takes to do is to be performed under the direction of the railroad company's engineer, who is clothed with almost absolute authority as to the manner in which it shall be done, the contractor is entitled to pay for piling of the original length ordered by the engineer and subsequently shortened at his direction, notwithstanding a provision in the contract that the contractor is to be paid for the lineal feet of piling actually used. Ib.
5. Conveyance.-Married Woman.- Release of Inchoate Interest.-Considera- tion.-Statute of Frauds.-The complaint in this case alleged that the plaintiff's husband sold a tract of land belonging to him to the de- fendant, the plaintiff joining in the conveyance; that the considera- tion for the land and the conveyance was the promise of the defendant to pay her five hundred dollars, it being agreed that he should sell the land as soon as he could procure a purchaser and pay said sum to plaintiff; that he had had frequent opportunities to sell the land for its full value, but had neglected and refused to do so; that he had refused to pay plaintiff the agreed sum; that he denied making the promise, and claimed that he was under no obligation to pay her any amount whatever.
Held, that the contract is supported by a sufficient consideration, is not within the statute of frauds, and that the complaint is good on de- Worley v. Sipe, 238
6. Same.-Estoppel.-A party can not deny the existence of a contract and at the same time insist upon its terms as a defence. 7. Condition.-Construction.-Promise to Pay Money Upon Completion of Rail- road to Certain Points.-The instrument sued on provided that the money sought to be recovered should become due and payable when a railroad should be built by a named company, and cars should be run from Kirklin, in Clinton county, to Carmel, in Hamilton county. It was further provided, that if said company should not construct said railroad from the former to the latter place and run a train of cars" to within one-fourth of a mile of Carmel within one year from this date, in Hamilton county, Indiana, and also to Indianapolis, in Marion county, Indiana, then this note shall be void.” Held, that there can be no recovery on the promise, unless the railroad was completed to both Carmel and Indianapolis within one year from the date of the instrument. Moore v. Campbell, 328
8. Insurance.-Compromise of Disputed Liability.- Rescission. When Neces- sary Prior to Action on Original Obligation.-A recovery can not be had upon a contract which has been released and surrendered in pursu- ance of a subsequent contract, upon which an amount has been paid as a compromise of a disputed liability upon the original obligation, so long as the subsequent contract remains unrescinded and in force, even though the compromise was effected by fraud.
Home Ins. Co. v. Howard, 544
CONTRIBUTION.
See JUDGMENT, 15.
See COMMON CARRIER, 3; JUDGMENT, 2; WILL, 1.
See CONTRACT, 5; DEED; FRAUD; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2, 3; MORTGAGE, 8. 1. Trust.-Gift-Recovery of Possession.- Quieting Title.-Where the pur- chasers of land have the legal title conveyed to another, who pays no part of the consideration, the latter, in the absence of facts show- ing a gift of the property, becomes a trustee for the purchasers, and
after a conveyance of the trust estate at the request of the beneficiaries can not maintain an action to recover possession or quiet title. Stringer v. Montgomery, 489 2. Same.-Evidence.- Written Instruments.-In such case it is proper to show all the transactions between the parties, and the written instru- ments relating to the acquisition and disposition of the property are admissible in evidence. Ib.
3. Same.--Married Woman.-Suretyship.—Trust Estate. The conveyance by a married woman, to secure her husband's debt, of property held by her in trust for him, is not invalidated by the statute prohibiting her from entering into a contract of suretyship, as such statute ap- plies only to property owned by her in her own right. Ib.
See LIFE INSURANCE, 8; STATE UNIVERSITY.
Sale of Stock.-Implied Warranty.-There is no implied warranty on the part of the vendor of certificates of stock, that the corporation issuing them is a corporation de jure. If the corporation is a de facto one, that is sufficient to relieve the vendor from any implied warranty as to the existence of the corporation. Harter v. Eltzroth, 159
See JUDGMENT, 10. COUNTY.
See COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; GRAVEL ROAD, 5, 10, 11; SOLDIER'S
1. Treasurer.Agency.-Respondeat Superior.-A county treasurer is not an agent of the county in such a sense that the maxim respondeat su- perior can be invoked. His duties are prescribed by law, and in the exercise of his office he is in no way subject to the control of the board of county commissioners. Vigo Township v. Board, etc., 170 2. Same.-Township Funds.— Defalcation of Treasurer.—Liability of County.— A county treasurer is not the agent of the county in respect to funds collected by him for townships, and, in the absence of a statute so providing, the county is not liable to the townships for his defalca- tions.
3. Same.-Trust.-Township Funds Credited to General Fund of County.- The board of county commissioners has no control of the funds which the law requires to be collected for and apportioned to the town- ships, and occupies no relation of trust concerning such funds in the treasurer's hands, unless they have actually been paid into the cor- porate treasury, i. e., credited to the general fund of the county. Ib. 4. Same.-Auditor.- Warrants for Township Funds.-Create no Obligation Against County.--In drawing warrants upon the county treasurer for the funds in his hands belonging to the townships, the county auditor does not act as the agent of the county, nor do such warrants create any obligation against it.
