tion, which was to be made for sin, may be easily perceived. That which we are chiefly to attend to in sin is its criminality. Satisfaction has relation to the penalty, which has been enacted against it by the Supreme Judge.

But here we must attend to a two-fold payment, which is noticed by jurists. One which, by the very deed of payment, sets at liberty the debtor, and annuls the obligation, whether the payment is made by the debtor in his own person, or by a surety in his name. Another in which the bare fact of payment is not sufficient to liberate the debtor, which takes place when the payment is not precisely that which is demanded in the obligation, but an equivalent. In this case, though the creditor has a right to refuse the acceptance of such payment, yet he admits it and esteems it a payment, which is entitled a satisfaction. The former of these takes place in a pecuniary, the latter in a penal debt. In a pecuniary transaction, the fact of the payment of the sum due, frees the debtor, by whomsoever the payment is made. Respect here is not had to the person paying, but to the payment only. Whence, the creditor, having been paid the full amount due, is not said to have treated with indulgence the debtor, or to have forgiven the debt. But in penal debt, the case is different. The debt does not regard things but persons. Here we regard not the thing paid, so much as the person who pays; i. e. that the transgressor may be punished. For as the law demands individual personal obedience, so it demands individual and personal suffering. In order that the guilty person may be released in consequence of an atonement being made by another in his stead, the governor or judge must pass a decree to that effect. That decree or act of the judge is, in relation to the law, called relaxation, and in relation to the debtor, or guilty person, pardon, or remission; for his personal suffering is dispensed with, and in its place a vicarious suffering accepted. But because, in the subject under discussion, sin has not a relation to debt only, but also to punishment, satisfaction is not of that kind, which by the act itself, frees the debtor. To effect this there must be an act of pardon passed by the

Supreme Judge, because that is not precisely paid, i. e. personal enduring of the penalty, which the law demands, but a vicarious suffering only. Hence we discover how per fectly accordant remission and satisfaction are with each other, notwithstanding the outcry made by the enemy respecting their supposed discrepancy. Christ made the satisfaction in his life, and at his death; and God, by accepting this satisfaction paves the way for remission. The satisfaction respects Christ from whom God demands a punishment not numerically but specifically the same which we owed. Pardon respects believers, who are freed from punishment, in their own persons, while a vicarious suffering is accepted. Hence we see how admirably mercy is attempered with justice. Justice is exercised against sin, and mercy towards the sinner-an atonement is made to the divine justice, by a surety and God mercifully pardons us.

3. This reasoning is greatly fortified from a consideration of the relations in which God stands to the sinner. He may be viewed in a threefold relation as the creditor; as the Lord and party offended; and as the judge and ruler. But though both the former relations must be attended to in this matter, yet the third is to be chiefly considered. God here is not merely a creditor, who may at pleasure remit what is his due, nor merely the party offended who may do as he will with his own claims without injury to any one; but he is also a judge and rectoral governor, to whom alone pertains the infliction of punishment upon offenders, and the power of exempting offenders from the penal sanction of the law. This all jurists know belongs to the chief magistrate alone. The creditor may demand his debt, and the party offended reparation for the offence, or indemnity for his loss; but the judge alone has the power to compel payment, or exact punishment. Here, lies the capital error of our adversaries, who maintain that God is to be considered merely in the light of a creditor, and that he is at liberty to exact or remit the punishment at pleasure. It is however certain, that God sustains the character of judge and sovereign of the world, and has the rights of sovereignty to maintain, and

professes himself to be the guardian and avenger of his laws; and hence possesses the claims not only of a creditor which he might assert, or remit at pleasure, but also the right of government, and punishment which is naturally indispensable. We must, however, in the punishment itself distinguish accurately between the enforcing of the penalty, and the manner and circumstances under which it is enforced as they are things widely different. Punishment may be viewed generally; and in this respect the right of Heaven to inflict it is natural; and its claims indispensable, for they are founded in the divine justice. If there be such an attribute as justice, and who will dispute it, belonging to God, then sin must have its due, which is punishment. But as to the manner and circumstances of the punishment, the case is altogether different. They are not essential to that attribute. They are to be arranged according to his will and pleasure. It may seem fit to the goodness of God that there should be, in relation to time, a delay of punishment-in relation to degree, a mitigation of it, and in relation to persons a substition. For although the person sinning deserves punishment and might be punished with the strictest justice, yet such punishment is not necessarily, indispensable. For reasons of great importance, there may be a transfer of the punishment to a surety. In this sense it is said by divines that sin is of necessity punished impersonally, but every sinner is not therefore of necessity to be punished personally. Through the singular mercy of God some may be exempted from punishment, by the substitution of a surety in their stead.

