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Rout v. Ninde et aL

In the case of Lemasters v. State, 95 Ind. 367, the forged note purported to be signed by one who could not write, and, although a space was left and indicated for a mark, it was held that forgery might be alleged upon such a note, notwithstanding the fact that there was no mark.

In Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379, the instrument was represented to have been executed by Vincent T. West, but it was signed " Dr. West," auda conviction was sustained.

It is always competent to prove that different names may,, in fact, identify or relate to the same person. Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. 269; Commonwealth v. Gale, 11 Gray, 320; State v. Dresser, 54 Maine, 569.

It is competent, therefore, to prove that a man often or usually signs instruments by initials, or by any abbreviation he chooses, or by any familiar name others may give him, and it can not be said as matter of law that William R. Stephens did not often or usually sign his name "Bill 8tevens," so that it can not be held that such a signature disclosed the invalidity of the note.

Judgment affirmed. 'Riled Sept. 30, 1887.

Ill 597

1115 463

No. 13,676.
Rout V. Ni»de Et Al.

SfTTOEME Cottrt.—Certiorari.Rules of Trial Court.—The Supreme Court
will not take notice of the existence of the rales of » trial court unless
they are properly in the record on appeal, and will not require !th»
clerk, by writ of certiorari, to certify such rules, unless embraced in a.
bill of exceptions or ordered by the court to be so certified.

From the Adams Circuit Court.

C. J. Lvtz and J. W. Headington, for appellant.

R. S. Peterson and E. A. Huffman, for appellees.

Rout v. Ninde el at..

Elliott, J.—The appellees ask a writ of certiorari requiring the clerk of the trial court to certify to this court a copy of a rule of the circuit court governing applications for changes of venue, and allege that such a rule existed, but do -not show that it was ordered to be certified to this court or that it was made part of the bill of exceptions.

It is one of the maxims of jurisprudence that " The practice of the court is the law of the court," and rules of practice adopted by trial courts of general jurisdiction are, so far as those courts are concerned, rules of law. As they are rules of law, although only such in a limited sense, they are, of course, always before the court by which they were framed, and need not be there pleaded, nor need they in any way be formally brought to the notice of that court. Broom Maxims, star p. 134.

Of its own rules the court takes notice. They are ever present, permanent in iheir nature and general in their operation. They are not adopted for particular cases, but for all cases of a given class; nor -do they constitute part of the procedure in a special case, but they constitute part of the general law of procedure applicable to a class or classes of cases. But, while this is true, it is also true that an appellate court can not take notice of the rules of the trial court. The rule is thus stated in Sandon v. Proctor, 7 B. & C. 800, by Holroyd, J.: "Anything required to be done by the law of the land must be noticed by a court of error; but a court of error can not notice the practice of another court."

It is obvious, therefore, that we can not take notice of the existence of rules such as that here sought to be brought before us, unless they are properly in the record.

It may be that, as such a rule is part of the permanent law of the trial court, it need not be incorporated in a bill of exceptions, but may be certified to this court by order of the trial court. But granting that this is so, still the clerk can not certify such a rule unless it is ordered by the court or is incorporated in a bill of exceptions. This is so, beWatson v. The State.

cause the clerk can not determine what is the law of the «ourt, nor can he certify to anything not properly in the record. It may, perhaps, be within the power of the trial court to order its rules certified to us; but, until such an order is made, the clerk can not authoritatively certify a rule to us unless it is incorporated in the bill of exceptions. We are not now required to decide whether the trial court may not, upon proper application, direct the rule to be certified to us; for the appellees' motion is fully disposed of when we hold, as we must, that without an order of that kind a writ can not issue to the clerk directing him to certify the rule, except in a case where the bill of exceptions contains the rule.

Certiorari denied.

Filed Sept. 30, 1887.

No. 13,309.

Watson V. The State.

From the Marion Criminal Court. /. N. Scotl, for appellant.

L. T. Mkhcner, Attorney General, and J. H. Gillett, for the State.

Howk, J.—In this case substantially the same questions are presented for our decision as those which are considered and decided in Trout v. State, ante, p. 499.

Upon the authority of the case cited, and for the reasons there given, the judgment in this cause is affirmed, with costs. Filed Sept. 20,1887.

Burton et al. v. State, ex ret Baker et al.

lit 600

H5 ato No. 12,917.

147 Hps Burton Et Al. V. State, Ex Bel. Baker Et Al.

148 ml From tne Monroe Circuit Court.

in tmo1 W. P. Rogers and J. E Henley, for appellants.

153 aMl J. H. Louden, it W. Mien, J. W. Butkirk and H. C. Duncan, for appellees

Howk, J.—By the record of this cause and the errors assigned thereon by appellants, substantially the same questions are presented for decision as those which were considered and decided by this court, at its present, term, in Strieb v. Cox, ante, p. 299.

Upon the authority of the case cited, and for the reasons there given, the judgment below in the cause now before us is affirmed, with costs.

Filed June 22,1887.


See Pleading, 1, 2.

1. What Constitutes.Real Estate.—To constitute an advancement the an-
cestor must, in his lifetime, divest himself of all interest in the
property set apart to the heir. Joyce v. Hamilton, 16S

2. Same.Possession of Property by Heir.Improvements.Intention.Differ-
ent Disposition by Ancestor.—Where, by the direction and with the
consent of the owner, his daughter and her husband enter into the
possession of a tract of land, and with his knowledge make lasting
and valuable improvements, it being the father's intention that they
shall reside thereon during his life, receive the proceeds, keep up re-
pairs and pay taxes, and at his death thedaugbterto take a life-estate,
with remainder to her children, there is no advancement, and the an-
cestor may make a different disposition from that intended. Ib.

3. Same.Evidence.Declarations of Ancestor as to Intention.—In an action
by the daughter to quiet title, evidence of declarations made by her
father, previous to the time she took possession, showing an intention
different from that asserted in the plaintiff's behalf, is admissible. Ib.


See County; Criminal Law, 27, 28; Evidence, 3; Gravel Road, 10;
Insurance, 6; Principal And Agent.

See Town.

See Bill Of Exceptions; Judgment, 10.

1. Action Begun Before Justice of Peace. —Amount of Recovery.Complaint.
Where, in an action instituted before a justice of the peace, the amount
of the recovery both there and in the circuit court is fifty dollars, and
there is no question of counter-claim or set-off, an appeal by the de-
fendant to the Supreme Court will not lie, although the complaint
demands judgment for more. Cincinnati, etc., R. W. Co. v. McDade, 23

2. Satisfaction of Judrpnent.Dismissal. —Where the judgment appealed
from has been satisfied, the appeal will be dismissed.

State, ex ret, v. Kamp, So'

3. Certificate to Transcript.Phrase " True and Complete."—The certifica-
tion of the transcript of the record, on appeal to the Supreme Court, as
"true and correct, instead of "true ana complete," in the language
of the statute, is sufficient, the former phrase being equivalent to the
latter. Walker v. Hill, SSS

4. Same.Motion to Dismiss.Wairer.Practice.—A motion to dismiss
an appeal on purely technical grounds must be made, if at all, on
the first appearance of the moving party in the Supreme Court; oth-
erwise, the objection will be deemed waived. Ib.

5. Complaint for New Trial—Separate Action.—The proceedings upon a com-


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