ceive to be their necessary expenditure. There is more extravagance, a greater craving, and consequently more ambition.There are more persons practically needy, impatient of embarrassment, and ready to sell themselves for preferment. Now it is singular that this is a favourite argument made use of by Mr. Windham in his famous speech on Mr. Curwen's bill, in support of what he so strenuously contends for-the necessity of influence to maintain in their efficiency the executive functions of the state. And all this is the more singular, as the reviewer observes in quoting the argument of Mr. Rose, that he will do Mr. Windham the justice to say that he does not make use of the same argument. And true, he does not; but it would have been candid in the reviewer to have added, that Mr. Windham, in stating the fact in a manner similar to the reviewer, drew a conclusion from it diametrically the reverse of his. For this very inadequacy of our riches to satisfy our wants and our extravagance he points to as an active source of popular discontent; and though with some who are within the vortex of political temptation it may facilitate the overthrow of their principles, yet with the far greater part, who are beyond the influence of those expectations, it is more likely to excite the dispositions which are the usual offspring of a sour state of discontent. Our readers will forgive us for quoting a part of this passage from Mr. Windham's speech:

"In seeking to embody the natural and unavoidable discontents of mankind for the purpose of overturning governments, which is the general description of what I should understand by jacobinism, it has become necessary to have recourse to something more solid and substantial than mere grievances of theory, and to take the discontents arising from real causes, whether the discontents themselves be reasonable or not, and then to connect them as effect and cause with something wrong, or said to be wrong, in the practice of government, The discontents you are sure of; they can never be wanting as long as men are men, and society is composed of various ranks and conditions, whereof some are higher and better than others. In a country like this, where a great portion of our immense riches is paid in contribution to the public service, no man will ever think himself as rich as he ought to be: for though the wealth has increased in full proportion, I believe, to its burthens, that is to say, to its expences; and though there never was a time when that wealth was more evenly diffused through all ranks and classes of people; yet as luxury has increased at the same time, not to say with equal rapidity, every man may, in some sense, describe himself as poor, inasmuch as his income and expenditure will, as a proportionate part, be less than it was before. It is, therefore, the singu

lar and melancholy state of the poverty here described, that it is one which riches cannot cure."

With respect to the necessity for the existence of influence of some kind, we have sufficiently enunciated our sentiments. Concerning the quantity of influence necessary to the activity of the state, let us not be understood to hold a proposition so monstrous, as that it has no legitimate bounds. On all hands it will be allowed that this line is difficult, and perhaps hardly possible to be drawn. It appears to us, that it can only be ascertained whether it does or does not exceed these bounds, by recurring to actual experience, and the comparative degrees of it exhibited in different periods of the country. This will at least always ascertain whether or not it has been in a growing state. And it should always be recollected, that in its nature it is a relative thing, and is to be set off against the strength of the opposite influence which arises from the wealth, and weight, and eloquence, and imposition which draw the people the contrary way. It is to be remembered how great an influence the passions of men, under a keen sense of privation, are exerting in a counter direction to the interests of reason, and the support of a cause the benefits of which are faintly discerned, while the sacrifices it enjoins are sens.bly felt and understood.

It is worthy of remark, too, that in the general estimation of the quantity of the subsisting influence, every being in every office and department under government is commonly reckoned as a figure in the account; as if every man who is fed by the bounty of another is of necessity attached to his interests; whereas, the real truth we believe to be, that government might well reckon among its bitterest enemies a great number of those who are nominally on the list of its dependents.

We have but little room left us, and cannot therefore go into details upon the actual state of the patronage and influence of the crown. We know it to be very great,-we believe it to be exaggerated. We do not conceive that a change in the constitution of parliament would go any way towards its reduction. We doubt whether this result is seriously expected from it by the best informed among its advocates. Of one thing we are very sure, viz. that it cannot stifle or resist the clamours or remonstrances of the people when they think themselves betrayed or abused. In the case of the Duke of York, though all the world expected a much greater development of misconduct to result from the inquiry, and the motives and manner of the prosecution have so curiously come out; yet, in the language of Mr. Windham," such was the surprise excited in this country by a suspicion even of

corruption in persons of high rank and station, and such the com motion which any suspicion to that effect never fails to create, that the Duke of York, a member of the royal family, the king's own son, in full possession of his father's favour, was fain to quit the situation of commander in chief, which he had held for fourteen years before, and to withdraw into retirement, sooner than run the risk of the steps which parliament, it was feared, would otherwise be induced to take." Let us recollect the various inquiries which have of late been set on foot; the few instances of great delinquency which have been discovered, and the abuses which have been checked. Let us consider how many lists of ministers have been driven from the court by the influence of the public feelings. And last of all, let us not forget, that in point of fact, if we compare the amounts of the divisions of successive parliaments going with the ministers on trying questions, the members regularly supporting government are not greater than in former years.