But that we may conceive it possible for God to do this, he must be considered not as an inferior judge appointed by law. An officer of that character, cannot remit any thing of the rigor of the law by transfering the punishment, from the actual offender, to another person. God must be viewed in his true character, as a supreme judge who giveth account of none of his matters, who will satisfy his justice by the punishment of sin, and who, through his infinite wisdom, and unspeakable mercy, determines to do this in such a way

as shall relax somewhat of the extreme rigour of punishment, by admitting a substitute, and letting the sinner go free. Hence we discover to whom the atonement is to be made, whether to the devil, (as Socinus with a sneer, asks) or to God, as sovereign judge? For as the devil is no more than the servant of God, the keeper of the prison, who has no power over sinners, unless by the just judgment of God, the atonement is not to be made to this executor of the divine vengeance, but to the Supreme Ruler, who primarily, and principally holds them in durance. We may add, that it is a gratuitous and false supposition, that in the suffering of punishment, there must be some person to whom the punishment shall be rendered, as in a pecuniary debt. It is sufficient that there is a judge, who may exact it in order to support the majesty of the state, and maintain the order of the empire.

4. The person who makes the atonement is here to be considered. As sin is to be viewed in the threefold light of debt, enmity, and crime; and God in the threefold light of creditor, party offended, and judge; so Christ must put on a threefold relation corresponding to all these. He must sustain the character of a surety, for the payment of the debt. He must be a mediator, a peace-maker, to take away the enmity of the parties, and reconcile us to God. He must be a priest and victim, to substitute himself in our room, and make atonement, by enduring the penal sanction of the law. That such an atonement may be made, two things are requisite. 1. That the same nature which sins shall make restitution. 2. That the consideration given must possess infinite value, in order to the removal of the infinite demerit of sin. In Christ, two natures were necessary for the making of an atonement—a human nature which might suffer, and a divine nature which might give the requisite value to his sufferings.

Finally, We must demonstrate how it is possible, in consistency with justice, to substitute an innocent person, as Christ was, in our room, and shew what things are necessary to render such a substitution just; because, at first view, it appears not only to be unusual, but also unjust.

Though a substitution, which is common in a pecuniary debt, rarely occurs in penal transactions, nay, is sometimes prohibited, as was the case among the Romans, because no one is master of his own life, and because the commonwealth would suffer loss in such cases, yet it was not unknown among the heathen. We have an example of it in Damon and Pithias. They were intimate friends. One of them voluntarily entered himself bail to Dionisius in a capital cause, Curtius, Codrus, and Brutus, devoted themselves for their country. The right of punishing hostages, when princes fail in their promises, has been recognized by all nations. Hence hostages are called aus, substitutes. To this Paul alludes, when he says, (Rom. v. 7.) " For a good man some would even dare to die." The holy scriptures often give it support, not only from the imputation of sin, by which one bears the punishment due to another, but from the public use of sacrifices, in which the victim was substituted in the place of the sinner, and suffered death in his stead. Hence the imposition of hands, and the confession of sins over the head of the victims.

But that such a substitution may be made without the slightest appearance of injustice, various conditions are requisite in the substitute or surety, all which are found in Christ: 1. A common nature, that sin may be punished in the same nature which is guilty, (Heb. ii. 14.) 2. The consent of the will, that he should voluntarily take the burden upon himself, (Heb. x. 9.) “ Lo I come to do thy will." 3. Power and right over his own life, so that, of his own right, he may resolve respecting his own life or death. (John x. 18.) "No one taketh away my life, but I lay it down of myself, for I have power to lay it down, and take it up again." 4. The power of bearing the punishment due to us, and of freeing both himself and us from the power of death; because, if he himself could be holden of death, he could free no one from its dominion, That Christ possesses this power no one doubts. 5. Holiness and immaculate purity, that, being polluted by no sin, he might not have to offer sa crifice for himself but for us only. (Heb. vii. 26, 27, 28.)