rope. I believe there is no instance of a herring running a hundred or a hundred and fifty miles up a fresh water river, or existing at all in water perfectly fresh.

"The above particulars you may depend upon; they were communicated to me by Mr. West, who is proprietor of the largest shad fisheries on the Delaware.

"This river also abounds in catfish, perch, jack, eels, and a great variety of others; above all, in sturgeon, which are frequently caught by accident in the shad-nets, and either boiled for their oil, or suffered to rot on the shores, being very seldom sent to market; when this is the case, they are sold for a mere trifle, chiefly to emigrants. The Americans have conceived a violent antipathy to this fish. I recollect no instance of seeing it at their tables. They have every external appearance of the European sturgeon, but in other respects must be very different, or the Americans lose one of the best fisheries in the world." p. 68–70.

This work contains a brief description of Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, and Boston, and many circumstances relative to the author's profession as a theatrical character, which we think uninteresting.

CXXXII. BACON'S NOVUM ORGANUM SCIENTIARUM; containing Rules for conducting the Understanding in the Search of Truth, and raising a solid Structure of Universal Philosophy.

(Concluded from page 493.) Section III. Of the Different Philosophical Theories.

Section IV. Of the Signs or Characteristics of False Philosophy.

Section V. Of the Causes of Errors in Philosophies.

Section VI. Of the Grounds of Hope, for the farther Advancement of Philosophy and the Sciences.

"We begin with God the author of all good, and the Father of light, from whom the goodness of this design manifestly shews it to proceed. We see in the divine works, that the smallest beginnings are certainly succeeded by the effects. And what is said of spiritual things, that the kingdom of God comes not with observation, is also found true in every great

work of divine Providence, where all things go quietly on without noise or bustle; so that the whole is accomplished before men imagined or took notice that it was in hand. And we should here remember the prophecy of Daniel concerning the latter ages of the world: Many shall go to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased; thereby plainly intimating it to be the design of Providence, that when the world was laid open to a general intercourse, as by our numerous long voyages it now begins to be, at the same time also the sciences should receive increase *." p. 90.

Other grounds of hope are expressed, and the author proceeds to the next section.

Section VII. An Idea of the New Method of interpreting Nature+. p. 116.

Part II. Section I. Particular aphorisms for interpreting nature, or the means of enlarging the human power and knowledge, by the discovery of forms.

After nine aphorisms, which, it is observed in a note, "contain a kind of close wrought, axiomatical chain of doctrine, that, when rightly understood, will appear deep, sagacious, and drawn from nature, so as to lay a firm, just, and adequate foundation for the intended new logic, or me thod of investigating the forms of things," the author proceeds thus in

"Aphorism 10. The indications for the interpretation of nature include two general parts: the first relates to the raising of axioms from experience, and the second to the deducing or deriving of new experi

* We may now be enabled, in some measure, to judge how far these grounds of hope were solid and well laid. Certainly a great revolution in philosophy has gradually ensued upon the endeavours of the author; and philosophers have been insensibly drawn of from speculation and theory to practice and experience, whence many useful inventions and works have proceeded, and more may, perhaps, proceed.

thor's method of interpreting nature, is ra + The idea given in this section, of the au formed by excluding what it is not, rather ther a negative than a positive idea, and than by directly shewing what it is, which will be the business of the second part to unfold. But this section was necessary to give some glimpse of the thing itself, and prepare the mind by degrees for the great lamp to be afterwards set up.

ments from axioms. The first is divided into three kinds of administrations or helps, viz. the helps, 1. for the sense; 2. for the memory; and, 3. for the reason.

"1. Therefore a just and adequate natural and experimental history is to be procured, as the foundation of the whole thing; for we are not to fancy, or imagine, but to discover what are the works and laws of na

ture.

"2. But natural and experimental history is so copious and diffusive a thing, as to confound and distract the understanding, unless such history be digested and arranged in proper order; therefore tables, and subservient chains of instances, are to be formed and digested in such a manner, that the understanding may commodiously work upon them.

"3. And though this were done, yet the understanding left to itself, and its own spontaneous motion, is unequal to the work, and unfit to enter upon the raising of axioms, unless it be first regulated, strengthened, and guarded, therefore, in the third place, genuine and real induction must be used as the key of interpretation. But we are to begin at the end, and proceed backwards to the

rest.

"The enquiry of forms proceeds in this manner. First, all the known instances agreeing in the same nature, though in the most dissimilar subjects, are to be brought together, and placed before the understanding. And this collection is to be made historically, without any overhasty indulgence of speculation, or any great subtilty for the present. We will illustrate the thing by an example in the enquiry into the form of heat." p. 167-169.

Then follow five tables to illustrate the author's plan, intitled the true method of discovering forms, illustrated by an example in the form of heat.

Table I. Instances agreeing in the

nature of heat.

Table II. Instances of approximation, yet wanting the nature of heat. Table III. Of the degrees of heat. Table IV. An example of the exclusion or rejection of natures, from the form of heat.

Table V. The first vintage, or dawn of doctrine from form of heat. VOL. I.

These tables conclude the first volume.

Volume II. Part II. Section II. The doctrine of instances; or, the method of expediting the interpretation of nature, and the investigation of forms, by prerogative instances. That our readers may form a judgment upon the nature of the second part of this work, we present to them the description given of it in the appendix.

"In the second section, the author proceeds to perfect the art of discovering forms, or to shew the manner of framing an induction that shall conclude as justly in philosophy, as syllogism does in logic, or demonstration in mathematics. Accordingly, he here directly treats of prerogative instances, or the way of procuring proper collections of such facts, observations, and experiments, as are best fitted to enter the three tables of view, corresponding to the three first above-mentioned; so that a few of these instances may answer the purpose of many, shorten the business of search and enquiry, and afford a prepared and proper matter for induction in all kinds of subjects.

