tember; but such knowledge of the Egyptian defences as had been obtained by the staff does not appear to have been communicated, Hamley, to whom all the important historical in stances of night attacks were familiar, seems to have had doubts as to the possible existence of outworks which might most materially affect the proposed operation, and these doubts were abundantly justified. Some twelve hundred yards in advance of the right centre of the lines of Tel-el-Kebir, such an outwork had actually been constructed. According to the official history, this outwork "had been twice .. but on neither occasion had it been possible to distinguish it from the main body of the works." Reconnaissances which failed in an abso lutely open country to "distinguish" this eminently detached position must have been singularly incomplete, and with the British force at Kassassin there were dozens of young officers who would have jumped at the chance of seen... be lost, unless a compact reserve of fighting men was ready and able to drive out the assailants. In either case, effective defence ultimately depended on the capacity of the Egyptians for fighting in the open, and they had already shown that this essential quality was non-existent. For reasons which are not altogether clear, it was decided to deliver a front attack with the mass of the available infantry. A turning movement on the British right was entrusted to the cavalry and horse artillery, but, being conjoined to the general advance, could not take effect until the infantry assault had succeeded or met with a serious check. On the left, a similar movement was prescribed for the Indian Contingent | operating on the south of the canal, where, except on the bank, there were no defences; but the advance of this turning force was held back for an hour, and it could bring no aid to the assault. Between the camp at Kassassin and the lines of Tel-el-Kebir lay a tract of desert, for the most part afford-setting all doubts to rest. In war, howing excellent marching ground, undulating somewhat, but offering nowhere the smallest obstruction to impede the advance or to throw the order of battle into disarray. The problem which presented itself, therefore, was to draw up the force in the contemplated formation for attack, fronting the enemy, and to direct it in an unswerving line upon the trenches. Either task was easy in daylight; both were difficult in the black darkness of a moonlight night. If the front of the attacking line had been originally parallel to the enemy's trenches, and if the alignment could be maintained during the advance, simultaneous attack would have been delivered. Neither condition was exactly fulfilled; and what the commander-in-chief had spoken of as "a race between the Highland Brigade and Graham," ended in the easy victory of the former. a The arrangements for the night attack were explained to the generals on the early morning of the 12th of Sep 1 Major-General Sir G. Graham, the commander of the leading brigade of the 1st Division. ever, fortune favors the adventurous, more especially when the enemy shows marked incapacity, and by pure accident the left flank of the advancing line just missed this outwork in the darkness. Heavy loss to the attacking force was thus averted. Such an operation as the night attack on Tel-el-Kebir necessarily excluded all the higher attributes of generalship; but in the conservation during the darkness of a long line of troops, and in the actual leading of the men in the final struggle, there was ample scope for soldierly qualities. To these tasks Hamley, the strategist and the student of war, devoted himself with the ardor of a young battalion commander. The difficulties of a night march, even under conditions so perfectly favorable, were soon apparent. The line of advance was admirably maintained through the night by Lieutenant Rawson; but, in Hamley's words: An incident took place illustrative of the precarious nature of such an operation. A rumor had passed about of horse men in our front; the companies in the | the personal exertions of the two centre had first stepped short, and finally generals, and, the rear brigade coming halted, while the order to conform to this up in dashing style, the whole force of had not extended to the other parts of the 2nd Division was brought to bear the line. These consequently continued on the heart of the enemy's position. to step on, moving unconsciously round Hamley now moved up to the advanced the pivot of the centre, until the wings troops, and with Sir A. Alison led them absolutely faced each other at a distance along the line of trenches which of some fifty yards. branched inward, pressing still onward into Arabi's camp and the railway station. The steadiness of the troops and the efforts of the staff and battalion commanders enabled this dangerous situation to be quickly remedied; and the Highland Brigade, again moving quietly