or from the command of the army, or from any other modern source, can outweigh the extent of undefined power exercised by the crown, by means of these jurisdictions."

Mr. Jopp furnishes us with an ample detail of instances of direct influence by the crown, in elections, from the reign of Philip and Mary to the revolution, and shows indisputably, that the House of Commons, during that period, was exposed to every species of influence; and it should be observed also, that at this time, and until the 7th of King William, the purity of elections" was unguarded by any direct law against that most pernicious of all artifices, bribery."

We have principally followed the line marked out by Mr. Jopp, in giving to our readers the above very hasty sketch of parliamentary and constitutional history. And we presume to think, that enough has been said to shew the tricking mistatements, or the specious ignorance, of those popular leaders, among whom the "perfect equality of representation, as supported by the ancient practice of the constitution," is an eternal theme of declamation. The obvious truth is, that what these persons recommend has no precedent or model in the history of this country; but must be considered as standing on its own intrinsic merit, or the authority of its grave projectors. Their schemes of reform are all their own, their ancestors have no posthumous share in them. Antiquity is in no wise implicated in them. The question is, whether the untried projects of a few individuals, such as the Rev. Mr. Wyvill, Major Cartwright, Mr. Wardle, Mr. Roscoe, and Sir Francis Burdet, or others of still inferior capacity, are to weigh against the whole system of representation, as it stands at present, which, however defective in theory, has been a source of so many practical benefits to the country, and has raised so high the standard of our felicity. We are far from entertaining an ungrateful sense of the virtues of those who have lived before us, and which are the stock from which we have derived our present happiness. We have a reverential regard to the lineage and pedigree of our rights, but our reverence arises from our considering them as transmitted to us marked with the progressive improvement of each succeeding æra. We endeavour to shew our respect for the parent source, not by discarding the derivative accumulations, but by a sober mistrust of all sudden changes, and conventional reforms. We shrink from disturbing arrangements, into which the constitution has imperceptibly been mellowed by its own

• See First Address to the Electors of Great Britain. Wyvill's Political Papers, vol. 1. p. 316.

inherent principle of adaptation to the condition of society, and the state of public opinion; we had almost said, by a sort of appetency of its nature, conducting it instinctively to the means of its own preservation. We are not ignorant, that to maintain in activity the principle of improvement, which belongs to our constitution, perpetual exertions are necessary; and that the different departments of our political system cannot be too watchful of each other. What we mean to impress as our firm opinion, and from which we shall not hastily depart, is, that without any thorough systematic reform, there is good reason to expect, that by the constant exercise of enquiry into abuses, and the temperate application of suitable remedies, political liberty, which consists in personal security, and depends upon the stability of the laws, may reach a still higher state of improvement, without in the least deranging an economy, which balances, though not upon geometrical principles, the opposite tendencies of our constitution-balances them on principles belonging to the nature, but transcending the contrivance of man.

The loss which was sustained by the monarchical part of our government, of its avowed legal direct influence, by its unsuccessful struggles with the people, produced a new description of influence, less honourable than that which had before subsisted, as not proceeding from the abuse of acknowledged authority; less honourable also, and less safe than that which has since grown out of the patronage and riches of the state, and which began to shew its crescent form and secondary power in the system as the sun of prerogative was setting. The first careless and profligate displays of this new art of governing brought an increase of odium on the family of the Stuarts; but since the reign of William, when the monarchy was further retrenched by a new maxim of the constitution, which made the legislative prerogative of the veto in the prince unsafe to be exercised, necessity, and a sort of natural struggle for life, have been gradually perfecting the economy of indirect influence, and changing a government of force into a government of favour. The stream of politics, checked in its ancient current, has worn itself a new channel, and continues to keep "the noiseless tenor of its way."

The reformists must excuse us, if exercising that liberty of speech for which they contend, and for which we will as boldly contend, we tell them, that their favourite phrase of "the genuine theory of liberty," is perfectly sickening to us. Liberty has no theory, but is virtually and truly that which produces the largest practical amount of human felicity, with the least

liability to disturbance from the passions of our selfish nature. That" boroughs, in their present state, are a public nuisance," that "the gross abuse in the representation originates chiefly in royal innovation," that "the ancient practice of our constitution ought to be restored," that " the statute of qualification was truly a statute of disfranchisement," that "the continuance of the same parliament beyond a single session is a virtual annihilation of the Commons of England," that "the fabric of the present House of Commons ought to be utterly abolished," though these, and a hundred other dogmas of the like tendency, composed the creed of the committees and sub-committees of reform, the proceedings of which are to be found in Mr. Wyvill's collection of political papers; and though these declarations were thought worthy of adoption by the general committee, whose resolutions received the signature of C. J. Fox, we must beg leave to enter our protest against them, as 2 senseless, unfounded, impracticable, hypocritical jargon. We doubt not but that Mr. Fox, at the time he adopted these opinions, was very well satisfied that they were in reality such, that even if the ministers of the day had been disposed to carry them into practice, the good sense of the nation would have risen against them: but the pliable integrity of a party-man has already been enough discussed; it is a disgusting and distressing theme.

