judged. And concerning opprobrious and reproachful language to a man's face, he fays, Whofoever shall say unto his brother, Thou fool, fhall be in danger of hell-fire: much more, against malicious backbiting and uncharitable detraction, would he have used the like feverity of expreffion. The reason is, because fuch kind of detraction and defamation is really more injurious, and more difficult to be guarded against, and of more extenfive effect, than any other ways of doing wrong to our neighhour. I conclude therefore with that declaration of our Lord, Matt. xii. 36. I fay unto you that every idle word (that is, every malicious word) that men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment: for by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.

And Therefore let us not only avoid the more grofs means of flander, but also take care never to strike at a man's Of Scoffing. reputation, by defpifing and fcoffing him; especially, if another should be encouraged from thence also to scorn and scoff at his neighbour, either on account of fome human infirmities, providential calamities, or even for his very fins; for in fo doing we do him a great injury. And perhaps moft men feel more in the whole of their life from the fcornful reproofs of the wealthy, the defpitefulness of the proud, taunting farcasms, and little inftances of ill-will, neglect and contempt, than they do from the more folid evils of life. You must exafperate a man, when you fcorn and make a jeft of him, as thinking him not of confequence enough to be hated. For fuch is the nature of men, they had rather be thought vicious than ridiculous. They can bear you should hate them for their vices; but they cannot endure you should ridicule them for their follies.

If we scoff at him for the deformity of his body, difa greeableness of his face, the folly or weakness of For infirhis understanding; we lay that to his charge which mities. he cannot help; and at the fame time impeach the wisdom and justice of God, who thought good to deny him those excellencies of the body and mind. And

The fame reason forbids us to reproach any person for thofe afflictions of body and mind, which are accidental to

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all

all men under the providence of God, who for wife, juft, and For calami- good reasons, correcteth the children of men when ties. and how he fees proper: and thereforewe ought not to to judge what are his motives for fo doing, but fearch our own hearts and repent, left our fins may deferve the like punishment; and inftead of perfecuting them whom God hath fmitten, and by our talk grieving them whom he hath wounded, we should well confider how our Saviour reproves fuch evil practices: Suppofe ye, fays he to the cenforious Jews, that thefe Galileans were finners above all the Galileans, because they fuffered fuch things; I tell you, nay; but, except ye repent, ye fhall all likewife perifh. In fine, whatever we ourselves are fubject to should never be the fubject of our derifion in another: So that For fins. the very fins of our neighbour are no just excuse for our contempt and fcoffing; but instead of reproach they fhould excite our compaffion. Bear then with the faults of those about you, as you expect they should bear with yours; faults, which frail nature cannot well guard against, and which therefore good-nature should overlook: be just to their merits, charitable to their failings, and tender to their misfortunes; because if we have not fallen into the fame or the like faults, it is not our own ftrength, but God's more especial grace, that preferves us. If a perfon, who in the main has led a good life, fhould yet, contrary to the general tenor of it, be guilty of fome unaccountable weakness, it should teach us to be watchful and circumfpect; left we, who think we stand, should also fall. The mifcarriages of a good man, which give an ill-natured pleasure to little minds, fuggeft to every great mind the most melancholy ideas of the weakness cf human nature, in general, but no fpiteful and venomous reflections against his weakness in particular. Therefore, upon the whole, he that would infinuate any thing from fuch cafes to his neighbour's difadvantage, is guilty of great injuftice to his Deftroying credit. In which he robs him of what is most valuathe credit, able in this life; and for which, it may be, he can nerreparable ver make a fufficient reftitution: for, where fhall we injury. go to recal our invidious fpeeches? Or, how is it poffible to fuppofe, that all, who have heard our flanders before,

great and

fhall

Men muft

shall either hear, or be willing to believe, our publick recantations? and if that cannot be certain, it is certain we can have no affurance of having repaired the injury done to our neighbour's reputation. Though we are obliged, by all the laws of God and man, to do all in our power endeavour to restore that good name we have blafted; or we to repair cannot hope that God will pardon us, the injury. whose eyes are open to, and will punish, every wicked thought, as well as deeds and words: Therefore,

To conclude this point of negative justice, let me exhort you not so much as to wifh or think evil of your of juftice neighbour; for the fame law that forbids us to hurt in the commands us to love, and not to hate, envy, or wish thoughts. any evil even to our enemies. So that notwithstanding we bridle our tongue, and lend no hand in any violent oppreffion of our neighbour, we ftand guilty before God for every malicious defire or pleasure we take at his misfortunes. Keep thy heart, fays Solomon, with all diligence; for out of it are the iffues of life: because none but the pure in heart fhall fee God.

