power and the substance as two separate terms or items; but it may be quite impossible for us to draw a material distinction, and to pronounce that there is more than the mere matter itself, which functions according to its own inherent power or energy. We may say consistently (and in the very language of modern science), "the matter is the force," and all matter is only localised and partial force, capable of resisting or overcoming other force. And though these forces may act in opposite directions, and appear to contend, we can have no reason for establishing such an antagonism as should justify us in saying, that there were more major substances or powers at work, than the mere one of which we suppose the universe to consist. The result of the apparent contention may be as Divine as either force separately, and the contention may be only the means by which the result is produced or secured. So long, in fact, as we do not turn to the realm of mind, we may wander in a pantheistic universe without being able to establish the existence of any separate intelligence really distinguished from the operating force.

In the moral world it is otherwise. Here we have the categorical imperative of conscience, the absolute supremacy of a law which knows no mitigation of its requirements, and admits of no contending principle. It is true that men may differ as to what items do actually constitute that law, but this is only a proof of man's ignorance and darkness. Such a diversity is a secondary question, and cannot affect

the major proposition of the moral world; for so soon as we have admitted any thing whatever to be right, or any thing whatever to be wrong, in the moral sense of obligation and responsibility (and all men and nations make this admission), we have then and thereby admitted the universal imperative which establishes a moral universe, and draws the distinction between the Infinite God and the created creature.

verse.

The categorical imperative presents itself in this form, that whatever may be man's desire, there is, over and above the desire, a duty, to which, in all cases and all circumstances, the desire ought to give way. Such is the fact on which the whole moral world is based, and such is the fact that obliterates the possibility of a pantheistic doctrine of the uniThe admission of obligation is the admission of law; and the admission of law (which is absolutely universal wherever man is found, however imperfect it may be,) is the admission of a power higher than man, from which power law emanates; and the admission of a moral power is the admission of a distinction between the finite who owes the duty, and the Infinite to whom the duty is owed; -and, consequently, any moral law whatever is utterly destructive of Pantheism.

Let us consider,

First, A moral law cannot exist without will. Second, A moral law must emanate from a will. Third, A moral law must be addressed to a will. Fourth, The will to which the moral law is

addressed, must be endowed or combined with conscious intelligence.

Fifth, A conscious intelligence endowed with will, or a will endowed with conscious intelli

gence, constitutes an individual personality.

Sixth, The PERSON giving the law, is essentially distinguished from the person receiving

the law.

Consequently, if there be a moral law at all, the universe is not pantheistic:

But, man cannot possibly escape from the admission of a moral law: (This is the necessity of fact, or material necessity, as distinguished from logical necessity.)

Ultimate conclusion.—Consequently, the universe to man cannot possibly be pantheistic.

Such is a brief summary of the mode in which the admission of a moral law destroys the pantheistic doctrine.

But let us also consider how this argument completely destroys that pantheistic argument, which pretends to make a demonstration by starting from the idea of substance. This argument (presented with great logical power by Spinoza, who, in all probability, was really imposed on by his own subtlety) assumes, that there can be but one substance, which is self-existent, and of which all phenomena are only the manifestations.

Now, let us essentially distinguish the natural universe from the moral universe, and we shall see

that the argument is perfectly irrelevant, and never reaches, nay, never approaches, the very question which man requires to solve, namely, the mental relation between God and man. We shall criticise

this point, and show that even if a pantheistic argument were perfectly irrefutable in the region of objective nature, it would entail not one conclusion affecting man's relation to the Divine Being.

Here we shall be obliged to discourse of subjects where man has no direct knowledge, and where he is only enabled to operate intellectually in general terms, and through the general propositions of the intuitional reason. We shall make the largest possible admissions, and, for the sake of refuting this subtle argument, shall even venture to speak of things which otherwise we should not have approached.

The case is this:

There is a phenomenal world, which is extended in space;

There is a mental world, which is protended in time;

The phenomenal world requires a substance (by a law of our rational thought);

The mental world also requires a substance.

The whole of the pantheistic argument lies in the word substance; and, to show its fallacy, we shall admit it to be true, in the whole objective region of nature. Of course, we do not admit it to be true, there or elsewhere, but we shall admit it by supposition, for the purpose of showing that, even if it were true, it

proves nothing. This point is philosophically important, therefore we shall approach it in plain terms.

Let us admit (merely by supposition), that the substance of the objective and phenomenal world is universally one and the same, that there is but one substance, and that the phenomenal world is pantheistic.

Let us even go farther; let us admit (only by supposition) that the substance of matter is the same as the substance of mind, and, consequently, that the natural universe, including both matter and the substantial essence of mind, is pantheistic: I say, let us even admit this; and yet, we have proven nothing to the purpose, and have not established one single point that need shake our faith in the Christian revelation.

Let us remember, that of substance we know directly nothing. So long as gold manifests itself in a different manner from silver, it makes no possible difference to us whether it be or be not of the same essential substance. And so long as mind is endowed with a consciousness which distinguishes it in our apprehension from matter, it makes no difference what the natural substance of mind is. It is not the substance, but the consciousness that constitutes the value of mind, and draws with it those responsibilities which give to man his destiny. Let the natural substance of the human mind be what it may, let it be the same or different from matter, let it be any thing we can imagine, let it even be nothing in the material sense, that is, let it be unextended, and have no place in the universe