fortune Your Excellency will be astonished—I have been admirably supported by Colonel Procter, the whole of my Staff and I may justly say every individual under my Command. Believe me Your Excellency's Obedient, faithful humble Servant. M. Genl. His Excellency Lt. Genl. Sir George Prevost Bt., &c., &c., &c. Endorsed-Copy of a letter from M. Genl. Brock, Detroit 16th Augt. 1812. Enclosure in Sir G. Prevosts No. 5, Augt. 26th 1812. A Correct Copy. GEORGE PREVOST. EXHIBIT 100. No. 47. MY LORD, Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst.1 Niagara 27th February 1813. On my return from Fort George from inspecting the Troops on this Frontier and viewing the works which have been erected between that place and Fort Erie, and from visiting the advanced positions which the solid state of the ice at the Northern Extremity of Lake Erie had rendered it indispensably necessary to establish, to prevent those incomplete and open Batteries from being surprised or taken in reverse I was met by an Officer with Dispatches from Detroit. Colonel Procter who is in Command there informs me that he had ascertained that General Harrison had precipitately retreated from the River Raisins to the foot of the Rapids of the Miamis upon his becoming acquainted with the annihilation of Brigadier General Winchester's Army; When the last Scouts came in Major General Harrison with about 2000 men had arrived at his intended position on the West bank of the River Miamis situated at about eighty miles from Detroit; But as a great part of the route to that place lies through 'Canadian Archives, Q. 121, p. 122. a Wilderness and immense Swamps, which are only passable at this Season of the Year and with extreme difficulty-by Indians, I did not think it prudent to allow Colonel Procter to move forward with the Garrisons of Detroit and Amherstburgh and the reinforcements detached from the Niagara frontier to his support; to dislodge the American Army, from the uneasy position it had taken, because I considered the movement hazardous and one which might seriously cripple the force under Colonel Procter's Command in which event not only the Michigan Territory would be exposed, but our influence with the Indian Tribes considerably diminished. I have therefore desired that Tecumseh who with the Warriors is advancing from the forks of the Wabash should be employed in interrupting the Communication with Major General Harrison's Army and in intercepting the supplies and reinforcements moving towards it from Fort Wayne & Chilicothe. The Indian Chiefs Roundhead and Norton with about Eight hundred Warriors supported by a chosen band from the 41st Regiment and the Detroit Militia were to proceed from Amherstburgh to co-operate with Tecumseh and I entertain hopes that these movements would so work upon the American Army by augmenting the privations and hardships inseparable from its present situation as in all probability to render it an easy prey to the Indian force coming from the Southward under Mr. Dickson. Having now had the honour of detailing to Your Lordship the measures I have pursued for preserving entire this portion of His Majesty's territories in British America, I humbly hope they will meet with the gracious approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I have the honor to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant The Right Honble. The Earl Bathurst. Having decided on the necessity of retiring on the Thames it became immediately an object of the utmost importance to convince the Indian Body of its Expediency also, and likewise to dispel all apprehensions of their being deserted by us both of which to a considerable degree were affected by communing with the Chief Tecumthé and then by means of him. The Indian cause and ours experienced a serious Loss in the death of Round head. On the 24th Ultimo I concentrated my force at Sandwich having previously sent off to the Thames my remaining Ordnance and Stores of every description for which Transport could be found and destroyed the small portion that remained, as well as the Public Buildings &c. &c. at Amherstburg. On the 26th the Enemy appeared in the Offing, sounding in every direction, and on the 27th landed 9 miles below Amherstburg in considerable force, and the same evening I commenced my retreat and by easy marches arrived on the 29th at the River Thames, I had immediately after the loss of our Fleet, observed an impatience to retire by which however I was not influenced ere it became at least prudent-a considerable number of Indians remained but not from want of attachment to us, nor do I apprend any diminution of it whilst our conduct is such as to retain the confidence of those who have accompanied us. I was not disheartened, tho' I could not but observe that the Idea of making a stand on the Thames below the Wilderness* or maintaining any position on it was generally treated as visionary, and that every direction given for that purpose was received with apathy and I soon perceived that it would not be in my power to occupy 