;" but if that gentleman will keep strictly in view the principle on which my hypothesis founds the existence of happiness, and "justifies the ways of God to man," in the unavoidable existence of evil, he will find that his objection will cease; since it will appear that not only all creation, but that all happiness, is necessarily inseparable from evil; that evil is alike essential to the production of both; that pleasure could not possibly exist without its contrast-pain and anxiety; that it is indeed their legitimate offspring; and that it is beyond the power of infinity itself to produce it without their agency, in minds constructed with limited attributes; since to produce happiness in such minds, change, fluctuation, counteraction and pursuit, causing the sensations of plea

except God. And another of these inferences substantiates the mechanical nature of the human mind, and the doctrine of philosophical necessity; but your usually crowded columns forbid my transcribing them for insertion.

sure and pain, become indispensably necessary; and these effects can only arise from contending or opposite causes, one of which necessarily iden tifies itself with what we call evil. Mr. E. asks, "How can we be sure of enjoying (unalloyed) happiness or perfection in heaven itself? For when there, we shall still be created beings, and as finite then as we are now, consequently as liable to miscalculation, failure and error." Now, so far from being sure of unchangeable happiness in a future state, my hypothesis proves that it is only on the ground of our being sure that no such inactive stagnant happiness can exist, that we can expect any happiness there at all; since the happiness of all created beings necessarily supposes change, transition, fluctuation, pursuit, hope and fear, grounded of course upon contending or opposite causes, one of which must be evil, as two opposite and contending causes cannot both be of the same nature or principle.

Mr. E. overstrains the conclusion to be drawn from my hypothesis, in supposing that it implies, that we shall remain " as finite then as now, and as liable to miscalculation, failure and error," as we are at present; for though in heaven we shall assuredly remain "created beings and finite," and still liable to miscalculation, failure and error," since both our existence and our happiness will be then, as they are now, inseparably and necessarily connected with these facts and liabilities; but the hypothesis by no means implies, that we shall be so liable to these things as now, nor so finite then as now, but the very contrary, inasmuch as it shews, that our mental powers will be astonishingly enlarged beyond what " eye hath seen or ear heard, or hath entered into the heart of man to conceive;" and in the measure in which they are so enlarged, and in proportion as we are enabled to perceive the consequences of our own conduct, and to secure the intended effects of our own designs, in that very proportion our happiness must increase. We have, indeed, a full example and illustration of this fact in the present life, since the wise and calculating avoid much more evil than the ignorant and unthinking and could we now ascertain the exact proportion in which

that increase of knowledge would take place, the same rule would, I doubt not, shew us the exact increase of our happiness; and which may there. fore be so far beyond our present conceptions, as to appear absolutely infinite, inasmuch as it defies our ut. most calculation; but infinite it never can be for the reasons before assigned.

With respect to "unmixed happiness being promised to the righteous in the gospel," I would only observe, that it is impossible that any word in any language can be of such extensive and unlimited meaning, as to comprise the promise of infinite happiness, either in degree or duration, (and unmixed happiness can be no less than infinite,) since as language cannot exceed idea, and seldom, indeed, comes up to it; and as we have no idea whatever of infinity, all expressions in allusion to future bliss, as well as to future punishment, must have a relative or limited meaning; and can really mean no more than this-a longer time or higher degree than we can calculate: and that this is the case in the original languages of the Scriptures, I have often noticed; and, hence, have frequently found an advantage in argument with the assertors of endless torment, when they have urged that the Greek ar implies endless duration, because it is used in reference to future happiness; and particularly that, in Matt. XXV. 46, avoy is used even in the same verse, in reference to happiness as well as to punishment; and, therefore, must have a like meaning in both cases, supposing, of course, that I should readily admit its endless meaning as to future happiness: but I have replied that this word in neither case signifies endless or infinite, either in duration, degree or nature, but only what its primitive signification imports, age-lasting or limited, or an indefinitely long period: and this is in perfect unison with the third as well as fourth inferences I have drawn from the hypothesis; the former of which denies the capacity of any creature to possess the attribute of immortality, and requires renewals of existence in a future state, to prolong it to an infinite period; and which faith in the goodness of the Almighty teaches us to rely upon. No

argument therefore can, I apprehend, be derived from the Scriptures, at all opposed to the inferences I have drawn.

I have endeavoured to procure a sight of Dr. Williams's Sermon, in which Mr. E. says there is something similar to my hypothesis, but in vain. It has just occurred to me, that there is, perhaps, something like it, in the old Heathen philosophy, which supposed that there was some intractability in nature, which God could not overcome; and, therefore, in creation could not dispense with evil, but made the best he could of his intractable materials. This, however, impiously supposed the Deity not to have been the Creator of the materials, out of which he fashioned the universe; and is, therefore, very different from that hypothesis, which merely points out certain effects necessarily attendant upon every creature, and which mark his inferiority to the Creator, by exhibiting the limited nature of his attributes.

I shall be most heartily sorry should my present communication hurt the pious impressions, or wound the future prospects of unchangeable happipiness, of any who may be incapable of perceiving the genuine basis upon which happiness, both here and hereafter, appears to me to be founded: none will regret it more than I shall; but called upon as I am to justify my impressions, be assured no consequences will ever frighten me from the maintenance, or the legitimate conclusions of truth.

I

SIR,

G. P. HINTON.

AM much obliged to your learned correspondent J. J. (pp. 465467), for the indulgent manner in which he controverts my criticism on Gen. iv. 26. When inquirers have no other object but truth, they will agree to differ; and there will be no ground for any other feeling but candour and mutual esteem. I will revise this question on a future occasion: at present I shall only say that the version, Then men began to call them selves by the name of Jehovah," is printed in the margin of a copy of an old edition of the Bible in my posses

sion.

