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Rout v. Ninde et aL
In the case of Lemasters v. State, 95 Ind. 367, the forged note purported to be signed by one who could not write, and, although a space was left and indicated for a mark, it was held that forgery might be alleged upon such a note, notwithstanding the fact that there was no mark.
In Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379, the instrument was represented to have been executed by Vincent T. West, but it was signed " Dr. West," auda conviction was sustained.
It is always competent to prove that different names may,, in fact, identify or relate to the same person. Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. 269; Commonwealth v. Gale, 11 Gray, 320; State v. Dresser, 54 Maine, 569.
It is competent, therefore, to prove that a man often or usually signs instruments by initials, or by any abbreviation he chooses, or by any familiar name others may give him, and it can not be said as matter of law that William R. Stephens did not often or usually sign his name "Bill 8tevens," so that it can not be held that such a signature disclosed the invalidity of the note.
Judgment affirmed. 'Riled Sept. 30, 1887.
SfTTOEME Cottrt.—Certiorari.—Rules of Trial Court.—The Supreme Court
From the Adams Circuit Court.
C. J. Lvtz and J. W. Headington, for appellant.
R. S. Peterson and E. A. Huffman, for appellees.
Rout v. Ninde el at..
Elliott, J.—The appellees ask a writ of certiorari requiring the clerk of the trial court to certify to this court a copy of a rule of the circuit court governing applications for changes of venue, and allege that such a rule existed, but do -not show that it was ordered to be certified to this court or that it was made part of the bill of exceptions.
It is one of the maxims of jurisprudence that " The practice of the court is the law of the court," and rules of practice adopted by trial courts of general jurisdiction are, so far as those courts are concerned, rules of law. As they are rules of law, although only such in a limited sense, they are, of course, always before the court by which they were framed, and need not be there pleaded, nor need they in any way be formally brought to the notice of that court. Broom Maxims, star p. 134.
Of its own rules the court takes notice. They are ever present, permanent in iheir nature and general in their operation. They are not adopted for particular cases, but for all cases of a given class; nor -do they constitute part of the procedure in a special case, but they constitute part of the general law of procedure applicable to a class or classes of cases. But, while this is true, it is also true that an appellate court can not take notice of the rules of the trial court. The rule is thus stated in Sandon v. Proctor, 7 B. & C. 800, by Holroyd, J.: "Anything required to be done by the law of the land must be noticed by a court of error; but a court of error can not notice the practice of another court."
It is obvious, therefore, that we can not take notice of the existence of rules such as that here sought to be brought before us, unless they are properly in the record.
It may be that, as such a rule is part of the permanent law of the trial court, it need not be incorporated in a bill of exceptions, but may be certified to this court by order of the trial court. But granting that this is so, still the clerk can not certify such a rule unless it is ordered by the court or is incorporated in a bill of exceptions. This is so, beWatson v. The State.
cause the clerk can not determine what is the law of the «ourt, nor can he certify to anything not properly in the record. It may, perhaps, be within the power of the trial court to order its rules certified to us; but, until such an order is made, the clerk can not authoritatively certify a rule to us unless it is incorporated in the bill of exceptions. We are not now required to decide whether the trial court may not, upon proper application, direct the rule to be certified to us; for the appellees' motion is fully disposed of when we hold, as we must, that without an order of that kind a writ can not issue to the clerk directing him to certify the rule, except in a case where the bill of exceptions contains the rule.
Filed Sept. 30, 1887.
Watson V. The State.
From the Marion Criminal Court. /. N. Scotl, for appellant.
L. T. Mkhcner, Attorney General, and J. H. Gillett, for the State.
Howk, J.—In this case substantially the same questions are presented for our decision as those which are considered and decided in Trout v. State, ante, p. 499.
Upon the authority of the case cited, and for the reasons there given, the judgment in this cause is affirmed, with costs. Filed Sept. 20,1887.
Burton et al. v. State, ex ret Baker et al.
H5 ato No. 12,917.
147 Hps Burton Et Al. V. State, Ex Bel. Baker Et Al.
148 ml From tne Monroe Circuit Court.
in tmo1 W. P. Rogers and J. E Henley, for appellants.
153 aMl J. H. Louden, it W. Mien, J. W. Butkirk and H. C. Duncan, for appellees
Howk, J.—By the record of this cause and the errors assigned thereon by appellants, substantially the same questions are presented for decision as those which were considered and decided by this court, at its present, term, in Strieb v. Cox, ante, p. 299.
Upon the authority of the case cited, and for the reasons there given, the judgment below in the cause now before us is affirmed, with costs.
Filed June 22,1887.
1. What Constitutes.—Real Estate.—To constitute an advancement the an-
2. Same.—Possession of Property by Heir.—Improvements.—Intention.—Differ-
3. Same.—Evidence.—Declarations of Ancestor as to Intention.—In an action
See County; Criminal Law, 27, 28; Evidence, 3; Gravel Road, 10;
AMENDMENT OF CHARTER,
See Bill Of Exceptions; Judgment, 10.
1. Action Begun Before Justice of Peace. —Amount of Recovery.—Complaint.—
2. Satisfaction of Judrpnent.—Dismissal. —Where the judgment appealed
State, ex ret, v. Kamp, So'
3. Certificate to Transcript.—Phrase " True and Complete."—The certifica-
4. Same.—Motion to Dismiss.— Wairer.—Practice.—A motion to dismiss
5. Complaint for New Trial—Separate Action.—The proceedings upon a com-