as such admits of a plural; as the Caesars, the Howards, Noun. the Pelhams, the Montagues, &c.: but Socrates can never become plural; so long as we know of no more than one man of that name. The reason of all this will be obvious, if we consider that every genus may be found whole and entire in each of its species; for man, horse, and dog, are each of them an entire and complete animal: and every species may be found whole and entire in each of its individuals: for Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and entirely a Hence it is, that every genus, though ONE, is multiplied into MANY; and every species, though ONE, is also multiplied into MANY; by reference to those beings which are their subordinates: But as no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY; and so, as well in nature as in name, is truly an INDIVIDUAL which cannot admit of number.

man.

Noun. them therefore to the genus called animal; and this word belongs to every species of animals, and to each individual animal. The same classification is made both of artificial and abstract substances; of each of which there are genera, species, and individuals. Thus in natural substances, animal, vegetable, and fossil, denote GENERA ; mạn, horse, tree, metal, a SPECIES; and Alex ander, Bucephalus, oak, gold, are INDIVIDUALS. In artificial substances, edifice is a GENUS; house, church, tower, are SPECIES; and the Vatican, St Paul's, and the Tower of London, are INDIVIDUALS. In abstract substances, motion and virtue are GENERA; flight and temperance are SPECIES; the flight of Mahomet and temperance in wine are INDIVIDUALS. By arranging substances in this manner, and giving a name to each genus and species, the nouns necessary to any language are comparatively few and easily acquired: and when we meet with an object unknown to us, we have only to examine it with attention; and comparing it with other objects, to refer it to the genus or species which it most nearly resembles. By this contrivance we supply the want of a proper name for the individual; and so far as the resemblance is complete between it and the species to which it is referred, and of which we have given it the name, we may converse and reason about it without danger of error: Whereas had each individual in nature a distinct and proper name, words would be innumerable and incomprehensible; and to employ our labours in language, would be as idle as that study of numberless written symbols which has been attributed to the Chinese.

14

15

ten the same with that of an or; but the shape of the one Novn animal, the symmetry and proportion of his parts, are totally different from those of the other; nor could any man be led to class the two individuals under the same species. It is by a similar process that we ascend from one species to another, and through all the species to the highest genus. In each species or genus in the ascending series fewer particular qualities are attended to than were considered as essential to the genus or species immediately below it; and our conceptions become more and more general as the particular qualities, which are the objects of them, become fewer in number. The use of a general term, therefore, can recal to the mind only the common qualities of the class, the genus or species which it represents. But we have frequent occasion to speak of individual objects. In doing this, we annex to the general term certain words significant of particular qualities, which discriminate the object of which we speak, from every other individual of the class to which it belongs, and of which the general term is the common name. For instance, in advertising a thief, we are obliged to mention his height, complexion, gait, and whatever may serve to distinguish him from all other men.

some masculine, some feminine, which denote sub. stances where sex never had existence. Nay, some languages are so particularly defective in this respect, as to class every object, inanimate as well as animate, under either the masculine or the feminine gender, as they have no neuter gender for those which are of neither sex. This is the case with the Hebrew, French, Italian, and Spanish. But the English, strictly following the order of nature, puts every noun which denotes a male animal, and no other, in the masculine gender; every name of a female animal, in the feminine; and every animal whose sex is not obvious, or known, as well as every inanimate object whatever, in the neuter gender. And this gives our language an advantage above most others in the poetical and rhetorical style: for when nouns naturally neuter are converted into masculine and feminine, the personification is more distinctly and more forcibly marked. (See PERSONIFICATION). Some very learned and ingenious men have endeavoured, by what they call a more subtle kind of reasoning, to discern even in things without sex a distant analogy to that NATURAL DISTINCTION, and to account for the names of inanimate substances being, in Greek and Latin, masculine and feminine. But such speculations are wholly fanciful; and the principles upon which they proceed are overturned by an appeal to facts. Many of the substances that, in one language, have masculine names, have in others names that are feminine; which could not be the case were this matter regulated by reason or nature. Indeed for this, as well as many other anomalies in language, no other reason can be assigned than that custom

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma, loquendi.

