to offer. Hence the precept, in its present form, was not written by Moses himself. It derives its method of expression from a much later time. The same remarks apply to Exodus xxiii. 19, where we read, "The first fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God;" where the existence of the tabernacle in Palestine is presupposed.'1

In reply, it should be observed, that in the clause, thou shalt not delay, &c., there are implicitly contained two precepts: the one, requiring the offering to be made; the other, forbidding all dilatoriness on the part of the offerer. The compound proposition, as it lies in the text, is logically equivalent to the other two. Undoubtedly Moses might, if he had chosen, have divided it into two distinct clauses. But, as the whole subject of offerings, and the manner they were to be presented, was to be afterwards treated at large in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, there was no necessity here for laying down expressly the clause enjoining an offering to be made. A modern lawgiver, indeed, would probably do so in similar circumstances, and make his law run in this form: 1. An offering of first fruits, &c., must be made, according to the regulations hereafter prescribed. 2. All must understand that there is to be no delay in the offering. Moses, however, goes more simply to work; and without formally announcing what was easily understood in general, but was to be afterwards drawn out in detail, calls attention to the diligence and punctuality which was expected from Jehovah's own people, when they presented the offerings to be prescribed. Surely this is quite reconcilable with the delivery of the law by Moses at the beginning of the Exodus. For although it was to come into operation in

1 Davidson, ib. p. 13.

Canaan, there is no reason why it should have been enacted there.

6

From this it will appear that, for the fulfilment of the law in Ex. xxiii. 19, the existence of the tabernacle in Palestine is presupposed,' as it is supposed for a host of other laws, which without it could never be obeyed. Davidson cannot mean that the tabernacle must have existed in Palestine before the law was made. For the principle thus involved would make all legislation an impossibility.

Vater, however, detects in the wording of the law, and the expression, house of Jehovah, the phraseology of the Book of Judges.1 Strange that the phrase does not occur there even once!

V.

your

Then shall the land enjoy her sabbaths, as long as it lieth desolate, and ye be in your enemies' land; even then shall the land rest and enjoy her sabbaths. As long as it lieth desolate it shall rest: because it did not rest in sabbaths, when ye dwelt upon it . . . The land also shall be left of them, and shall enjoy her sabbaths, while she lieth desolate without them; and they shall accept of the punishment of their iniquity: because, even because they despised my judgments, and because their soul abhorred my statutes' (Lev. xxvi. 34, 35, 43).

This language,' continues Davidson, 'refers to a time when the people should be carried into exile by their enemies. It states that the land should enjoy its sabbaths then; which it did not when they dwelt in it. The implication is, that the sabbatical and jubilee years had not been legally observed by the Israelites while they were peaceably inhabiting Canaan. The later circumstances of

1 Commentar. iii, p. 637.

their history in the promised territory are presupposed in a manner which Moses could scarcely have done. We can imagine him referring to the earliest circumstances of the people after they had got possession of the promised land; but not to the later, without speaking of them apart. The entire paragraph (Lev. xxvi. 3-45) bears the stamp of a period much later than the Mosaic.'1

It is hard to see why Moses could not refer to the later circumstances of the people without speaking of them apart. He is uttering his warnings against the national neglect of the law, and describing in lively colours the miseries that would be the necessary result. Why should he be confined to the immediate future? He could hardly expect the full tide of wickedness to break in upon them after the memory of Jehovah's works in their favour was still fresh in their minds. One crime would lead to another, until the measure was full, and Jehovah would rise in his might, and expel them from the land they had profaned. The connection is such, that if Moses really suspected anything of their later circumstances, he could not avoid referring to them.

But Davidson's real objection to the passage is that it contains a prophetic foresight of those later circumstances. Such an objection, however, is of no weight in a question of historical criticism. For whether he rejects the possibility, or only the existence of prophecy, it cannot form a rational element in the case. If he denies wholly the possibility of God's making known the future to man, we need say nothing of the theological blasphemy and philosophical absurdity which is involved: but he will admit, that, at best, it is only a view or opinion, which can have no influence on the historic value of the criticism. The other view is both more philosophical and more reveren

1 Ib. pp. 13, 14.

tial, and cannot submit to be unceremoniously thrown overboard as an old-fashioned conceit, unworthy of our present enlightenment. If, on the other hand, he merely denies that there is proof of its actual existence in Moses, he has no right to take his belief of its non-existence as a proof that Moses did not write the Pentateuch. We hold that the Pentateuch was written by Moses; and infer that he was a prophet. You maintain that he was not a prophet; and conclude that he did not write the Pentateuch. Which is the rational criticism? Surely the criticism that makes the premisses depend on an historical examination of the evidence; and then infers what is necessarily involved in the demonstration: certainly not the criticism, that lays down as the premisses a bundle of mere views and opinions; and then, on the strength of their imagined truth, infers à priori the facts of actual history.

But, indeed, if the prophetic character of the passage is to be allowed at all, it may as well be ascribed to Moses, as to anyone else. There is no doubt it was written before the exile, and before the land enjoyed its sabbaths. Most critics will allow that; and certainly it is admitted by Davidson himself, who refers the present form of the Pentateuch to the reign of Manasseh.1 It is difficult, therefore, to escape from the conclusion, that after all it is prophetic. Why may not Moses be the prophet?

VI.

6

Colenso characterises as an oversight the command to sacrifice"turtle doves or young pigeons" in Lev. xiv. 22, with express reference to their life in the wilderness,arising from a later writer in a later age employing inadvertently an expression common in his own days, and

1 Ib. xxii. p. 131.

forgetting the circumstances of the times which he is describing.'1

The

Alas, for the critical school, where such arguments pass current! The law was intended for Canaan. period of the Hebrew sojourn in the desert was so short comparatively to their expected long possession of Palestine, that the legislation generally overleaped the former transitory condition, and made it of no account. If, then, there were not in the desert any birds of that description, the law, like many others given in the desert, but meant for Canaan, fell into abeyance, until such time as circumstances enabled them to reduce it to practice; and hence, in verses 22 and 30, the offerer is to present such as he can get, even such as he is able to get.'

Allusion is certainly made in the law to the life in the wilderness.' But this does not show it was expressly drawn up with the desert life in view, as the normal state of the people who were to keep it. It only implies, that the law originated in the desert, and took some of its colouring from the situation of Israel at the time. That fact, however, is so far from militating against the genuineness of the Mosaic laws, that, when taken in conjunction with so many others stamped with the same features, it shows the law to have originated between the Egyptian exodus and the Canaanitish conquest; and, as a necessary consequence, to have proceeded from Moses.

VII.

In the last chapters of Exodus the frequent phrase, "As God commanded Moses," shows a time posterior to Moses, for at least the form of the laws (Ex. xxxix. 5, 7; xl. 19, 27, 29, 32.) '2

1 Ib. p. 198.

Davidson, ib. p. 12.

VOL. I.

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