it was right of way or otherwise. As to the right of way, for instance; if permission were given to use certain paths or roads, the fact of such permission having preceded the use; at once destroyed the claim of right. If the license and permission were proved, there was an end of the right. By that proof, all the inferences drawn from the use were at an end they were at once destroyed. The coronation was for the purpose of the monarch's recognition by the people, and on the part of the king to enter into the solemn compact to preserve the laws. The coronation of a queen was a mere ceremony; but that of the king was something more than ceremony. His coronation was accompanied by important political acts the recognition by the people, and, on the other hand, the solemn compact entered into by the sovereign to preserve and maintain the laws of the realm. Still, however, as far as the king was concerned, it was a ceremony; it was not necessary to the sovereign's possession of the crown - it was what proceeded from his will, and might be dispensed with. But the queen-consort, who filled no political character in the state, had only enjoyed the privilege because she was the king's consort. With respect to a queen-con⚫ sort, when she was crowned, there was no recognition of her by the people, no compact towards the people. There was no engagement between her and the subjects of the realm. This fact established that, with respect to a queen-consort, a coronation was an honorary ceremony, unaccompanied by any acts. That the coronation neither was, nor had been considered to be essential to the possession of the crown, was proved by the fact of considerable delays having often taken place between the accession of the monarch and his coronation. Henry the Sixth, for instance, was not crowned till eight years after the crown had descended to him. Again, in the " Pleas of the Crown,” it was held, that the king was fully invested with the crown the moment it descended to him; that he was absolutely king although there should have been no coronation. If the coronation of a king, important as he held it to be, proceeded from the sovereign will, à fortiori it must be so with that of a queen consort. The rights of the queen-consort did not proceed from any coronation; they flowed from her relationship to the sovereign. Her rights were complete and absolute without any coronation. Nor was it essential to the people, for the queen-consort occupied no political station. This view of the right was strengthened by the important preamble of William and Mary, which settled the coronation oath. The language of the act applied to queens regnant, not to queens-consort, for to the latter no oath was administered. As the oath was prescribed, it became necessary that every reigning monarch should be crowned, that there might be the oath and recognition; but the law made no mention of any thing that rendered such a ceremony requisite in the instance of a queen-consort. How then could the crowning of a queenconsort be considered a necessary adjunct of the coronation of the reigning monarch? No part of the ceremony rendered her presence requisite. Selden's work had been quoted in support of the memorial; amongst other things, Selden expressly said that the "anoint ing, &c. of the queen-consort, were dignities communicated by the king." Selden further stated, that the anointing of the queen, as well as her consecration it was, in fact, a consecration rather than a coronation proceeded from the "request" and "demand" of the king, after he had been crowned, made to the metropolitan, who had performed such ceremony. Bracton had entered largely into the particulars de coronatione regis, but not one word of the queen's coronation. There was not a single law-writer that had touched upon the existence of such a right, as appertaining to a queen. Blackstone had it not, nor Lord Coke, nor Selden. He next adverted at some length to the precedents quoted by his learned friends opposite, beginning with that of William the Conqueror. The very precedents quoted by his learned friends raised the inference, if there were no other arguments, that the act, so far as related to the queen, was entirely dependent on the will of the king. The Attorney-General then referred largely to Reymer, from whose book he quoted apposite passages, in support of his main argument, that the ceremony of a queen's coronation was entirely dependent upon the order of the king. In all, from the time of Henry the Seventh, six queens had been crowned, and seven had not; so that the majority was against the present claim, which it had been attempted to support on the plea of ancient, uninterrupted usage. The Attorney-General concluded at a quarter before one o'clock; and the SolicitorGeneral, after a short pause, rose to follow his learned friend, and of course was compelled to go over the same ground, strengthening and confirming the preceding statements by such arguments as occurred to his observance, and contending that the usage pleaded by her Majesty's law-officers arose entirely from the sovereign's will and pleasure. About two o'clock MR. BROUGHAM rose in reply, but we can touch but very briefly on his arguments. It had been intimated that the queen's right to be crowned rested on the proclamation of the king; but it might as well be pleaded that the right of the eldest sons of peers to seats in the House of Lords rested on |