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Términos y frases comunes
Arthur Schopenhauers Auflage aufser ausdrücklich Bedeutung Begriff Beharrlichkeit beiden Berkeley besonderen Bestimmung Beweis bewufst Bewusstsein Beziehung blofs blofse Empfindung Cartesianischen cogitatio cogito ergo sum dafs daſs Deduktion Denken Descartes deutlich Dinge dunklen Vorstellungen Ebenda Einbildungskraft empirischen Anschauung Erfahrung erkennen Erkenntnis Erscheinungen ersten Existenz Fichte Form Frage Gedanken gegeben Gegenstand Geist Gerh Gesetz Geulinex gewisse gibt Gott grofse Grundlage Orig heifst Hobbes idea ideas Ideen Kant Kategorien kausalen Kausalität klar kommt Körper Körperwelt Kritik läfst lediglich Lehre Schopenhauers Leibniz lichen Locke logischen Lourd Malebranche Materie Menschen Metaphysik möglich Monade mufs müfste Natur notwendig objektive pensée Perzeptionen phantasma Philos Philosophie Plato Polis priori psychologischen Raum Reflexion sagt Sämtl Satzes vom Grunde Schopen Schriften Seele Sinne Sinnesempfindungen Sinnlichkeit Spinoza Subjekt subjektiven Substanz Tatsache Thomas Reid transscendentalen überhaupt unendlich unmittelbare Objekt unserer unterscheiden Ursache vergl Vermögen Vernunft verschiedenen Verstand Wahrnehmung Welt Wesen Wirklichkeit Wirkung wissen Wolff zugleich Zustand zweiten
Pasajes populares
Página 104 - Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the MATERIALS of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Página 104 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:— How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE.
Página 116 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Página 66 - Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.
Página 121 - ... figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.
Página 139 - As to the first question, we may observe that what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
Página 135 - Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name impressions ; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.
Página 110 - Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.
Página 94 - Erkenntnis entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemüts, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Rezeptivität der Eindrücke), die zweite das Vermögen, durch diese Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneität der Begriffe...
Página 139 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.