were to die a natural death after sitting for seven years, and the king were to refuse to issue his proclamation to convoke another within three years of that period, as ordered by the first of William and Mary, sec. 2, cap. 2, would it be asserted that the subject would have no right to call for the proclamation of the king to convoke another parliament, because such proclamation could not issue without an act of the crown? He thought that none of their lordships would advocate such an absurdity. But the subject and the country were in full possession of all these rights; and if the Queen's right to a coronation were put upon the same footing, it would be equally clear that she possessed it, and that the necessity of granting it was as obvious as it was imperative. He had heard it said that her Majesty could not claim the honours of a coronation by prescription, because she was not a corporation. This, however, he denied. Her Majesty certainly could prescribe, for what business had they to call her Majesty less a corporation than the King? But still, supposing her not to be a corporation, she

had a right to prescribe as a functionary, holding a high dignity and situation. This was evident from Baron Comyn's Digest, who, under the title of Prescription, lays it down that such a functionary can claim by prescription. In conclusion, Mr. Brougham said, their lordships would sit in dignified judgment on the opinion given by the great lawyers of the nineteenth century; and, as he firmly believed, finding they had no difficulties to explain, perceiving that they had no obscurities to clear up, they would not be under the necessity of referring to those remote periods of our history, to which he had been obliged to allude, but would look back to the first decision that ever had been given on this question, with that decided confidence which the names of those privy counsellors before whom the case was argued would in after-times command judgment, which he ventured confidently to pronounce, would not derogate from the high character they had so long maintained.

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Mr. DENMAN followed on the same side, and after a long speech, called on their lordships, as a court sitting for legal inquiry, to say

whether there ever was a case presented to an inquest, which depended on custom and usage, where a more complete and perfect body of custom and usage had been adduced, than was brought forward on the present occasion? If her Majesty's claim were refused, no dignity was safe, no property was secure, not a single institution could be said to rest on a firm foundation. If the coronation of the Queen could not be supported by custom, the rest of that ceremonial could not be supported. Why was this country governed by a king? Why did we submit to a kingly government? Because the earliest ages, because all times, had recognised that form of government, and because we could trace that custom beyond all time of memory. Nothing could be more dangerous than to separate royalty from the circumstances which belonged to it and added to its dignity. The lives and properties of men depended for their security upon the same principle. Why was there a house of peers, in which noble lords formed a part of the legislature? Why were there commoners, who sat as representatives of the

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people? Precisely because custom had ordered it so. Custom was the author of the law and the law-makers. Custom authorized the king, lords, and commons, to enact laws for the government of this realm. All property, all dignity, all offices existed, because they were sanctioned by prescriptive custom, or because custom gave a prescriptive right to create them.

Saturday. The Privy Council resumed this morning, soon after ten o'clock. Below the bar was again crowded to excess.

Counsel were then called in.

MR. BROUGHAM said, he now held in his hand, and was prepared to lay before the council, the documentary evidence to which he and his learned friend had adverted in the course of their addresses in support of her Majesty's memorial.

LORD HARROWBY.-Mr. Attorney-General, have you any observations to offer on what counsel have stated to their lordships?

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL then rose. - He said, he perhaps should best discharge his duty by stating, at the commencement, that, in his

own opinion, the argument and claim were wholly unfounded. That the claim was not founded on any recognised law, appeared from the statements and course of proceeding adopted by her Majesty's counsel. He would add, that the claim now made, so far from ever being supposed to have any foundation, was not even mentioned by any writer on the laws and constitution. It had never been agitated or alluded to in any way, not even by those writers who had touched on the privileges peculiar to a queen-consort. The one single ground urged in support of the claim was usage that usage was supposed to have prevailed through a long series of years at the coronation of kings who were married. It had been stated with confidence that such usage was evidence in support of the right; but when they were talking of rights founded on usage, it was not sufficient to state that particular facts had taken place. In all such cases, where the facts were relied on, it was essential to state the circumstances that had attended such facts, the peculiarities that had accompanied the alleged privilege, whether