to belong to that communion. Such a combination as this never could have grown up in any colony where the English principle of responsibility had been in operation. Indeed, there was something so abhorrent to British feeling and justice in the whole affair that Lord Glenelg at once decided that it was "too bad"; and, while in Her Majesty's name he thanked the Commons for the representation they had made, he directed the Governor to dissolve the old Council and form two new ones free from the objec-/ tions which the Assembly had urged.

Had the instructions given been fairly carried out, there is little doubt that in Nova Scotia, as in New Brunswick, the people and their representatives would have been contented for a time; and would have felt that, in extreme cases, an appeal from their local rulers to the Colonial Secretary would be effectual. The existing machinery of government might have been supposed to be adequate to the necessities of the country, with perhaps an entire revision and repair at the hands of the master workmen at home once in ten years, or whenever the blunders of subordinates in the colony had completely clogged its operations.

But mark the result. The Governor was instructed to call into the new Councils those who "possess the confidence of the country." Now, you in England are simple enough to believe, that when the Whigs have, in a house of six hundred and sixty-eight members, a majority of eight or ten, they possess the confidence of the country; and if their majority should happen to be double that number, you would think it droll enough if they were excluded from political influence, and if the new creations of peers and selections for the Cabinet should all be made from the ranks of their opponents. This would be absurd at home, and yet it is the height of wisdom in the colonies. At the time these commands were sent out, the party who were pressing certain economical and other reforms in Nova Scotia were represented by two-thirds of the members of the popular branch. The relative numbers have occasionally varied during the past three sessions. At times, as on the recent division upon a delegation, the reformers have numbered thirty-three to eleven, in a House of forty-six. On some questions the minority has been larger, but two-thirds of the whole may be fairly taken as the numerical superiority on all political questions, of the reformers over their opponents. It will scarcely be believed, then, in England, that in the new appointments, by which a more popular character was to be given to the Councils, six gentlemen were taken from the minority and but two from the ranks of the majority. So that those who had been thanked for making representations to the Queen and who were pressing for a change of policy, were all passed over but two; while those who had resisted and opposed every representation, were honoured by appointments and placed in situations to render any such change utterly hopeless. The Executive Council, the local cabinet or ministry, therefore, contained one or two persons of moderate views, not selected from the House; one from the majority, and eight or ten others, to render his voice very like that of the "man crying in the wilderness." He held his seat about half a year and then resigned; feeling that while he was sworn to secrecy and compromised by the policy he had not approved he had no influence on the deliberations of the Cabinet or the distribution of patronage. Things were managed just as much in accordance with the royal instructions with respect to the Legislative Council. The pack was shuffled the game was to remain the same. The members of the majority, as I have said before, were all omitted in the new creation of peers, but one; while from the House and beyond it some of the most determined supporters of old abuses were selected; and among them, a young lawyer who had shown a most chivalrous desire to oppose everything Her Majesty so graciously approved; and who, in the excess of his ultra zeal, had, upon the final passage of the address to the Crown, when almost all his friends deserted him, voted against the measure in a minority of four.

Here, then, your Lordship has a practical illustration of the correctness of Lord Durham's observations, and may judge of the chance the present system offers of good colonial government, even when the people have the

Queen and the Colonial Secretary on their side. Such policy would wither all hope in the Nova Scotians, if they did not confide in the good sense and justice of their brethren within the four seas. We do not believe that the Parliament, press, and the people of England, when rightly informed, will allow our local authorities "to play such tricks before high heaven" or force us to live under a system so absurd, so anti-British, so destructive of every manly and honourable principle of action in political affairs. The House of Assembly, as a last resort, after ample deliberation, determined to send two members of that body as delegates to England, to claim the rights of Englishmen for the people of this country. Your Lordship's declaration tells me, that on this point they will be unsuccessful; but patient perseverence is a political characteristic of the stock from which we spring.