18. It has been already observed that most nouns are the names, not of individuals, but of whole classes of objects termed genera and species (B). In classing a number of individuals under one species, we contemplate only those qualities which appear to be important, and in which the several individuals are found to agree, abstracting the mind from the consideration of all those which appear to be less essential, and which in one individual may be such as have nothing exactly similar in any other individual upon earth. Thus, in classing the individuals which are comprehended under the species denominated horse, we pay no regard to their colour or the size; because experience teaches us, that no particular colour or size is essential to that individual living creature, and that there are not perhaps upon earth two horses whose colour and size are exactly alike. But the qualities which in this process we take into view, are the general shape, the symmetry, and proportion of the parts; and in short every thing which appears evidently essential to the life of the individual and the propagation of the race. All these qualities are strikingly similar in all the individuals which we call horses, and as strikingly dissimilar from the corresponding qualities of every other individual animal. The colour of a horse is of

The process of the mind in rendering her concep. tions particular, is indeed exactly the reverse of that by which she generalizes them. For as in the process of generalization, she abstracts from her ideas of any number of species certain qualities in which they differ from each other, and of the remaining qualities in which they agree, constitutes the first genus in the ascending series; so when she wishes to make her conceptions more particular, she annexes to her idea of any fore abstracted from it; and the genus, with this annexagenus those qualities or circumstances which were be tion, constitutes the first species in the descending series. In like manner, when she wishes to descend from any species to an individual, she has only to annex to the idea of the species those particular qualities which discriminate the individual intended from the other individuals of the same kind.

This particularizing operation of the mind points out the manner of applying the general terms of language for the purpose of expressing particular ideas. For as the mind, to limit a general idea, connects that idea with the idea of some particular circumstance; so language, as we have already observed, in order to limit a general term, connects that term with the word denoting the particular circumstance. Thus, in order, to particularize the idea of horse, the mind connects that general idea with the circumstance, suppose, of whiteness; and in order to particularize the word horse, language connects that word with the term white: and so in other instances.-Annexation, therefore, or the connecting of general words or terms in language, fits it for expressing particular conceptions; and this must hold alike good in all languages. But the methods of denoting this annexation are various in various tongues. In English and most modern languages we commonly use for this pur

pose

Nun.

17 Cases, the

18 The im

ease.

pose little words, which we have chosen to style particles; and in the Greek and Latin languages, the cases of nouns answer the same end.

19. Cases, therefore, though they are accidents of nouns not absolutely necessary, have been often considered as such; and they are certainly worthy of our examination, since there is perhaps no language in which some cases are not to be found, as indeed without them or their various powers no language could readily answer the purposes of life.

All the oblique cases of nouns (if we except the vomarks of cative) are merely marks of annexation; but as the annexation, connections or relations subsisting among objects are very various, some cases denote one kind of relation, and some another. We shall endeavour to investigate the connection which each case denotes, beginning with the genitive. This is the most general of all the cases, and gives notice that some connection indeed subsists between two objects, but does not point out the particular kind of connection. That we must infer, not from our nature or termination of the genitive itself, but from our previous knowledge of the objects connected. That the port of the genitive denotes merely relation in general, might be progenitive ved by adducing innumerable examples, in which the relations expressed by this case are different; but we shall content ourselves with one observation, from which the truth of our opinion will appear beyond dispute. If an expression be used in which are, connected by the genitive case, two words significant of objects between which a twofold relation may subsist, it will be found impossible, from the expression, to determine which of these two relations is the true one, which must be gathered wholly from the context. Thus, for example, from the phrase injuria regis, no man can know whether the injury mentioned be an injury suffered or an injury inflicted by the king: but if the genitive case notified any particular relation, no such ambiguity could exist. This case therefore gives notice, that two ob jects are, somehow or other (c), connected, but it marks not the particular sort of connection. Hence it may be translated by our particle of, which will be seen af terwards to be of a signification equally general.

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it is said, Profectus est Romam, his apposition with Rome is conceived as the effect of his motion thither.

From this idea of the accusative, the reason is obvious why the object after the active verb is often put in that case; it is because the action is supposed to proceed from the agent to the patient. But the same thing happens with respect to the dative case, and for the same reason. Thus, Antonius læsit Ciceronem, and Antonius nocuit Ciceroni, are expressions of the same import, and in each the action of hurting is conceived as proceeding from Antony to Cicero; which is finely illu strated by the passive form of such expressions, where the procedure above mentioned is expressly marked by the preposition ab: Cicero nocetur, Cicero læditur AB Antonio. It is therefore not true, that "the accusative is that case, at least the only case, which to an efficient nominative and a verb of action subjoins either the effect or the passive subject; nor is the dative the only case which is formed to express relations tending to itself." The only thing essential to these two cases is to denote the opposition or junction of one object with another; and this they do nearly, if not altogether, in the same manner, although from the custom of language they may not be indifferently subjoined to the same verb.

not.

Noun.