The paper on the Greek Accents (pp. 442-450) is evidently the production of an elegant scholar. The lovers of Greek literature must feel obliged to the author for bringing the subject before the readers of the Repository in so tangible a form. I will pay due attention to it; and T. F. B. may expect from me, through the same channel, a respectful reply to his positions.

I feel very grateful to the learned Gellius (pp. 457, 458) for the notice which he has taken of my Lexicon. His remarks are well calculated to draw to it the attention of the learned readers of the Repository, which was evidently his intention. I beg to make a few remarks on his notes. The article da, in my Lexicon, is carelessly done. The general term “ appearance," which implies "show" or "semblance," the sense it bears, as Gellius observes in Orestes, 235, ought to have been inserted. Lexicographers and critics have not sufficiently observed that a word, in a certain connexion, may have a meaning, which yet is foreign to the word itself. Thus araxy, as Gellius remarks, may mean the clippings of hair. But the appropriate sense of the term is first-fruits or offering; what the offering might be depends on the context; and it may denote wine or honey, as well as hair. Thus, also, api, in general means to dismiss or put away; but its sense, in the context of Orestes, 115, coincides with the idea of "spilling or pouring out." But even there apes would more exactly be expressed by "drop," i. e. drop as an offering on the grave.-Karaya is a nautical term, signifying, to bring to land or into harbour, which, to prevent injury, is done with caution and gentleness. The master of a steam-boat standing up and calling, while advancing among the shippings to the landing-place,

Gently, gently," i. e. approach gently, would, it appears to me, convey the exact idea implied in the verb καταγε, καταγε, addressed by Electra to the chorus, who was afraid of disturbing Orestes, now reposing from his madness. When Gellius says that avaraλλw means to soar, as in Orest. 316, he, with other critics, confounds this verb with ανεπαλλω, (ανα, επί,

λλw,) which, in the active form, signifies to cause to spring up, or to

this measure, though Sturze and Schleusner are chargeable with the neglect of it. The practice affords unspeakable advantages to the learner, as it enables him, by the most obvious and simple analogy, to retain words in his mind which would otherwise be forgotten unless held by the sole grasp of a powerful memory. The above explanation of Bave, and its several branches, is in our opinion deserving of attention, as being perhaps the fairest specimen of lexicography that can well be met with. The learner is put in complete possession of its several senses by the aid of the context. The several branches of the verb are stated with the anomalies caused by the dialects and poetic licence. Dr. Jones has, indeed, largely profited by the labours of Damm, but he has condensed his matter into one tenth of the space which is occupied by that most admirable and useful lexicographer. Nor has he servilely copied his model, but tacitly shews him to have been mistaken in three or four points in this very article. Damm makes Beβᾶσι to be the Ionic form of βεβηxas; whereas Dr. Jones represents it as a contraction of the perfect middle Beßaar. Damm again states BeBauer to be a poetic form of Biva, while Dr. Jones takes it to be the perfect middle infinitive, ßeßaeva, by Syncope βεβᾶναι, βεβῶμεν. The former writer seemingly, could not comprehend how Beopas, if the Ionic form of Baqua, could mean, I will love or obey,' as it does in Il. o. 194. He therefore classes it with Blow as its root. But Dr. Jones has happily hit on the intermediate idea, for what is to love or obey a person, but to go by his will? And here it is obvious to remark, how similar the idioms of the Greek and of the English are to each other on many occasions. This is one among many reasons, why a Greek Lexicon should be written in our native tongue. Damm renders Bñsiya, II. B. 183, by cæpit currere but this version does not seem so well to express the sense of the original, as he hastened to go,' or he hastily went;' nor does B λaav, bear the precise sense of agebat equos, but is more adequately represented by he hastened to drive,' or he hastily drove.' And here it

is worthy of notice, that where Dr. Jones quotes a phrase differing in genius from one in our own tongue, he renders it literally first, and then expresses it in a free version, conformably to our own. This is not the usual practice of lexicographers, but it is as it should be, since it enables the learner to perceive in his own tongue the peculiar features of the Greek. Upon the whole, this Lexicon is a work of great labour and research. We have much pleasure in adding, that we deem it also a work of very great merit, which we conceive cannot fail to meet the approbation and patronage of those, who, where the English language is used, study to acquire a knowledge of the Greek." J. JONES.

Unitarianism in the United States of

America.

SME very interesting letters have been lately received by Mr. Belsham from America, and put into our hands by the venerable friend to whom they were addressed. We lay before our readers a few extracts. The names of the writers are well known in this country, but we do not think it necessary to give them. The fact of Mr. Jefferson, the Ex-President, having avowed his belief in Unitarian Christianity, is of great importance, and will be hailed with delight by all that desire to see divine revelation adorned by the intellectual endowments and public virtue of its individual professors.

The following is from a letter dated Baltimore, June 20, 1823.

"In this country the interests of religious truth are as prosperous as could be expected. Important changes of opinions and habits must always be slow. Prejudices are stubborn things, and can be removed only by degrees; but in the United States I have reason to think, that they are yielding as rapidly as the nature of things will admit. The advocates of old systems are awake; the lovers of the dark things of the dark ages are numerous and vigilant; opposition to the progress of religious knowledge is perpetual and strong; the floodgates of obloquy are hoisted; and the thunders of anathema and denunciation roar from one end of the Union to the other; yet there is a spirit