forward, struck the enemy's lines at the first glimmer of dawn. The Egyptians, although badly served by their outposts, appear to have been in no sense surprised, and immediately after the sounding of the alarm a sheet of fire blazed forth from the trenches. Carrying out to the letter the wishes of the commander-in-chief, the Highland Brigade charged with the bayonet, and the centre battalions, quickly surmounting the parapet, became engaged in a struggle in which all order was temporarily lost. The 2nd Division had attacked the strongest part of the position, and the enemy displayed considerable tenacity. For the moment, no tactical dispositions were possible; but Hamley, well knowing the importance of being able to follow up the first rush by compact forces, busied himself in collecting small bodies of men and sending them forward together, at the same time calling up his 2nd Brigade. The crisis of the fight is thus described by Sir A. Alison: Just as I was moving on, there came a refluent tide of men which carried me back over the rampart and down into the ditch. It was a very critical moment. I sprang on my horse and did all I could to get the men on again. Hamley came up with his Staff at this moment, and exerted himself nobly. I never saw man expose his life more recklessly. We got the men halted in the ditch (it was only the left of one regiment which had fallen back-the rest of the centre met with no check) and soon got them on again. a The attack of the 2nd Division was naturally decisive. The Egyptian defences were pierced at their strongest part. The troops manning the lines to the south were taken in rear. Those lining the dwindling trenches to the north were left completely en l'air. Moreover, Hamley's success enabled the artillery to be at once brought up, and two batteries entered the lines soon after the Highlanders and rendered valuable assistance in the advance to the station. Three other batteries quickly followed and fired upon the retreating enemy, while two more batteries enfiladed the lines to the north thus materially assisting the attack of the 1st Division. To have brought the whole of the long front of the attacking force up to the line of trenches at the same moment was, under the circumstances, a practical impossibility; while so soon as actual contact anywhere occurred, the enemy would evidently open fire along his whole line. When the Highlanders made their first rush, the 1st Division was still at a considerable distance,1 and as the day was rapidly dawning the formal order of attack was adopted for the further advance. While, therefore, the two divisions may be said to have become engaged at the same moment, the troops of the 1st Division appear not to have actually reached the trenches till about a quarter of an hour after the Highlanders. From unfore 1 Twelve hundred yards, according to the report of one of the battalion commanders. 2 Captain (now Colonel) G. B. N. Martin, R. A., in a careful "note" given to Lieut. Commander C. F. Goodrich, U. S. N., the able writer of the best general account of the operations which has yet The partial recoil was thus averted by appeared, gives 4.55 A.M. as the time of the first The In seen circumstances, it resulted that Hamley's command bore the brunt of the fighting at Tel-el-Kebir, and suffered proportionately. Its losses were in fact seventy-five per cent. greater than those of the 1st Division, while the Indian contingent on the south of the canal had only fourteen casualties.1 and the Cavalry Division none. battle was won by a purely infantry attack on the centre of the position, which proved decisive before any turning movements-if they were contemplated-had time to take effect. some circumstances duty may demand that a general of division should rest content with directing his brigades from a distance. To a nature like Hamley's such a course was impossible. Entrusted with the conduct of a night attack, he felt that his place was in the thick of the struggle. In the darkness, he could not do more than bring his personal authority to bear upon the troops within immediate reach; and, as his gallant brigadier has testified, he "exerted himself nobly" at the very crisis of the battle. Subsequently, in the growing light, he led the advance by which the victory was sealed. Tel-el-Kebir, like Inkerman and a host of other British achievements, was not a general's battle; but justice claims for Hamley's memory the principal share in a signal success. It was his good fortune to have commanded was on his way home; and no mention of the crucial action of the 2nd Division on the 13th of September having found place in the official dispatches, he published a masterly account of the battle. Technically, this was a military offence; and while significant precedents might be quoted, Mr. Shand's justification cannot be accepted. A subordinate general may not claim that his reports should be made public, although