5. Same.-Compromise of Suit Against Defaulting Treasurer.-Rights of Town- ships.-Action Against County.-Where a suit has been instituted by the county auditor upon the official bond of a defaulting county treasurer, and a compromise is effected, whereby a certain part of the amount converted is accepted in full satisfaction, a township which suffered a loss to its funds by the defalcation is entitled to its pro- portion of the sum recovered, but it can not maintain an action therefor against the county, unless it is shown that the share belong- ing to it has been covered into the county treasury to the credit of the general fund. Ib.
See COUNTY, 4, 5; MORTGAGE, 2; Office and Officer, 6, 7. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
1. Authority to Build Jail and Sheriff's Residence.-The board of commis- sioners of a county has authority to build a jail and a sheriff's resi- dence in connection therewith. Board, etc., v. Bunting, 143 2. Same.-Contract.—Plans and Specifications.-Right to Change.—Compensa- tion.-Evidence.-Under a contract between the board of commission- ers and an architect, by which the former, acting officially, has the right to change the plans and specifications for the proposed building, evidence of a request for a change, not specifying the character of the alteration, by one member, acting individually, is not admissible in a suit upon the contract for compensation.
COUNTY SURVEYOR.
See DRAINAGE; Office and OFFICER, 8.
COUNTY TREASURER.
See COUNTY; CRIMINAL LAW, 9 to 15; OFFICE AND OFFICER, 4. CRIMINAL LAW.
See INTOXICATING LIQUOR; JUDGMENT, 10.
1. Former Jeopardy.-Plea of Guilty.-Dismissal.-Practice.-Where a de- fendant is arraigned before a court of competent jurisdiction to hear and determine the charge, and to adjudge the punishment affixed to the offence, and pleads guilty, which plea has been entered and ac- cepted, and all other steps required by law have been taken, so that nothing further remains to be done except to assess the punishment, he has been put in jeopardy, and can not again be put on trial for the same offence. Boswell v. State, 47
2. Same.-Assault and Battery.-B. was charged with assault and battery, by a sufficient affidavit, duly filed. He was arrested on a proper war- rant, brought before a justice of the peace having competent juris- diction to try and determine the charge, and being required to plead entered a plea of guilty, which was entered and accepted by the court with the consent of the State, the prosecuting attorney being present. Afterwards, the injured party being present, the defendant standing on his plea of guilty, and demanding a hearing, the State volun- tarily dismissed the prosecution;
Held, that such proceeding was a bar to any further prosecution of B. for the same offence, he having been in jeopardy. Ib. 3. Cruelty to Animals.-Domestic Fowl.-Statute Construed.-A domestic fowl is an animal within the meaning of the statute on the subject of cruelty to animals. State v. Bruner, 98
4. Same.-Affidavit.-Ownership of Animal.-Immaterial Averment.-Descrip- tion.-Proof.-In an affidavit charging cruelty to an animal, an alle- gation as to the ownership of the animal is unnecessary; but where the ownership is charged, it becomes a matter of description and must be proved as alleged."
5. Same.-Necessary Averments.- Method of Torture and Effect Produced.-In such an affidavit, the method of torture or mutilation, as well as the effect produced, ought to be stated.
6. Same. An affidavit which avers substantially that the defendant "did then and there unlawfully and cruelly torture, torment and needlessly mutilate a certain animal, to wit, a goose, the property of some person VOL. 111.-39
or persons to the affiant unknown, by then and there unlawfully tur- pentining and burning in a cruel and wanton manner the said goose," sufficiently charges cruelty to an animal within the meaning of the Ib. 7. Rape.-Penetration.-Under the statute, section 1806, R. S. 1881, the slightest penetration, the other elements of the crime being present, is sufficient to constitute rape. Taylor v. State, 279 8. Same.-Circumstantial Evidence.-Penetration, like any other element of crime, may be established by circumstantial evidence. Ib. 9. Embezzlement.-County Treasurer.— Indictment.- Description of Funds.- Under the act of 1883 (Acts of 1883, p. 106) it is not necessary to the sufficiency of an indictment charging a county treasurer with embezzlement that it should contain a particular description of the different funds embezzled, i. e., whether county funds, school funds, Hollingsworth v. State, 289 10. Same.-Proceedings Declaring Vacancy.-Admissibility in Evidence.-De- fective Summons.-Upon the trial of a county treasurer, charged with embezzlement, proceedings before the circuit judge, upon petition of his sureties, wherein the office is declared vacant, are admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the summons in that proceeding did not state where the petition would be heard. If such a statement is re- quired under sections 5538 and 5545, R. S. 1881, its omission is a mere irregularity, not available collaterally.
