6,977,985 5. That the expences of the Navy, Army, and Ordnance, for the year 1778, will exceed the peace establishment, in a sum not less than 4,860,268!. exclusive of navy debt, and extraordinaries of army and ordnance, and including those articles, in a sum not less than 9 millions. In the above account is not included Which will make the excess, for the 9,060,268 6. That from the experience of past times, that whenever peace shall be restored, great expences must necessarily be still incurred. That the charge of paying the troops till they can be brought home, and before they can be disbanded, and particularly the foreign troops, for some of which this nation is to pay even for 12 months after they are returned into their own country; the expence of re-conveying our army, artillery and stores, across the Atlantic, and sending the foreigners to Germany, and the arrears and demands of various sorts, will create an excess of 3,120,000 expence in the years immediately follow397,200 ing a peace, little short of what it will be 488,695 in the last year of the war. From whence' it appears, that if peace was this day restored, the cost of the present war would be as follows: 4,005,895 Feb. 17. A Petition of several of the gentlemen, freeholders, and others, of the county of Norfolk, and of the city of Norwich, was presented to the House, and read: setting forth: "That your petitioners observe, with the utmost concern and surprize, that extraordinary endeavours are used in this county, and in many other parts of the kingdom, to raise men and money for his Majesty's service by free gifts and contributions, not given and granted in a parliamentary course, which unusual and strained efforts (concerning the very legality of which they conceive doubts may justly be entertained) while parliament actually sits, and at a time when his Majesty is in apparent peace with all the powers in Europe, strongly indicate some violent distemper in the state, to which its ordinary powers and means of supply are not sufficient. We most humbly apprehend, that if a war with any of the neighbouring nations threatens to break out, nothing can give more encouragement to it than the taking such measures as tend to prove this kingdom to be as much exhausted in its strength at the very commencement of foreign hostilities, as it has been at the close of the longest and most wasteful wars. Your petitioners have been also called upon, in a manner equally alarming, by persons of great power and rank in his Majesty's service, to raise men and money for supporting the constitutional autho⚫ rity of Great Britain. We hope and trust that constitutional authority is safe and well supported in the affections of a loyal and a free people; we know of no attack upon, or resistance to, the operation of the laws in this county, or in this kingdom, Impaired, as we may be, in power of reputation abroad, we have however peace at home; but in the thirteen once flourishing and obedient colonies of Great Britain, his Majesty has no authority or other government to be supported. A misrepresentation of our unhappy situation would be a mockery of Dur distress. An empire is lost. A great continent in arms is to be conquered or abandoned. One whole British army of veteran troops has surrendered prisoners of war to the sudden levies of a new nation another, abandoning a province which had been over-run in the last campaign, and after two engagements in the field successful without advantage, baving marched out to take a view of an enemy posted in one of those places of inaccessible strength with which America abounds, has been compelled by necessity to march back to an open town, which they are obliged to fortify for winter quarters at an enormous expence; the continent of America is, it seems, to be conquered by defeated and defensive armies. It is a project we cannot comprehend. Sixty thousand soldiers, a force of artillery (if we are to judge by the charge) such as never has been sent out of this kingdom, 60,000 seamen voted, more than an hundred armed ships employed in this special service, an unheard-of expence in every sort of military supply, have, after three years struggle, brought things to such a state, that, instead of quieting our civil troubles, we are threatened with a foreign war, for which, after such an abun dance (for we cannot call it profusion) of parliamentary grants increasing daily, and with the most exuberant recruiting funds, we are called upon to piece-out the deficiency of public wealth by private contributions; a nation of such power as this, reduc ed to such a state, must lose its reason and its feelings, together with its glory, if it could acquiesce in its condition. It is not in our choice to suppose that it can have happened without a fault somewhere: in the generals and armies the fault cannot be; if their known and tried characters did not forbid all suspicions of them, yet his Majesty's most gracious speeches from the throne make it improper for us to entertain the least doubt of their courage and conduct; but his Majesty has not forbid us to entertain doubts of the wisdom, care, and prudence of those who conduct his affairs; and we trust, that the House of Commons, whose duty calls, and whose competence and constitution enables them to come to the bottom of those evils, will seriously enquire into the causes of our present calamitous situation, for we greatly fear that we, with the rest of your constituents, have been hitherto greatly deceived and deluded, with regard to the nature, the cause, and the importance of the Ameri can troubles, as well as concerning the means of quieting them, both legal and coercive: else we should not have the misfortune to see acts of parliament made only to be sent back to be repealed; armies sent out to inforce them, only to be returned to us as prisoners under capitulation; and, to speak with the filial confidence of free subjects, we plainly declare ourselves unwilling to com mit any more of our national glory to to all the citizens of the British empire, to avert, if possible, a foreign war, or, if that be not possible, to take due care that rational, effectual, and becoming provision, in an orderly and parliamentary way, be made for our defence and safety; under the accumulated distress of foreign and civil hostility, we throw ourselves with the most perfect reliance on the care and wisdom (never more called for than in the present exigency) of a British House of Commons; on them we rest the last hopes of a deserving, but, we fear, an injured, deceived, and endangered people." [Signed by 5,400 persons.] Ordered to lie on the table. Debate in the Commons on Lord North's Conciliatory Propositi ns.] Lord North, agreeably to his promise, rose to make his Conciliatory Propositions. He