this course has been frequently taken; but, on the other hand, it is an unwritten law that the dispatches of a commander-in-chief shall be based upon these reports, except in regard to events which occur under his own eye. From the expiration of Hamley's appointment at the Staff College in 1877 to the dispatch of the Expedition to Egypt in 1882, the military authorities had shown no disposition whatever to utilize his services. In 1887, having been unemployed for five consecutive years, he became liable to compulsory retirement; but in obedience to popular demand his term on the Active List was extended, without any intention of turning the concession to practical account. For the second time the press, with which he had never been connected and which he would have scorned to inspire, spoke strongly and unanimously in favor of the general who, in the words of a memorable Punch car looked." the force whose attack proved decisive; | toon, had been scandalously “overit was his distinction to have led that force with conspicuous personal gallantry. The crushing defeat inflicted upon Arabi's army ended all resistance, and the prompt measures instantly ordered by the commander-in-chief saved Cairo from disorder. In less than a month from the date of the landing at Ismailia, Egypt lay powerless in the grasp of England, and recognition of the heavy responsibility thus involved would have averted many subsequent troubles. A month after Tel-el-Kebir Hamley shot, and estimates that the attack of the 1st Division "approached" at about 5.15 A.M. 1 No killed. In 1885 Hamley became member for Birkenhead, and entered upon a new sphere of activity. Henceforth he devoted himself to the practical problem of national defence, and his speeches were received with the marked attention which the House of Commons accords to manifestations of real knowledge. It was a period of awakening, when questions of military organization and preparation for war were beginning to lay hold of the mind of the nation. No one has done more than Hamley to enlighten and direct popular opinion on these great subjects, and the volunteer forces owe a lasting debt of gratitude for his earnest championship of their claims. Conservative to the core, both by instincts and training, he did not scruple to inflict a defeat on the party leaders in connection with a matter so distinct from mere politics as the volunteer grant. The many pre-occupations of parliamentary life interrupted Hamley's literary pursuits; but he found time for several reviews, such as the thoughtful estimate of the "Life and Letters of George Eliot," contributed to Blackwood's Magazine, and for "The War in the Crimea," published in 1890. This, practically his last work, is altogether admirable. In wise judgment, military grasp, and charm of expression the book stands unrivalled as a historical study of a memorable campaign. A distressing throat affection, of which there had been earlier warning, began to assert itself, and in 1891 Hamley resigned himself without a murmur to the life of an invalid. His powerful intellect was unclouded; his keen interest in public affairs was unabated; he remained a student to the last. Awaiting death with unfailing patience, he calmly passed away on the morning of the 12th of August, 1893. It is perhaps too soon to attempt an estimate of Hamley's genius, and the task is beset with difficulties. The astonishing versatility of the writer who could produce "The Operations of War" and "Shakespeare's Funeral," the "Life of Voltaire" and the "Treatise on Outposts," the review of "Lothair," and "Our Poor Relations," baffles the critic. We cannot regard him as the most accomplished soldier of his day without remembering his achievements in realms of thought where military science does not enter. We may not claim for him a rare distinction in the department of pure literature without recalling the grave disabilities imposed by his profession. If opportunities had been granted, the qualities displayed in the Crimea, in three foreign missions, and at Tel-el-Kebir, linked to a profound knowledge of the art of war, would doubtless have raised him to a high rank among military commanders. And if literature had been the main object instead of the recreation of his life, he would unquestionably have left a deeper mark on the century. No one can read his one novel and the lighter imaginative pieces which preceded it without recognizing that the rich domain of fiction had opened at his summons. The "Life of Voltaire" reveals possibilities of more enduring work than the long series of striking articles contributed to Blackwood and the Edinburgh; while the immense labor bestowed upon "The Operations of War” supplies proof of capacity for sustained effort. It may almost be said that Hamley's literary life would have been more richly productive if fate had decreed for him any other profession, and that his great military qualities would