You ask me for the remedy. Lord Durham has stated it distinctly: the Colonial Governors must be commanded to govern by the aid of those who possess the confidence of the people, and are supported by a majority of the representative branch. Where is the danger? Of what consequence is it to the people of England, whether half-a-dozen persons, in whom that majority have confidence, but of whom they know nothing and care less, manage our local affairs; or the same number, selected from the minority, and whose policy the bulk of the population distrust? Suppose there was at this moment a majority in our Executive Council who think with the Assembly, what effect would it have upon the funds? Would the stocks fall? Would England be weaker, less prosperous or less respected, because the people of Nova Scotia were satisfied and happy?

But, it is said, a colony being part of a great empire must be governed by different principles from the metropolitan state. That, unless it be handed over to the minority it cannot be governed at all; that the majority, when they have things their own way, will be discontented and disloyal; that the very fact of their having nothing to complain of will make them desire to break the political compact, and disturb the peace of the empire. Let us fancy that this reasoning were applied to Glasgow, or Aberdeen, or to any other town in Britain, which you allow to govern itself. And what else is a Province, like Nova Scotia, than a small community, too feeble to interfere with the general commercial and military arrangements of the Government; but deeply interested in a number of minor matters, which only the people to be affected by them can wisely manage; which the ministry can never find leisure to attend to, and involve in inextricable confusion when they meddle with them? You allow a million of people to govern themselves in the very capital of the kingdom; and yet Her Majesty lives in the midst of them without any apprehension of danger, and feels the more secure, the more satisfaction and tranquillity they exhibit. Of course, if the Lord Mayor were to declare war upon France, or the Board of Aldermen were to resolve that the duties on brandy should no longer be collected by the general revenue officers of the kingdom, everybody would laugh, but no one would apprehend any great danger. Should we, if Lord Durham's principles be adopted, do anything equally outré, check us, for you have the power; but until we do, for your own sakes-for you are as much interested as we are-for the honour of the British name, too often tarnished by these squabbles, let us manage our own affairs, pay our own officers, and distribute a patronage, altogether beneath your notice, among those who command our esteem.

The Assembly of Nova Scotia asked, in 1837, for an elective Legislative Council, or for such other reconstruction of the local government as would ensure responsibility. After a struggle of three years we have not got either. The demand for an elective upper branch was made under the impression, that two Houses chosen by the people would sufficiently check an Executive exempt from all direct colonial accountability. From what has occurred in the Canadas; from the natural repugnance which the House of Peers may be supposed to entertain upon this point; from a strong desire to preserve in all our institutions the closest resemblance to those of our mother country,a responsible Executive Council, as recommended by Lord Durham, would be preferred. Into the practicability of

his Lordship's plan of a union of all the colonies under one government, I do not intend to enter; that is a distinct question; and whenever it is formally propounded to the local Legislatures, will be gravely discussed upon its own merits; but whether there be union or not, the principle of responsibility to the popular branch must be introduced into all the colonies without delay. It is the only simple and safe remedy for an inveterate and very common disease. It is mere mockery to tell us that the Governor himself is responsible. He must carry on the government by and with the few officials whom he finds in possession when he arrives. He may flutter and struggle in the net, as some well-meaning Governors have done, but he must at last resign himself to his fate; and like a snared bird be content with the narrow limits assigned him by his keepers. I have known a Governor bullied, sneered at, and almost shut out of society, while his obstinate resistance to the system created a suspicion that he might not become its victim; but I never knew one, who, even with the best intentions and the full concurrence and support of the representative branch, backed by the confidence of his Sovereign, was able to contend on anything like fair terms, with the small knot of functionaries who form the Councils, fill the offices, and wield the powers of the Government. The plain reason is, because, while the Governor is amenable to his Sovereign, and the members of Assembly are controlled by their constituents, these men are not responsible at all; and can always protect and sustain each other, whether assailed by the representatives of the Sovereign or the representatives of the people. It is indispensable, then, to the dignity, to the independence, to the usefulness of the Governor himself, that he should have the power to shake off this thraldom, as the Sovereign does if unfairly hampered by faction; and by an appeal to the people, adjust the balance of power. Give us this truly British_privilege, and colonial grievances will soon become a scarce article in the English market.

