but three operative words in it-plain English words-neither technical nor Latin or Greek. We pledged ourselves to such a "disposition," "control," and "government" of the Philippines as Spain and ourselves could agree upon. Whatever these three words mean, to that these two nations bound themselves to give effect. Each, then, became responsible to the world for the character of that to which it agreed, and makes itself a partaker in the result. If it shall be good, our Government shares in the credit; and if bad, it shares equally in the condemnation. In this case the good or the ill will fall principally upon our Government, because its co-obliger has little if any power to shape that result. The world will for these reasons hold us responsible for what comes of the treaty we have bound ourselves to make.1 Now, what is the meaning of the three words "disposition," "control," and "government," in this use of them? The first includes the other two, and they add nothing to its meaning or scope beyond an explanation and more clear definition of its power. No man can dispose of a thing who cannot make title. Disposition carries with it title and control, and control is an attribute of sovereignty, and sovereignty necessitates government. Nothing can be made more clear than that, when we agreed to participate in the disposition of the Philippine Islands, we became a party participant in their future under whatever sovereignty or form of government we might thus agree upon for them; not only a party participant, but, for the reasons already stated, the determining party. This agreement gives the widest liberty as to that disposition. It permits of any such disposal as shall be deemed wise by those who make it, But, when made, whatever it may be, it is our disposal of the Philippine Islands. It admits of a remittal to Spain of an undisturbed title, of a transfer of that title to the Uni ed States, of a sale to the highest bidder of a group of European nations eager for the purchase, or the parties may transfer that title to nobody but to the Philippines themselves, as has already been agreed upon as to Cuba. Whatever is done is, however, our act, and we become responsible to the world for its character. These methods of disposition are all that seem possible, and it

Ex-Senator Dawes's article was written before the treaty between Spain and the United States had been signed by the Commissioners of the two countries. This fact in no way injures the force of the argument. In essentials the problem remains unchanged.-THE EDITORS.

therefore only remains for us to determine which of them is, in our judgment, safest and wisest, and for the character of which of them we are most ready to be judged by the civilized world.

Which of them will entail the least burden, and upon which can be staked, with the greatest safety and credit, that National responsibility for the future of these islands which cannot be escaped? It is the duty of every citizen to examine these questions:

First, Shall they be turned back to Spain? We must then either help her to put down a rebellion which she has never been able in her best estate to subdue, and which she is now as helpless as a babe to accomplish, or else we must permit her at will to "Weylerize" these islands as she did Cuba, and wreak her will on ten millions of people there, till conditions become as insufferable as those which justified a war to liberate Cuba. She will be at liberty then to sell them to that Power, least friendly to us in the East, ready to give any price for the commanding position thus voluntarily abandoned by us. We have done that once, and there can be found no American who would now repeat that blunder. In 1849 we voluntarily surrendered commercial supremacy in the Pacific and across this continent, by a surrender of our Western coast-line from 49 degrees to 54° 40', notwithstanding the American people had in 1844 declared our title unimpeachable.

Blunders in national policy sometimes rise to the height of crimes, and one is enough till its disastrous consequences are forgotten.

Second, Shall the United States join Spain in the sale of these islands to any other nation on assurances of future governmental reform and friendly use? In addition to what has been said as to the folly of giving up to some unfriendly power such a commanding position must then be added the further folly of trusting to such assurances, which would be observed only so far as it should become for the interest of the party making them, or would be used for the exaction from us of a quid pro quo. Put not your trust in that kind of princes! And for whatever wrong it would be for the interest of any such nation to permit, we, who had assented to the grant of power to commit it, would be held responsible for its character. We must else go to war to enforce assurances we had vainly relied upon.

Third, Shall these islands be turned over to themselves, as we have promised that Cuba

shall be? If this were possible, and stable government were attainable by any help of ours under present conditions, that question might be debated. But these islands are in no respect another Cuba; for we must consider their relations to Spain and her neighbors.

From these environments they cannot be separated, and their future must be determined by ourselves and Spain, in their presence. Besides, when will Spain agree that they shall be free to govern themselves? This is the last of all the alternatives to which she would voluntarily assent. What she wants most of all is to sell them to pay her debts, and she is ready to do that to the highest bidder on almost any terms. Least of all would she give them away to her own rebels. Long before she would thus give them up she would surrender them to us, $20,000,000 or not; and preparatory to any such disposition must first come pacification, and that through means to which Spain must, in the treaty, agree. Thus, jointly with Spain or alone, we should be obliged to take Spain's war upon our shoulders. This is not the way to build up free institutions they do not come of force. Men must hunger after self-government before they can digest it, and till then it is waste to serve it to them.