There is a variance between the reformists of 1782, and the present political purists, which is worthy of notice. At a mecting of the electors of Westminster, in 1782, Mr. Fox animadverted with severity on the sentiments of the Earl of Shelburne, who, while he promised to promote parliamentary reform, professed an opinion, that in lieu of the influence which this reform was to destroy, it might be necessary to restore the obsolete and "dangerous practice of giving the royal negative to bills, which have received the consent of the two other branches of the legislature." In the course of his animadversions upon this occasion, Mr. Fox plainly intimated not only the necessity of destroying indirect influence, and that his precious expedient, as he was then minded at least, was universal suffrage, but, at the same time, of practically abolishing the veto.

Now the modern reformers affect an anxiety for the preservation of the prerogative, equal to their antipathy to the influence of the crown. Is there a man in the country that does not laugh at this pleasantry? Will not the manager of the company, when he shall retire from that public stage on which he has played so many parts, in reviewing the various mysteries and arts of his gainful career, shake his easy chair at the recol

lection of this piece of humour, more than at all the impositions upon the people, to the success of which he has contributed.

We differ from Lord Shelburne in this, that when the influence of the crown is gone, we know of no power in the state that can guarantee the exercise of the royal veto. No man can think this to be practicable who duly reflects upon the cause of its long desuetude. Is it not the consequence of a gradual change in the circumstances of the nation? Is it not the consequence of a public feeling, which has settled into a maxim? Can this be restored at the will of any minister, or the fiat of a prevailing party in the country? That it cannot,

is plain to every honest and reflecting mind; and, therefore, any theory of reform which supposes this to be practicable, is built on no foundation of experience or analogy. Who shall take down from its place in the sanctuary this spear of Goliah, and put the unwieldly weapon into the hand of the sovereign? or who, while the prince is employing it, will answer for the security of the sceptre?

Still, however, our modern reformers contend for the neces sity of replacing this influence, by the restoration of a proper proportion of the prerogative. By this they hope to avoid the dilemma of either proposing a vain thing, or advocating republicanism; since every man of sense, and almost every school-boy feels, that we must have active prerogative, or silent influence, if the kingly government is to be supported. If they take away the influence, they perceive that to leave the elements of monarchy standing, they must set up the prerogative. But in their endeavour to prove their constitutional orthodoxy, they have gone into an excess which plainly shews their ignorance of the consequence of political measures. Thus Mr. Cobbett has contended that the parliament has no manner of right to interfere with the king's choice of his ministers; and a popular commoner has argued for restoring to the sovereign the prerogative of settling what burghs shall be allowed, and what shall be excluded from the privilege of sending members to parliament. It would be a waste of room to comment upon the absurdity of either of these propositions. One thing is certainly to be said for them, viz. that they are not only reconcileable, but that the one is well adapted to support the other. For if the commons are to be no party to the choice of ministers, nor to interfere with their continuance in place, the king and his servants become insulated from the people, and must maintain the conflict together: majesty must put itself foremost and sustain every attack, till at length, as the author of the

Oceana has somewhere expressed it, there will be a perpetual wrestling-match between the monarch and his people. In this state of exposure, the proposal last alluded to comes in to the relief of the king, by enabling him to put all the burghs in the kingdom at the disposal of the treasury. To such absurdities are men driven when they seek to substitute speculation for experience in human affairs, and quarrel with what is practically good, because they can prove it to be false in theory. But we do not give to all who clamour for prerogative the credit of being real friends to it. We wish these professed friends of prerogative to reflect, if they are sincere, that if their point were carried the dilemma of the crown would be this,—either it must suffer all its power to be lost, or it must contend hand to hand with opposing factions.

It is a maxim of unquestionable verity, that power is attracted by property. The house of commons, therefore, which holds the purse, has acquired insensibly by far the largest share of the real power of the country. Theorists have amused themselves with the picturesque idea of the balance of powers, controuling each other by their opposite tendencies, and maintaining their allotted places in the system, without any blending or intermixture of operation. Many fine observations have been made by De Lolme, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, on this happy counterpoise in the parts of the constitution of this country. Their illustrations are perfectly agreeable to the theory of the state, and are therefore well pleasing to the lovers of symmetry and system. But as practical representations, they have little more to do with the case than the vortices of Descartes. The House of Commons is the mart of business, as it is the focus of power, and there is hardly a person in the country familiar only with the newspapers, who does not know that if this part of the constitution did not include in its composition the elements of the monarchy and aristocracy, it would soon set itself in array against them both, and prove too strong for their united force. This is not theory. The history of the country supplies the example. It is, therefore, a problem much too hard for our solution, to determine how the business of government can possibly be carried on, unless the king and lords are indirectly represented in the commons, and have their hands upon that only lever by which the state can be put into motion. This is to speak fairly out, but not with greater sincerity than the times demand.

But we are very far from meaning to deny that this influence, for the necessity of which, to a certain degree, we have ventured to contend, may exceed a proper measure, and be carried to a