The planets that encircle the sun, warmed by its heat and rejoicing in its effulgence, are moved and sustained, each in its bright but subordinate career, by the same laws as the sun itself. Why should this beautiful example be lost upon us? Why should we run counter to the whole stream of British experience; and seek, for no object worthy of the sacrifice, to govern on one side of the Atlantic by principles the very reverse of those found to work so admirably on the other. The employment of steamers will soon bring Halifax within a ten days' voyage of England. Nova Scotia will then not be more distant from London than the north of Scotland and the west of Ireland were a few years ago. No time should be lost, therefore, in giving us the rights and guards to which we are entitled; for depend upon it the nearer we approach the mother country, the more we shall admire its excellent constitution, and the more intense will be the sorrow and disgust with which we must turn to contemplate our own.

CXXXVIII

JOSEPH HOWE TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL

[Trans. J. H. Chisholm, op. cit.]

My Lord, I have read the speech delivered by your Lordship on the 3rd of June, as reported in The Morning Chronicle, several times; and beg your Lordship's attention to what I conceive to be the rational solution of the difficulties raised in that speech to the concession of the principle of local responsibility Had your Lordship been more familiar with the practical workings of the existing colonial constitutions, and with the feelings of the people who smart under the mischiefs they produce, you would not, perhaps, have fallen into some errors by which that speech is disfigured; nor have argued the question as one in which, the obvious, manifold, and vital interests of the colonists were to be sacrificed to fear of some vague and indefinite injury that might be sustained by imperial interests, if execu

tive power were taken from the ignorant and given to the well-informedif it passed from the hands of officers to whom but a nominal responsibility can attach, into those of men subject to constant scrutiny, and, whenever they fail in their duty, liable to exposure and disgrace.

Lord Durham recommends that the English rule, by which those who conduct public affairs resign when they have lost the confidence of the Commons, should be applied to the Executive Councillors in North America. Yord Lordship denies the existence of the analogies upon which Lord Durham's views are based:

"It does not appear to me that you can subject the Executive Council of Canada to the responsibility which is fairly demanded of the ministers of the executive power in this country. In the first place, there is an obvious difference in matter of form with regard to the instructions under which the Governor of the colony acts. The Sovereign in this country receives the advice of the ministers, and acts by the advice of those ministers; and indeed there is no important act of the Crown for which there is not some individual minister responsible. There responsibility begins, and there it ends. But the Governor of Canada is acting, not in that high and unassailable position in which the Sovereign of this country is placed. He is a Governor receiving instructions from the Crown on the responsibility of a Secretary of State. Here then, at once, is an obvious and complete difference between the executive of this country and the executive of a colony."

Now, my Lord, let me beg your Lordship's attention to a few of the reasons why I conceive that such an argument as this ought not to stand in the way of the permanent peace, prosperity, and happiness of a million and a half of human beings. "The Sovereign in England receives the advice of the ministers and acts by the advice of those ministers;"—but are there no limits assigned by law, within which those advisers are bound to keep?—and is not the Sovereign bound to know and to apprise the country when they over-step them? What is the question at issue now between the Whigs and Tories? Is it not, whether, according to the spirit and practice of the Constitution, Sir Robert Peel had or had not a right to advise the changes in Her Majesty's household, upon which he insisted, before he would consent to form an administration? Suppose the present Cabinet were to advise Her Majesty to cut off Sir Robert's ears, or to bombard the city of London, would she obey, or would she not say, "Gentlemen you are exceeding your powers, and unless you conduct yourselves with more discretion, you must resign?" It is plain, therefore, that there are bounds beyond which even in the mother country, neither the advisers nor the monarch can pass; and none who seek colonial responsibility are so mad as to require, that corresponding restrictions shall not be binding here; that there shall not be a limit beyond which no Executive Councillor can pass, and over which no representative of Majesty will consent to be driven? These bounds must be clearly defined in the Act of Parliament which establishes the new system, or in the instructions sent to the Governors, to be communicated to the Legislatures; and which they may, if they see fit, embody in a bill, which, so long as it exists, shall be, to all intents and purposes, the Constitution of the Colony.