Fourth. It only remains to consider the last of these possible alternatives-that of a transfer to the United States. I shall make no attempt to minimize the dangers at home or elsewhere, or the chances of failure. I measure each, and admit the magnitude of those now visible, as well as the probabilities of those as yet unseen. But I consider the question now to be a choice between the last two of the four alternatives we have been considering the setting these islands up in an independent self-government or their transfer to the United States. If there are any who prefer that they be turned back to Spain, a new sacrificial offering to "Weylerism," or who desire to help Spain to sell them to any other Power, I have nothing to say to them Between what the protocol leaves us at liberty to choose, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that we must assume sovereignty over these islands or do worse. The burdens will be substantially the same in either case, while the opportunities will be immeasurably on the side of independent control. Indeed, it is next to impossible to accomplish much good among them in the absence of sovereign authority. If there be

any who cannot sleep through fear that we shall be swallowed up in imperialism by engaging in this work, I should be glad to put them at ease. I inquire of them why it must be an "empire"? We are constitutionally free to establish a territorial government over these islands of whatever nature Congress may choose. But if the day ever comes when the Philippines become capable of maintaining self-government, those responsible will act more wisely if free to act than if fettered by requirements whose effect could not be foreseen when made. But my contention is that, while we are responsible for the character of their government, we must have controlling authority.

As already suggested, there need be no anxiety lest the limited powers of this Government may fail to meet this wholly unprecedented call for their exercise. The Supreme Court has declared that the power to declare war and conclude peace carries with it the power to acquire new territory; and the Constitution declares that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." Thus clear and comprehensive is the power for every needed exercise of authority.

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There are those-wise and true men they are too-who, protesting most earnestly against remitting these islands to the "insufferable" rule of Spain, and equally against assuming control ourselves, proposed that we agree to join Spain in the work of building up free institutions among them, and in educating them up to the maintenance of self-government, and then let them go. my mind this would prove an utter failure. I should as soon think of seeing Lord North teaching John Hancock the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence as to find a Spanish Minister, in fulfillment of treaty obligations, engaged jointly with the United States in preparing the Philippine Islands to become, in any measure, a self-governing State. Equally vain would be the "hope they express of "co-operation in this work of other friendly European Powers." If there were no danger from such entangling alliances, against which the oft-quoted Washington has so solemnly warned us, still it would be such an awkward business for any European nation to be engaged in, that little if any good could come from any such effort, however sincere. Not so. This Nation is as yet the

only teacher of self-government among the nations of the earth, and any reliance upon its enemies will prove a snare.

There is another solution of this problem to which I have made no allusion thus far, because those who propose it, while calling upon the country to fulfill to the letter the promise we made to Spain in the beginning on condition that she would not fight, wholly ignore the pledge made at the end on her promise to stop fighting. This is their solution, for which they are organizing to defeat the treaty: "Quit the Philippine Islands at once, drop Porto Rico, let Cuba shirk for herself with such treatment at our hands as will extinguish any hope of ever becoming a part of the United States, and then call home

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our Peace Commissioners." This leaves open but a single question: What would be a reasonable sum for us to pay to Spain for the trouble to which we have put her! We should then be at liberty to retire within ourselves and ask the world what it thinks of us.

Thus, to sum up, assuming that the promises of the protocol are to be kept, I have been led by irresistible logic to the conclusion that, of the four possible methods of solution we have been considering, we are compelled to assume control of the Philippine Islands. If the premises are correct, this conclusion cannot be avoided. I repeat, in the discharge of a duty or an obligation no one is permitted to stop while he counts the cost or calculates the risk.

R. Benjamin Kidd's last book, "The Control of the Tropics," brings us face to face with the situation which has been created by the war with Spain and the battle of Manila. Mr. Kidd's idea seems to be that so-called inferior races, semi-civilized and barbarous, are exposed to the tender mercies of any nation which chooses to act the part of a land-grabber and exploit their territory for its own purposes, unless civilized nations of the world come to their rescue and take upon themselves the task of training them for autonomy. This view presupposes, first, that the Fili pinos are not capable of ruling themselves; and, secondly, that the Anglo-Saxon race have a sufficient sense of their duty and responsibility to govern justly and equitably. We are, in fact, to be schoolmasters, leading these peoples to a higher and purer civilization. In the words of Mr. Kidd, "the Americans may occupy the Philippines with a clear conscience and a stern face to the world if she occupies them in the name of higher ideals of government and a trust for civilization, giving equal opportunities to all." This, of course, is a view which would find accept ance with almost any thoughtful, large-hearted statesman, provided that he could be sure of two things-first, that other nations have no prior or better claim; and, second, that such occupation on the part of the United States would not be considered an unfriendly act by the European Powers or Japan.