have been more appreciated if his bent had been less literary. By soldiers generally he was not well understood. He wielded weapons with which they were not all familiar, and the skilful use of which they were apt to resent; his mind was often occupied with thoughts that they did not comprehend; his outspoken independence of judg ment was not calculated to propitiate the so-called military authorities. Proud he certainly was, and misunderstanding on the one side inevitably produced reserve on the other; yet few men were less reserved than Hamley when in the society of congenial spirits. Of his innate kindness of heart Mr. Shand gives abundant proof; children at once became his allies, and his sympathy for animals amounted to a passion. If, among his large circle of friends, military officers were relatively few in number, they were nevertheless staunch in days of trial; and by Sir Richard Dacres, his old chief of the Gibraltar and Crimean days, as well as by men of such breadth of mind as the late Sir Patrick MacDougall, he was regarded with warm affection. A parallel and a contrast alike striking suggest themselves. From the date of his first commission in the Prussian Army, Moltke devoted himself to solitary study, and quickly came to be regarded as cold, reserved, and Failing the opportunities which have been freely provided for infinitely less capable soldiers, Hamley will be best remembered as the most brilliant military writer that this country has yet produced, and as a teacher who set before the British army a new standard of attainment. The student of the future who, discriminating between the shadow and the substance, attempts to trace the source of the great advance of military science in this country during the latter part of the nineteenth century, will be led back by sure steps to "The Operations of War." Time will bring its gentle revenge, and the lack of Algerian prestige, which possibly militated against Hamley's career, will seem a pitifully small thing in view of the rich legacy which he has bequeathed to the army. self-absorbed. His great literary faculty soon displayed itself, and he even wrote much poetry, produced a novelette at the age of twenty-eight, and at forty-two accomplished translations from Byron. Alone he wrestled successfully with the English language, undertaking and nearly completing the translation of Gibbon's twelve volumes. His first experience of war was in the East, where he witnessed the defeat of Hafiz Pasha's army in Asia Minor. His "Letters from the East," published in 1841, first drew attention to his power as a writer, and his history of the war of 1828-29 revealed an acute military judgment. Nearly thirty years passed before he again saw active service, and meanwhile his literary energies were never idle. Here, however, the parallel ends. Moltke's study of war was turned to splendid account by an army in which genius is welcomed. His great literary capacity proved a direct aid to his career. At the age of fiftyseven he became the directing head of the Prussian general staff, and so remained nearly to the close of his ninety years, with results which startled the world. "High-sounding reputations, prodigious promotions," states French writer, "were won in Algeria," while Moltke toiled at his desk, and at length the day came when the distinguished African generals were "Eh, mich same as he allus is," she brought face to face with the student responded wearily. "Sometimes a bit of war in a mighty conflict by which better, an' sometimes a bit war. they were submerged. Hamley lived took me all my time to keep him abed but sixty-nine years, and for nearly when he heared yo'd started to ploughsixteen years of his army service was in' th' Sunnyfields. Eh, he were that unemployed. For him, in the prime of takken to I 'ad to be vexed wi' him his intellect, no military post could be at th' last. He allus reckoned bein' at found, and it was left to a foreign th' ploughin' o' yon hissel', thou knows government to pay him the compli--it's bin pasture iver sin' gron'feyther's ment of recognition. It is true that the British army does not provide scope for genius like that of Moltke; but the above contrast is not the less painfully significant. England has too frequently discarded the services of her most distinguished sons. a From Blackwood's Magazine. TH' PLOUGHIN' O' TH' SUNNYFIELDS. "How does feyther find hissel' toneet?" Mrs. Rainford, who had been bending over the fire, slowly stirring the steaming contents of a small black pot, tapped her wooden spoon against the side, and turned round. time-___" It "Well, it wanted turnin' up bad enough as how 'tis," interrupted her husband, with a roll of his bullet-head. He had been practically master of the Gate Farm for more than six months now, and did not see why his fatherin-law should interfere with his arrangements. Old Joe Orrell was indeed the nominal proprietor of the place, but |