On the great and perilous question of parliamentary reform, we are therefore, upon the whole, humbly though firmly of opinion, that nothing systematic, general, or radical, is at all called for by the circumstances of the country; and that nothing can be adventured in this shape without inconceivable risk to all the pillars of public happiness. We do not say that the wisdom of parliament may not, at an auspicious. moment, make some alterations in the borough system, so far, perhaps, (but we speak with great timidity) as to remove some of those blemishes which afford a handle to the disaffected, and supply a plausible topic to the vulgar outcry. At the same time, we are satisfied that the representatives of these close boroughs are often among the wisest and honestest trustees of the public; and they are certainly the most firm against public clamour, which may often overrule the real judgment of those who represent large and populous places. To go back again to a fact, of which no one doubts, that the real power of the state is centered in the House of Commons, and that virtually and substantially the force of the executive resides in the majorities of that assembly, we surely cannot avoid seeing one clear advantage resulting from the close boroughs, the access they open to the influence of the great families of the nation, to the place where its counterpoise can be exerted with least violence to the machine of government. By thus intermingling the operation of the different sentiments, which different habits and stations inspire, we presume to think the country is more diffusively represented than it would be were the Commons entirely composed of persons

sent thither by the shopkeepers and artificers of the country; and it is also to be feared that were elections wholly popular, we should have few men either of business or knowledge in the house.

Now after all that we have written on this subject, we cannot find stomach for Mr. Roscoe's dish of reform, the great and fulsome ingredient in which is downright universal suffrage. Nor has he at all recommended it to our palates, by assuring us that it is made precisely after the receipt of Sir Francis Burdett. To drop our allegory, we seriously wish all the friends of reform to read Mr. Roscoe's letter. We think it will send them back with a sort of recoil nearer to the dictates of sound sense. It will be quite enough for our purpose to quote a few lines from the fifth page of the work.

"If I might use your own mode of illustration, I should say that this is not proposed to be done by changing the machinery of the state, further than such machinery is imperfect, decayed, or useless; and if the analogy might be pursued, it is precisely doing that which has been done in our principal manufactories, and by which we have in this respect obtained so decided a superiority over the rest of the world. That such a plan, if well digested, and passed into a law, by king, lords, and commons, would be carried into effect as easily as a turnpike bill, I have no doubt."

We shall not trouble ourselves with answering this sort of reasoning or illustration; it would be abusing the patience of our readers, and squandering our own time. We shall do better perhaps by presenting them with a page or two from the candid letter of Lord Selkirk to Major Cartwright at the head of this article.

"I allude to the observations which I had occasion to make in the United States of America, where a system of representation is established, approaching as nearly as perhaps is practicable to the theoretical perfection at which you aim; and where that system is combined with a general diffusion of property, of itself calculated to check in a great degree the force of corruption. A very short acquaintance with the legislative proceedings of America may afford conviction, that universal suffrage and frequency of election prove no bar to the misconduct of representatives; and that a political adventurer, raised to power by popular favour, is fully as likely to abuse that power, as is the purchaser of a rotten borough.

"There is no ground for the idea, that in that country public affairs are managed with a higher regard to the public welfare than in our own. The parliament of England, with all its corruptions, cannot be accused of proceedings approaching, in disgrace, to the infamous and bare-faced jobs, which have been transacted in many of the legislatures of America. It is evident to the most careless

VOL. III. NO. V.

observation, that the state of public morals is there worse than in England that political integrity is less respected-that corrupt motives have not the same degree of check from feelings of honour, as they have among Englishmen. To sum up all, there is no room for comparison between the two countries in that great test of a good government, the administration of justice.

"When I consider that a country thus deficient in the most es sential points of practical good government, has a constitution framed upon the very principles, to which the advocates of parlia mentary reform look, as the foundation of every prospect of amendment in our own, I cannot avoid the conclusion that these principles are fallacious. The reasonings which have occurred to me, as to the source of the fallacy, would lead me into too great length; but I think the observations to which I have already referred sufficiently justify the opinion that parliamentary reform in England would not have the effects which its most sincere and zealous friends anticipate.

Fully as I am impressed with the opinion that parliamentary reform is not the road to any practical public benefit, I am very far from thinking that there is nothing which requires reform in our government. I am well convinced, that there are many corruptions of most pernicious tendency, which may and ought to be eradicated. But we have to consider, how that object is to be effected, without endangering benefits of still greater importance. The advocates of a radical and entire reform have not perhaps fairly considered the extreme difficulty of guarding every avenue to abuse, and how often the measures which are taken for repressing it in one quarter, serve only to open for it some new channel still more pernicious.-We have a government in which, with all its corruptions, there is much essentially good: though particular cases of hardships may undoubt edly be quoted, yet it would not be easy to find, either in the past or present state of the world, a parallel to the great mass of public happiness, which has grown up in England, under those institutions of which we complain. The protection which our government affords to the personal liberty of the subject, the purity of the distribution of justice, and the security in which every man may enjoy the fruit of his industry, are surpassed in no country in the world:-hardly can we find one that bears the least comparison to our own. Let the value of that which we possess be fairly appreciated; and then let us consider coolly, whether the blemishes of our government are of such magnitude, as to warrant the application of remedies, which, if they do not cure, may kill." (P. 6.)

We will now dismiss our readers with once more taking the liberty to remind them that contemplative benefits, and practical advantages, are two very different things. If evils were not of indigenous growth, if they were not a part of the allotment of humanity, the business of reform would be a plain and simple operation, and little more would be necessary than sensibility to