While in Japan during the months of August and September, after sailing up through the Philippines, I had some opportunity of testing the feeling of the Japanese on these important points. Among those whom I personally interviewed were Count Okuma, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Count Itagaki, the Minister for Home Affairs; Captain Brinkley, the editor of the "JapanMail;" Mr. Saburo Shimada, M.P., ex-ViceSpeaker and the chief editor of the “Mainichi;" Mr. Ukichi Taguchi, M.P., the editor and owner of the Tokyo "Economist;" together with a large number of the leading men in Tokyo. Every one whom I met was frank and candid in his expression of opinion that it was next to impossible, if not quite impossible, for the United States to hand back the Philippines to Spain. The general feeling was that the Spanish policy in the tropics is the worst possible policy that could be adopted. She has treated the Filipinos as savages to be despoiled and exploited, rather than semi-civilized tribes to be wisely controlled and educated. While admitting that Spain has to a large extent abolished piracy in the Southern Islands, there is no doubt that her rule has been thoroughly selfish and aggrandizing; the natives have been kept ignorant and uncultured; advantage has been taken of their ignorance by the fifth-rate officials sent out to govern in the name of Spain. It has not been government; it has been the oppression of the weak by

the strong, the crushing by means of heavy taxes and intolerable cruelty of native races that are incapable of protecting themselves. Beyond doubt the view of Japan is that Spain is incapable of governing her colonies. and must surrender them. That being so, the next question to consider is, What view does Japan hold with regard to the future occupiers of the Philippines?

"Whatever is resolved," said a leading member of the Japanese Government to me, "all the facts of the case ought to be taken into consideration. If, for example, America determines to take over the Philippines, will it create unfriendly feeling with some other nation? and, secondly, does she clearly understand the tremendous responsibility involved?" Until the war with Spain called attention to the islands, few people knew anything about them; they considered, in fact, as Mr. Stephens says, that "Manila was spelt with two l's, and was floating around in the South Sea somewhere between Fiji and Patagonia." Now, the Philippines consist of some two thousand islands, large and small; two of these islands, namely, Luzon and Mindanao, are over forty thousand square miles in extent. The population is estimated at nearly nine millions, made up of Malays, who are either Indios or Moros; Negritos, the aboriginal inhabitants, and the Idiosneian tribes. This implies a large number of different dialects and languages, for Spanish is spoken only to a very slight extent in the towns. Much of the interior of these islands is almost unexplored, and many of the tribes are tue more than savages. On the other hana, notwithstanding earthquakes and typhoons, the Philippines have some considerable advantages; the climate, generally speaking, is fairly healthy; the soil produces rice, maize, sugar, hemp, tobacco, in abundance.

In discussing the situation with Count Okuma I ventured to ask him what was the foreign policy of Japan under the present Government towards the great Western nations, and his answer was as follows: "Geograpnically, Japan is so far from Europe that at first sight it looks as though we might play the part of a free and independent nation without fear of aggression from any other State.

England is much more involved in European politics than Japan is ever likely to be. Still, the world has shrunk considerably of late, and the position of Japan, like that of the United States, is an extremely difficult and delicate one. The United States

has found herself face to face with a great responsibility. Her foreign policy will have to be entirely changed; she can no longer be cut off from the great tide of affairs in the Western world. Japan, without desiring war in any way, found war necessary in order to obtain peace for the future, and it is quite likely that a section of the Japanese people would prefer a 'greater Japan' policy in foreign affairs; on the other hand, the majority of us wish to show that aggrandizement is no part of our ideal; nevertheless, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that other nations are pursuing in China the very policy we condemn; and so far as the Philippines are concerned we should infinitely prefer that they be controlled by a people with higher motives and ideals than those possessed by certain of the great Western powers. Japan has millions of acres of land still to develop, and we could with ease produce twice as much as we do at the present moment; therefore, for the present at any rate, we do not need to colonize. But, apart from this, the jealousy of other nations would be too great to allow of occupation or government by Japan. Leaving the United States out of account, we nevertheless consider that no other nation has any just claim or right in the Philippines."

"What would be your feeling in the case of England?" I asked. "I have no doubt that England's administration and rule would be just to the people and a benefit to the country. We have less objection to England in the East than to any nation except America. Japan is on the most friendly terms with her in regard to the treatment of China. England, like Japan, believes in a policy of peace, together with the development of trade and industry. Egypt and India are both illustrations of England's wisdom of policy and the prosperity which follows her rule. Yes, we should have perfect confidence in England's power to administer the Philippine Islands, and there is not the slightest doubt that, if it were the wish of the United States, there would be no diffi culty in coming to a friendly arrangement with Japan. On the whole, however, I consider that the best policy both for us and for the Philippines would be for America to take possession." I may say also that this is the view of Captain Brinkley, of the "Japan Mail,” who, both in leading articles and private conversation, has stated that if America will only regard the Philippines as