'Canadian Archives, Q. 135, p. 536. *A Wood between the Moravian Town & Delaware, the Road thro' wch. is 34 miles & very bad. [Appearing in original text.] the narrows of the River Sinclair, as I had intended and prevent the Enemy's vessel passing into Lake Huron. I had assured the Indians we would not desert them, and it was my full determination to have made a stand at the Forks (Chatham) by which our Vessels and Stores would be protected, but after my arrival at Dover, three miles lower down the River, I was induced to take post there first, where ovens had been constructed and where there was some shelter for the Troops, and had accordingly directed that it should be put into the best possible state of defence that time and circumstances would admit of, indeed it had been my intention to have opposed the Enemy nearer the Mouth of the River, had not the Troops, contrary to my intentions been moved during my absence of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the Country in my Rear. On the 3d Instant during another unfortunate attempt for the said purpose with the Offir. of Engineers whom indisposition had prevented waiting on me from the 24th Ultimo to the Evening of the 2nd Inst. The Troops on the advance of the Enemy entered until stopped at the Forks, and altho' the measure was at the time strongly opposed by the Indian Body, it had the effect of determining them, the next morning to immediately retreat to the Moravian Town, and which I found on my arrival was carrying into effect, a hasty measure that made it requisite to emmediately sink and destroy, the Vessels and Naval Stores brought from Amherstburg, as well as all others, that could not from the want of time be removed and which was accordingly done. Immediately on my determination to fall back directions were given and measures immediately taken for the construction of Ovens and a sufficiency of Perogues or large Canoes on the Communication, had my intentions been carried into effect promptly, we should have been well accommodated with Provisions, and not encumbered with them on the move, as I had explicitly directed that every Article of food should be in our Rear, and that portions of it as well as individuals of the Commissariat should be at stated distances for the accommodation of the sick and of Women & Children who were to be sent off, as conveyances could be found, in short every measure was adopted that my experience or enquiries could prompt for the disemcumbering my Force and facilitating its supplies. In the attempt to save provision and ammunition we became en cumbered with Boats not suited to the state of the Navigation. The Indians & the Troops retreated on different sides of the River and the Boats to which sufficient attention had not been given, became particularly exposed to the Fire of the Enemy, who were advancing on the side the Indians were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into the possession of the Enemy, and with them several of the Men, and Provisions and all the ammunition that had not been issued to the Troops and Indians. This disastrous circumstance afforded the Enemy the means of crossing and advancing on both sides of the River, finding the Enemy were advancing too near, I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry in a wood below the Moravian Town, which last was not cleared of Indian Women and Children or of those of the Troops, nor of the Sick-The Troops were formed with their left to the River, with a reserve of a six pounder-On the Road near the River; the Indians on the Right-The want of ammunition was unknown to the Men, and but to few of the officers-My only anxiety was on that head, which I made an immediate attempt to procure a supply of, as well as of Flour and Corn, and awaited the result of the attack with full confidence, the Gun which certainly should have produced the best effect, if properly managed was in possession of the Enemy, immediately as the attack had commenced without having fired a shot, this circumstance operated so very unfavorably that the Line commencing near the left gave way, and notwithstanding the exertions of the officers in general could not be reformed, or the Men rallied, having in vain endeavoured to call the Men to a sense of their Duty and having no chance by remaining but of being captured, I reluctantly quitted the Ground, and narrowly escaped being taken by the Enemy' Cavalry. I cannot but observe that the Troops did not seem to have had that confidence in themselves, that they have shewn on every former occasion, and which had produced a conduct that I witnessed with pride and satisfaction, and which had they felt in the late unfortunate instance, would I am confident have produced quite another result, and have placed me in a very different state from what I feel myself in at present, having already waited too long for the return of Lieut. Le Breton, whom I sent with a Flag of Truce, to ascertain the fate of Individuals &c. I shall no longer delay, but take the earliest opportunity of giving any fur |