began by apologizing for the intended length of his speech, but he said it was necessary, from the quantity of matter he was obliged to go into, and from the perspicuity and clearness which he intended to make use of, in order to give satisfaction upon every part of the detail. He declared, that from the beginning he had been uniformly disposed to peace. That the coercive Acts which he had made, were such as ap attaint, and the persons of more of our countrymen to foreign hardships and perils, without any common human security, that they shall not, by the same errors, be exposed to the same calamities and disgraces which many of those have fallen into who have already been sent forth. Without wise councils at home, we cannot have empire or reputation abroad; it is our duty to our Sovereign, to whose person and illustrious House we have ever borne the most distinguished and zealous attachment, which compels us to lay before this honourable House this representation of his affairs; we shall ever be foremost in providing for every reasonable and useful supply for the public service; but we cannot make ourselves the instruments of any faction, or grant money as a test of our support of it; if the colonies can be brought to obedience, we are convinced, by sad experience, it must be by wise and lenient counsels, and by those in whom they have no experience of ill-will or incapacity, the one producing hatred, and the other contempt; for our domestic protection, we most humbly conceive, that our constitutional militia, which his Majesty has been enabled to call out, is the most effective and least invidious defence; twelve entirely new corps, consisting of 15,000 highlanders of the northern part of the United King-peared to be necessary at the time, though dom, and of the towns of Manchester and Liverpool, appointed during the sitting, without the previous approbation of parliament, and which can hardly be ready in time for American service, are not, we most humbly submit it to superior wisdom, the defence in which we can or ought, for obvious reasons, to trust, in preference to that more numerous and equally well-equitable, and most lasting bond of union trained and well-affected body, the national militia; nor have we been given to understand, at a time when the war establishment stands at comparatively low numbers, and those numbers far from complete, and at a time when the public burthens are so oppressive, for what reason corps should be raised, or on what grounds: if a compliment was meant (at the expence of our finances, and what we conceive the most serviceable military arrangement) the compliment has been confined to the above mentioned parts of this kingdom. We do therefore with all earnestness and humanity pray an enquiry into the true grounds and conduct of this unhappy civil war, that the best means may be found for bringing it to a speedy termination, for facilitating the restoration of concord and confidence new in the event they bad produced effects which he never intended. That as soon as he found that they had not the effect which he intended, he proposed a conciliatory proposition before the sword was drawn. That at that time he thought, and that he still thinks, the terms of that pro position would form the happiest, most between Great Britain and her colonies. That by a variety of discussions, a proposition, that was originally clear and simple in itself, was made to appear so obscure, as to go damned to America; so that the Congress conceived, or took occasion to represent it as a scheme for sowing divisions, and introducing taxation among them in a worse mode than the former, and accordingly rejected it. His idea never had been to draw any considerable revenue either in that way, or any other, from America; his idea was, they should contribute in a very low proportion to the expences of this country. That he had always known that American taxation could never produce a beneficial revenue; that there were many sorts of taxes that could not at all be laid on that country, and that few of them would prove worth the charge of collection; that the Stamp Act was the most judicious that could be chosen for that purpose, as it interested every man who had any dealing, or any property to defend or recover, in the collection of the tax, and the execution of the law but, notwithstanding the high rate at which that duty had been formerly estimated, he did not believe its produce would have been a very considerable object; and if the people had confederated, as they seemed in general disposed to do, and in some places had actually done, to go on without stamps, it would produce nothing at all, but would increase the confusions of the country, if any attempts were made to disturb the transactions which were carried on without stamps. That, accordingly, he never had proposed any tax on America; he found them already taxed, when he unfortunately (as he still must say, whatever use had been, or might be made of the word) came into administration. That his principle of policy was to have had as little discussion on these subjects as possible, but to keep the affairs of America out of parliament; that accordingly, as he had not laid, so did he not think it advisable for him to repeal the tea-tax, nor did he ever think of any particular means for enforcing it. or pretended, of parliament's ever attempting to tax them again, and to take away all exercise of the right itself in future, so far as regarded revenue. That as to the other particulars in controversy, he observed that the Americans had desired a repeal of all the Acts passed since 1763; that this could not, however, be supposed to mean any more than those Acts which had, in some way or other, pressed on them; for that some which had passed in 1769 were beneficial, and such as they themselves must consider in that light, being the granting of bounties and premiums, or the relaxation of former statutes that had been grievous to them. That as to the late Acts, such as the Massachuset's charter, the Fishery, and the Prohibitory Bills, as they were the effect of the quarrel, they should cease; and that as to complaints of matters of a various nature, authority should be given to settle them to the satisfaction of America. That all these matters, consisting of a great variety, would be better left to the discussion of commissioners, than be established here by act of parliament, or by explicit powers given for each specific purpose; for that the Americans in the negociation would consider every concession made actually here, to be a part of the basis of the treaty, and therefore never to be receded from, and would accumulate new demands upon that; therefore, as every thing of that kind might be variously modified by agreement, he was for