them, whereby the ideas under consideration are so varied, as to be more serviceable to their purpose, and to be thereby brought to an easier and nearer agreement, or more visible and remoter disagreement one with another. This is plain and direct sophistry."LOCK on the understanding, Sec. 42. Mr. Tucker's predestination calmly considered, abounds with this most despicable craft; in fact it forms the axle upon which he turns in every difficulty. For example, he argues and says, "Some perhaps, may object here, that if Sin be the the effect of the sovereign will, he must be the author of it: if he works all things after the council of his own will, he must be the worker of it; and if he could prevent it and would not, he must be the abettor of it."-L. xvi, note on p. 121. Here mark, instead of him holding forth Sin as being the unfrustrable effect of the Divine will, and the determinate act of him who will do all his pleasure, he changes the terms, to a "could prevent and would not." Thereby craftily changing the objectionable point for that which is not objected to, like as a man detected in circulating counterfeit coin, he is expert in concealing that which is base and presenting that which is genuine for the test of inspection. Again he argues, and.says, 'If God can be considered as the author of Sin, because he would not influence to prevent it, it will follow, that he could but be the author of it, if it existed at all."-T-R, p. 208. Mark, He says nothing here about" Sin being the ordination of God," or about it being "eternally and absolutely determined by the omnipotent. He is silent here as to "Sin being the effect of God's Lb sovereign will," or as to "the Divine will being the alone and only source, spring and cause" of Sin. He leaves these his extravagancies out of the question, and talks sensibly, and scripturally, about God not preventing Sin; and by this his change of language he slides along undetected. But having got over the difficulty, by this, his "could and would not prevent," he quits the sacred truth, and retracts to his old stand and general positions, telling us that "As nothing exists contrary to the will of him who says "I will do all my pleasure," it certainly was his determination that Sin should have being."-T—r, p. 209. Yet he can talk of the freedom of the creature's own will, and of his sufficiency of power to have stood in his original purity. Hence his language is, "Could there be any injustice in leaving them to the freedom of their own will, as they had power sufficient to stand, though free to fall?"-T-R p. 230, 231. Had then the creatures power sufficient to stand or rather to withstand omnipotent determination? If so, they must be wonderful creatures indeed! Mr. T. says, "If God had not determined Sin's existence, it could not have had being; unless we suppose Sin to be greater than God."-T-R, L. xvii, p. 124. To which it might be replied, If God had determined the creatures to Sin, they could but Sin, unless we suppose the creatures to be greater than God. But to glance again at the question, "Could there be any injustice in leaving them to the freedom of their own will, as they had power sufficient to stand, though free to fall?" I say there could be no injustice in such case: neither could there be a freedom of will in the crea ture as touching the fall, admitting it to be either effected or prevented by the will of him who says "I will do all my pleasure." But Mr. T. says, "If he could prevent Sin and would not he must be the author of it." stances. I say not; for if so, he must necessarily be either unjust, or unwise, in placing them under law circumFor to place them under law circumstances without freedom or possibility to transgress, would have rendered the law useless; and to place them under law circumstances without power to stand, must have been unjust. But placing them under law circumstances, with power sufficient to stand though free to fall; there can be no injustice attributed to the Divine being, in case the creatures do fall. But in case that their fall was the work and effect of the omnipotent unfrustrable will of him who says "I will do all my pleasure," I cannot see but that the creature in such case, is a sacrificed victim to absolute necessity; and nnder such circumstances, I cannot see how the divine justice can possibly be defended to the satisfaction of any rational finite understanding. Many of the old divines poured contempt upon the doctrine of the divine permission of Sin. Hence says CALVIN, "And now I have sufficiently proved that God is called the Author of all these things, which according to the system of these censors, happen only by his uninfluential permission. He declares that he creates light and darkness, that he forms good and evil and : that no evil occurs which he hath not performed."CALVINS Inst., b. 1, c. xviii, p. 249. Calvin held the Divine permission of Sin, as being an invention of men; and as a mere subterfuge. "Hence, (says he) Was invented, the distinction between doing and permitting; because to many persons this appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious are subject to the power and government of God, so that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for the execution of his judgements. They therefore endeavour to evade the difficulty, by alleging that it happens only by permission, and not by the will of (iod; but God himself, by the most unequivocal declarations, rejects the subterfuge."-Inst. b. 1, c. xviii, p. 244. If the blinding and infatuation of Ahab be the Divine judgment, the pretence of bare permission disappears. For it would be ridiculous for a judge inerely to permit, without decreeing what should be done, and commanding his officers to execute it."Inst., p. 245. "It often occurs in the sacred history, that whatsoever comes to pass proceeds from the Lord; as the defection of the ten tribes, 1 KINGS, ii, 31; the death of the sons of Eli, and many other events of a similar kind. Those who are but moderately acquainted with the scriptures will perceive that, for the sake of brevity out of a great number of testimonies I have produced only a few; which nevertheless abundantly evince how nugatory and insipid it is, instead of the providence of God, [to substitute a bare permission."-Inst., b. 1, c. xviii, p. 246. "But nothing can be desired more explicit than his frequent declarations, that he blinds the minds of men, strikes them with giddiness, inebriates them with the spirit of slumber, fills them with infatuation, and hardens their hearts. These passages also many persons refer to permission, as though, in abandoning the reprobate, God permitted them to be blinded by Satan. But this solution is too frivolous, since the Holy Spirit expressly declares that their blindness and infatuation are inflicted by the righteous judgment of God. He is said to have caused the obduracy of Pharaoh's heart, and also to have aggravated and confirmed it. Some elude the force of these expressions by a foolish cavil; that, since Pharaoh himself is elsewhere said to have hardened his own heart, his own will is stated as the cause of his obduracy. As though these two things were at all incompatible with each other, that man should be actuated by God, and yet at the same time be active himself. But I retort on them their own objection; for if hardening denotes a bare permission, Pharaoh cannot properly be charg ed with being the cause of his own obstinacy. Now how weak and insipid would be such an interpretation as though Pharaoh only permitted himself to be hardened. Besides the scripture cuts off all occasion for such cavils. God says, "I will harden his heart."CALVINS Inst., b. 1, c. xviii, p. 247. - From the above, it appears then, that the doctrine of the divine permission of Sin is not Calvinism. Thus having given the high advocates a candid hearing both for and against the divine permission of Sin. I would also solicit a candid hearing while I make a few homely observations upon this important subject. I say then again, that the divine permission of Sin, is a subject oftener spoken of than investigated. Pray, if a man may be so bold as to ask the question, What authority have we talk about the divine permission of Sin? Is it a doctrine of the Bible? Can the advocates for the doctrine, produce sacred authority to prove the divine permission of the Sin of our first parents? No; the most that they can say, is but deduced from inference; they tell us, God did not pre |