V. Having largelyfhewn, in the foregoing particulars, how a man may do an injury to his neighbour; I fhall Of pofitive now proceed to that which divines call pofitive juice. JUSTICE, or giving that to our neighbour which he of right can demand of us as his due. And therefore I fhall confider this branch of juftice, first, as it regards all men in general; and then, as it refpects each in his proper ftation of life. Thus Truth muft take place in all our promifes and engagements; because, where we were at full liberty before, pro- Speaking mifes oblige us, and give our neighbour a right; truth to all and we fhould never allow ourselves to make them, men unless there be an intention to put them in execution. Therefore, before anyone refolves, let him thoroughly confider the matter he refolves upon, and of the and of the arguments that may be urged for and against it. Let him confider his own temper and humour, when he doth resolve. Let him make his refolutions as particular as may be; not only refolving upon the end, but upon the means likewife of attaining that end. And above all, let him be prudent in his refolutions, and not burthen himself with unneceffary promifes or engagements.

So

;

So to engage to do a thing, when we cannot accomplish it, or have it not in our intention, is really to injure Promife no thing out of our neighbour, and to wrong our own fouls at the thy power. laft day. And as we must be supposed to promife what we are able to perform, and what we fuppofe to be lawful; fo, if it appears otherwife, we must repent of our rashnefs, and not add fin to fin, by executing a rash unlawful act. Hence it is plain that no promise can be made in bar of all future contingencies, nor release a man from that which the providence of God makes much more his duty. In short, it is to speak as we think, to do what we pretend and profess, to perform what we promife, and really to be what we would feem and appear to be to all about us. Yet this no way implies, that we are obliged to tell every man all our mind but that we must never declare any thing contrary thereto. We may conceal as much of ourfelves, as prudence, or any other good reason, requires: but we must not put on a difguise, and make a falfe appearance and empty fhew of what we are not, either by word or deed. I fear most of that comAvoid flat- pliment, which is current in common converfation, is contrary to this virtue; because, for the most part, it is nothing but words, to fill up the gaps and fupply the emptiness of difcourfe; and a pretence of that kindness and esteem for perfons, which either in truth we have not, or not to the degree that our expreffions feem to import; which, if done with defign, is that which we call flattery: a very odious fort of infincerity, and so much the worse, because it abuses men intoa vain and foolish opinion of themselves, and an ill-grounded confidence of the kindness and good-will of others towards them; and therefore finful. Civility is fit to be profeffed and practifed to all; but profeffion of refpectand efteem is another thing; and when there is nothing to answer it, it is inconfiftent with the candour and fimplicity of a difciple of Chrift. Commendations given to men, which we think they do not deferve, or flattering them upon excellencies they are not poffeffed of, if they pass with for words of courfe now, will not pafs fo eafily in the day of the Lord. By throwing an undistinguished glare of praise on every object, we perceive no object at all in its juft and genuine light. He

tery.

who

who commends every one, in effect commends no one at all. An undistinguishing praise confounds the characters of men, as well as an undistinguishing cenfure: it does not follow, that we ought to speak well of every body promifcuously, and in general: because we ought to make a diftinction where there is a difference. So

Speaking every one truth with his neighbour has ever been acknowledged, by men of all conditions, to Of lying. be our neceffary and indispensable duty. Heathens,

as well as Christians, men of all ranks and profeffions, of all fects and religions whatever, have agreed in this, that there is an eternal obligation founded in the nature of things, which every man that attends to the dictates of his reafon and confcience cannot but own and be fenfible of, that our words fhould be agreeable to our thoughts; and have been sensible that lying, or endeavouring to deceive each other, is a base and mean practice, unworthy the dignity of a rational creature, and highly displeafing to God, who has given us the use of that noble faculty of speech to this very end, that it might be the interpreter of our thoughts to each other. The proper notion of a lye, therefore, is an endeavouring to deceive another by fignifying that to him as true, which we ourselves think not to be fo, in the ordinary way of communicating our thoughts, even though they should be fignified by nods and geftures. And again, if a man thinks a thing not to be true, and yet declares it to another as certain; though in the event the thing should chance to prove true, yet fince he knew it not, and believed it not to be fo, his act is ftill the fame, and may properly be called a lye: wherefore God expreffeth himfelf highly offended with those that practise lying and falsehood; and proclaims a deteftation of them: Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. Put away lying, fays the apostle; lye not one to another, but let every man fpeak truth with his neighbour. We, who worship the God of truth, ought to fpeak truth: to use plainnefs and fincerity in all our of equivowords; to abhor falfhood and diffimulation, and cation. thofe more refined ways of lying by equivocation of words, and fecret refervations of our minds, on purpose to deceive the innocent, Ina word, that man who can difpenfe with himself