But, your Lordship says:-"The Governor is acting, not in that high and unassailable position in which the Sovereign of this country is placed." Why should he not occupy a position nearly as independent; and be perfectly unassailable, so long as he does not interfere (as the Sovereign would not dare to do) with matters for which others are responsible; nor allow himself, or his Council, to overstep those boundaries which British subjects on both sides of the Atlantic, for the protection of their mutual rights and interests, have established; and for a jealous recognition of which he, in case bad advice be given him, is alone responsible? The Queen's position is unassailable only so long as she does no act which the Constitution does not permit to be done. The Governor, if assailed, would in like manner turn to the Constitution of the colony committed to his

1 See No. CXXXVI.

care; and show that on the one hand he had neither trenched upon the rights essential to the security of colonial liberty, nor, on the other, timorously yielded aught which the laws for the protection of imperial interests made it criminal to yield.

Your Lordship is mistaken, therefore, in supposing that the Sovereign is divested of all responsibility; although I admit it is much more difficult to call him or her to an account than it would be the Governor of a colony. If the Queen were to deprive Sir Robert Peel of his ears or open a few batteries upon London, an émeute or a revolution would be the only remedy; but a Governor, if he consented to an act which shut out British manufacturers, or was tempted to levy war upon a friendly state, could be called to account without difficulty or delay; and, hence, I argue, that the facility and certainty of inflicting punishment for offences of this sort would prevent their commission; and operate as a sufficient guard to the imperial interests, which your Lordship seem to anxious to protect. If it be said that the people in a colony may sustain councillors who give unconstitutional advice, my answer is, that the same thing may occur in England. When it does, a peaceful modification of the Constitution, or a revolution follows; but these cases are not so frequent as to excite alarm, nor is there any reason to believe that they will be more so in the colonies, whose power to enforce improper demands is so questionable.

"He is a Governor receiving instructions from the Crown, on the responsibility of a Secretary of State." This passage suggests some reflec tions which I feel it my duty respectfully to press upon your Lordship's attention. One of the evils of the existing system, or rather haphazard mode of government, devoid of all system, is the various readings given to the medley of laws, usages, and Colonial Office despatches, by which we are at present ruled. An excellent illustration of the difficulty of obtaining an interpretation of these, about which there can be no mistake-which he who runs may read-may be furnished by contrasting the views put forth by your Lordship with those acted upon by Sir Francis Head'; and which, after a bloody rebellion, brought on to prove the value of his theory, he still avows in every succeeding edition of his Narrative, with a consistency and complacency worthy of all praise. "The responsibility," says your Lordship, "rests on the Secretary of State." "The responsibility," says Sir Francis Head, in every act of his government and in every page of his book, "rests on me." From the moment of his entering into Upper Canada, he threw overboard all the instructions from the Colonial Secretary (who, according to your Lordship ought to have been obeyed, for he was alone responsible); he struck out a course of policy entirely new; commenced "putting the padlock on the mind," to be followed by some hundreds of handcuffs on the wrists, and padlocks on the body. His language to Lord Glenelg throughout was, "You must support me," "The fear is that I will not be supported at the Colonial Office." In fact, from first to last, Sir Francis gave instructions to, instead of receiving them from, the Secretary of State; and finding that Lord Glenelg would not permit him to try his experiments in government, and combat the fiery dragon of democracy in the bosom of a British Province, at the cost of a good deal of blood and treasure, and the prospects of a foreign war, without occasionally offering a little advice, the worthy Baronet resigned; and has ever since been publishing his complaints to the world and claiming its sympathy, as a sufferer for conscience' sake, in upholding the only correct reading of colonial constitutions, and which the Secretary of State, and the Whig Government of which he was a member, did not understand. The doctors in this case differed; and the patient was left prostrate, mangled, bleeding and exhausted, listening to their altercations, but suffering from every gash made to convince each other at her expense; and there she lay, until recently; when, beginning to suspect that both had been talking nonsense and trying absurd experiments, she lifted her languid head, stretched out

Head was Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada from January, 1836, to March, 1838. He published a highly characteristic account of his rule entitled A Narrative (3rd Edn., London, 1839).