11. Same.-Affirmative Showing of Error.-An objection to the admission in evidence of the order of the judge declaring the office of treasurer vacant, on the ground that no record of the proceedings appears to have been made, is not available unless it affirmatively appears that such record was not made.
12. Same.-Instructions.-Bill of Exceptions.-Supreme Court.-The mere act of the clerk in copying into the transcript what purport to be in- structions given by the court, but which are not made part of the record by a bill of exceptions or otherwise, does not present them in a manner authorizing consideration by the Supreme Court. Ib. 13. Same.-Excluding Documentary Evidence.-Showing of Error.-The Su- preme Court can not determine that there was error in ruling out offered documentary evidence if the instruments excluded are not in the record. Ib.
14. Same.-Embezzlement by County Treasurer.--Demand not Necessary to Estab- lish.-A demand upon a retiring county treasurer by his successor for the funds remaining in his hands is not necessary in order to establish a conversion and embezzlement of such funds. 15. Same.-Evidence.-- Voluminous Records.-Expert Accountants.-In a pros- ecution for embezzlement, or other crime, where the books, records, papers and entries are voluminous, and of such a character as to render it difficult for the jury to arrive at a correct conclusion as to amounts, expert accountants may be allowed to examine such books, etc., and testify to the result. Ib. 16. Technical Errors.- Briefs.-Sufficiency of.—A judgment will not be re- versed on account of technical errors which did not affect the sub- stantial rights of the accused on the merits.
Ib. 17. Embezzlement.-Indictment.-"Employee." - Meaning of and Averments as to.-The word "employee" has a well defined meaning, and in an in- dictment for embezzlement against one employed by another, charg ing him with having embezzled the funds of his employer, it is sufficient to describe him as an "employee," without setting out the facts constituting the employment. Ritter v. State, 824
18. Same.-Supreme Court.-Practice.-Case not Reversed on Weight of Evi- dence. In a criminal case the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal, nor the judgment reversed, merely on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Ib.
19. Instruction to Jury.-Invasion of Province of Jury.-An instruction to the jury in a criminal cause, to the effect that, under the evidence ad- duced, if they find the defendant guilty, it is an aggravated offence, and that they have the right to fix a proper penalty, is an invasion of the province of the jury, and erroneous. Roberts v. State, 340 20. Same.-Presence of Prisoner Throughout Trial.-In a criminal prosecu- tion, where the offence charged is punishable by death, or by confine- ment in the State prison or county jail, the defendant must be per- sonally present during the trial, unless he in some way waives the right, and if any substantial part of the trial is had in his absence without his consent, notwithstanding the presence of his counsel, it is such an error as requires a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Ib. 21. Same.-Instructing Jury Part of Trial.—Withdrawal of Erroneous Instruc- tion.-Instructing the jury is a part of the trial, and if the jury, after retirement, are called back into the court-room, and an erroneous in- struction withdrawn or corrected by a statement of the court, in the absence of the defendant, who is charged with a crime of the class above mentioned, it is error.
22. Bill of Exceptions. -Agreement by Prosecuting Attorney Extending Time of Filing. An agreement by the prosecuting attorney extending the time for filing a bill of exceptions beyond the statutory limit of sixty days allowed by the court (section 1847, R. S. 1881), is without au- thority, and a bill thereafter filed is not properly in the record, and presents no question. Bartley v. State, 358 23. Conspiracy to Defraud.―Indictment.-Naming Parties to be Defrauded.—It is not necessary to the sufficiency of an indictment charging a con- spiracy to cheat and defraud "divers citizens of Randolph county and the "public generally," by certain false and fraudulent repre- sentations, that the names of the persons against whom the conspiracy was directed should be set out. McKee v. State, 378 24. Same. Character of Pretences.-Question for Jury.-In such a case, whether the alleged pretences were of such a character as to impose upon citizens of the community, as communities are actually consti- tuted, is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
Ib. 25. Same.-Protection of Weak and Credulous.-The purpose of the law is to protect the weak and credulous from the wiles and stratagems of the artful and cunning, as well as those whose vigilance and sagacity enable them to protect themselves.
26. Same.-Renewal of Conspiracy.—After the joint design is once fairly es- tablished, every act done in pursuance of the original purpose, whether by one or more of the conspirators, or their agent, is a renewal of the original conspiracy.
Ib. 27. Same.-Agent of Conspirators.- Declarations of. - Evidence.-One employed as agent by conspirators, after their criminal undertaking is on foot, to aid in the prosecution of their designs, may testify to false representa- tions made by him and some of his associates while carrying forward the business of the undertaking, although made in the absence of the person on trial. Ib.
28. Same.-Employment of Agent to Commit Crime.-Liability of Principal.— One who employs an agent to assist in the execution of a criminal act is as guilty of the acts of the person employed as if he himself had performed them.
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