leaving the whole to commissioners. That the Act enabling the East India Company to send teas to America on their own account, and with the draw-back of the whole duty here, was a regulation which he thought it not possible the Americans could complain of, since it was a That the commissioners formerly aprelief instead of an oppression; but that pointed had very large powers, so, indeed, the ill-affected there, and persons con- he understood those powers; but that as cerned in a contraband trade, endeavoured others seemed to consider them as more to represent it as a monopoly; that some limited than in reality they were, he should hand-bills that were scattered about at take care now to be very explicit, and he Boston, even supposed that he had taken would give them full powers to treat, disoff the American 3d. per pound duty, and cuss, and conclude upon every point whatthat on that supposition, the disaffected 'ever. That as some difficulties had arisen excited the people to a tumult, upon a about the powers given to the commisprinciple totally distinct from all idea of sioners, of treating with the Congress by taxation. That, therefore, as he never name, he would now remove that difficulty, had meant taxation as his object in the last by empowering and enabling the commisTea Act, so neither did he in his Concilia-sioners to treat with the Congress as if it tory Proposition; but in the latter, considered it only as a means of union and good agreement between the two countries; that, therefore, in what he was going to propose he was uniform and con sistent. One of the Bills he proposed to move for was, to quiet America upon the subject of taxation, and to remove all fears, real were a legal body, and would so far give it authenticity, as to suppose its acts and concessions would bind all America. That they should have powers to treat with any of the provincial assemblies upon their present constitution, and with any indivi duals in their present civil capacities or military commands;-with general Washington, or any other officer. That they should have a power, whenever they thought requisite, to order a suspension of arms. That they should have a power to suspend the operation of all laws. That they should have a power of granting all sorts of pardons, immunities, and rewards. That they should have a power of restoring all the colonies, or any of them, to the form of its ancient constitution, as it stood before the troubles; any of those where the King nominated the governors, council, judges, and other magistrates, to nominate such at their discretion, till the King's further pleasure be known. curred to him, as the nation was still strong and vigorous, that they could raise a number of men, and that the resources were far from exhausted, that their strength should be exerted to repair the losses, and to pursue the war with vigour to a happy termination: but when he reflected upon the uncertainty of events, which had hitherto so much disappointed his expectation, and that in case of the utmost success, the terms which he now proposed must be substantially the same as he should propose in the height of victory, he saw no reason to prevent the protractThat as the powers of the former coming the war, the effusion of blood, and the missioners had been objected to, so the immoderate expence, he would offer the Congress had raised a difficulty, on pre- same propositions now. tence of the non-admission of their title to be independent states. As the Americans might claim their independence on the outset, he would not insist on their renouncing it till the treaty should receive its final ratification by the King and Par liament of Great Britain. That the commissioners should be instructed to negociate for some reasonable and moderate contribution towards the common defence of the empire when reunited; but to take away all pretence for not terminating this unhappy difference, the contribution was not to be insisted on as a sine qua non of the treaty; but that if the Americans should refuse so reasonable and equitable a proposition, they were not to complain, if hereafter they were not to look for support from that part of the empire to whose expence they had refused to contribute. That it might be asked, If his sentiments had always been such with regard to taxation and peace, and why he had not made this proposition at a more early period?-To this he answered, his opinion had ever been, that the moment of victory was the proper time for offering terms of concession. That the House might remember, that at the beginning of the session he had declared, that such were his sentiments; he at that time thought that the victories obtained by sir William Howe had been more decisive, and he knew nothing of general Burgoyne's misfortune. That when the news of that misfortune had arrived, and that the victories obtained by sir William Howe could not be so improved as to hinder general Washington from appearing with some superiority in the field, and that the King's troops were obliged to retire, and fortify themselves in winter quarters, the first thing that oct. That he was convinced that they would considerably aid the operations of war, as they would themselves be aided by the force in America, which was still very great; that in case nothing farther could be done by force, at any rate, they would be offered with more grace than hereafter. That the events of war in America had turned out very differently from his expectation; that great force had been procured to be sent into America, but to little purpose hitherto. That he must confess himself extremely disappointed in his expectations of the effect of our military force. He did not mean at that time to condemn, or even to call in question, the conduct of any of our commanders, but he had been disappointed. That sir William Howe had not only been in the late actions, and in the whole course of the campaign, in goodness of troops, and in all manner of supplies, but in numbers, too, much superior to the American army which opposed him in the field. That ge neral Burgoyne, who was at length overpowered by numbers, had been in numbers, until the affair at Bennington, near twice as strong as the army under general Gates. That all these things had happened in a manner very contrary to his expectation. That, for his part, he never had made a promise which he did not perform, or receive an information which he did not communicate. That he only kept back the names of those who had given him information, and which it would be unfaithful and inhuman to divulge; that he promised a great army should be sent out, and a great army had been sent out; there were 60,000 men and upwards: that he had promised a great fleet should be employed, and a great fleet had been em. |