"And of these instances he makes twenty-seven different kinds; viz. 1. Such as exhibit the nature enquired after in things that agree with, or differ from others, in respect to that nature only. 2. Instances wherein the nature sought appears in a state of generation, or destruction. 3. Those wherein the nature enquired after stands alone, in a high degree of perfection, or predominancy. 4. Such as shew the thing enquired after, in its lowest state, weakest virtue, or first rudiments. 5. Such as exhibit the nature enquired after, in the way of a lesser form. 6. Such as shew a likeness and relation in the concrete, so as to help in uniting nature. 7. Such as shew bodies in the concrete, as it were out of their course, or broken in nature. 8. Errors of nature, things monstrous, extraordinary, or out of the course of nature. 9. Bodies consisting of two different natures, or double species. 10. The most per fect works of men in every kind. 11. Instances wherein the nature sought is either constantly present, or constantly absent. 12. Instances that shew the limits of nature, or the bounds betwixt existence and non

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existence, in all subjects. 13. Such as mix and join natures supposed to be incompatible, or heterogeneous. 14. Such as show an inviolable conjunction of one nature to another, and the separable alliance of others. 15. Such as shew the separation of natures that frequently meet. 16. Such as assist the actions of the senses, particularly the sight. 17. Such as bring those things to the senses that did not appear before. 18. Such as discover the motions of nature connected, or gradually continued. 19. Such as afford information where the senses fail. 20. Such as excite the attention, and hint the subtilty of nature. 21. Such as measure the powers, and virtues of things, by space. 22. Such as measure the powers of nature by time. 23. Such as shew in what proportion quantity of body contributes to quantity of virtue. 24. Such as shew the prevalency or subjection of virtues to one another; under which come, all the species of motion, or active powers. 25. Such as point out advantages and conveniences for mankind. 26. Such as regard things of common occurrence, and therefore save the trouble of new demonstrations; under which come the several ways of practice, or means of operation. And, 27. Such instances as show that a small quantity of matter, or an apparently small efficient, may have a great effect.

"This doctrine of prerogative instances is treated with care, and illus. trated with a suitable variety of examples, that open the way to enquiries of all kinds, and lead to the improvement of all the parts of philosophy; so as to shew, in a summary view, what is already known, in numerous subjects, and direct a farther prosecution, at the same time that the author is carrying on his own particular design of perfecting the art of introduction, and laying down precepts, and giving directions for the execution of the remaining parts of his work. And here ends all that is left of the Novum Organum." p. 250 -253.

CXXXIII. NATURAL THEOLOGY, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature. By WIL

LIAM PALEY, D. D. Archdeacon of Carlisle, 8vo.

HIS work is divided into twenty

THIS

seven chapters, which contaio the following subjects: Chapters I, and II. State of the argumentIII. Application of the argument.IV. Of the succession of plants and animals.-V. Application of the argument continued.-VI. The argument cumulative.-VII. Of the me.chanical and immechanical functions of animals and vegetables.— VIII. Of mechanical arrangementia the human frame-of the bones.IX. Of the muscles.-X. Of the ves sels of animal bodies.-XI. Of the animal structure regarded as a mass.XII. Comparative anatomy.-XIII. Peculiar organizations.-XIV. Prospective contrivances. —XV. Relations.-XVI.Compensations.-XVII. The relation of animated bodies to inanimate nature.—XVIII. Instincts.

XIX. Of insects.-XX. Of plants. -XXI. Of the elements.-XXII. Astronomy.-XXIII. Personality of the Deity.-XXIV. Of the natural attri butes of the Deity.-XXV. Of the unity of the Deity.-XXVI. Of the goodness of the Deity.-XXVII. CODclusion.

In stating the argument the author says, "In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary. it had lain there for ever; nor would it perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so forined and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day;

that, if the several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manher, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it." p. 2, 3.

A minute description is then given of the materials used, and the differ ent parts of the machinery employed in the construction of a watch. The inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction, and designed its use." p. 3, 4,

The argument is inforced by the following considerations: "I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture.

"Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that if the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right, the purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement; or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to shew with what design it was made; still less necessary when the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

"Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain

whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever." p. 4, 5. This is illustrated in two supposed

cases.

"Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of many possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

"Nor, fifthly, would it yield his enquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation.

"He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker.

Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

"VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, the law of

metallic nature,' may sound harsh to a philosophic ear, but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as 'the law of vegetable nature,'-' the law of animal nature,' or indeed, as the law of nature' in general, when assigned as the cause of phænomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclu

sion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knows nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end. He knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know." p. 6-8.

The state of the argument is thus continued in the second chapter: "Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch should, after some time, discover that in addition to all the properties he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the property of producing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself; (the thing is conceivable ;) that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of laths, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us enquire what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion?" p. 9.

Our limits preclude us from detailing the whole of the author's arguments, we can do little more than give the topics as they are stated.

I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate, skill of the contriver." p. 9.

"IL. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were in some sense the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter for instance is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second; in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced." p. 10.

"III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observer had found, was

made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design. remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more ac counted for now than they were before. In the same thing we may ask. for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat, and these causes may all be different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to an use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question, by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be a design without a designer; contri vance without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to an use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind." &c. p. 11, 12.

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IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty further back, i. e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced by another watch, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for." p. 13. This part of the argument is pursued, by considering the increase of terms in a series, and the simile of the chain that however numerous its links, it is unable to support itself, &c. &c. and thus concludes. "It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to alledge that a series may be carried back to infinity; for 1 do not admit that we have yet any cause at all of the phænomena, sull less any series of causes finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer." p. 17.

"V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the