20

The Greek language has no ablative case: but in of the abthe Latin, where it is used, it denotes concomitancy, or lative case. that one thing accompanies another. From this concomitancy we sometimes draw an inference, and sometimes For example, when it is said, Templum clamore petebant, clamour is represented as concomitant with their going to the temple; and here no inference is drawn ; but from the phrase palleo metu, although nothing more is expressed than that paleness is a concomitant of the fear, yet we instantly infer that it is also the effect of it. In most instances where the ablative is used, an inference is drawn, of which the foundation is some natural connection observed to subsist between the objects thus connected in language. When this inference is not meant to be drawn, the preposition is commonly added; as, interfectus est cum gladio, "he was slain with a sword about him;" interfectus est gladio, "he was slain with a sword as the instrument of his death.”

21

Noun.

cases.

22

20. The Greek and Latin among the ancient, and the German among the modern languages, express different connections or relations of one thing with another Import of the Greek by cases. In English this is done for the most part by and Latin prepositions; but the English, being derived from the same origin as the German, that is, from the Teutonic, has at least one variation of the substantive to answer the same purpose. For instance, the relation of possession, or belonging, is often expressed by a different ending of the substantive, which may be well called a case. This case answers nearly to the genitive case in Latin; but as that is not a denomination significant of the nature of the case in any language, it may perhaps in English in English be more properly called the possessive case. Thus, God's grace, anciently Godis grace, is the grace belonging to or in the possession of God and may be likewise expressed by means of the preposition; thus, the grace of God.

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One case

to denote possession.

Although the word Godis is as evidently an inflexion of the noun God as the word Dei is an inflexion of Deus, there are grammarians who have denied that in English there is any true inflexion of the original noun, and who have said that the noun with the addition of that syllable, which we consider as the sign of a case, ceases to be a noun, and becomes a definitive; a word which with them is devoid of signification. Thus, in the expression Alexander's house, the word Alexander's stands not as a noun, but as an article or definitive, serving to ascertain and point out the individuality of the house. But this is a palpable mistake the word Alexander's serves not to point out the individuality of the house, but to show to whom the house belongs; and is therefore beyond dispute, not an article, but a noun, in the possessive case. Again, when we say St Peter's at Rome and St Paul's at London, the words St Peter's and St Paul's are neither articles, nor, as has been absurdly imagined, the proper names of edifices, like the Rotundo or the Circus; but they are in the possessive case, the names of the two apostles to whom the churches were dedicated, and to whom they are supposed to belong.

:

But that this, which we have called the possessive case, is really not so, must be evident, it is said, because there are certain circumstances in which it cannot be substituted for the noun with the preposition prefixed. Thus, though a man may say, I speak or Alexander, I write or Cæsar, I think or Pompey; he cannot say, I speak Alexander's, I write Caesar's, or I think Pompey's. This is indeed true, but it is nothing to the purpose: for though I may say, Loquor DE Alexandro, Scribo DE Cæsare, Cogito DE Pompeio; I cannot say, LOQUOR Alexandri, Scribo Cæsaris, or Cogito Pompeii: and therefore all that can be inferred from this argument is, that as the Latin genitive is not always of the same import with the preposition de, so the English possessive is not always of the same import with the preposition of. Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that English nouns admit of one inflexion; and

any article to limit it, is taken in its widest sense. Thus the word man means all mankind;

and appears to possess the powers of self-motion and sensation we therefore refer it to its proper species, and call it a dog, a horse, a lion, or the like. If it belongs to none of the species with which we are acquainted, it cannot be called by any of their names; we then refer it to the genus, and call it an animal.

But this is not enough. The object at which we are looking, and which we want to distinguish, is not a species or a genus, but an individual. Of what kind? Known or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before and now remembered? This is one of the instances in which we shall discover the use of the two articles A and THE: for, in the case supposed, the article A respects our primary perception, aud denotes an individual as unknown; whereas THE respects our secondary perception, and denotes individuals as known. To explain this by an example: I see an object pass by which I never saw till now. What do I say? There goes a beggar with a long beard. The man departs, and returns a week after: What do I then say? There goes THE beggar with THE long beard. Here the article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered. Yet mark the force of this apparently minute change. The individual once vague is now recognised as something known; and that merely by the efficacy of this latter article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring a present perception to a like perception already past.

Article.

"The proper study of mankind is man:" where mankind and man may change places without making any alteration in the sense. But let either of the articles of which we are treating be prefixed to the word man, and that word is immediately reduced from the name of a whole genus to denote only a single individual; and instead of the noble truth which this line asserts, the poet will be made to say, that the proper study of mankind is not the common nature which is diffused through the whole human race, but the manners and caprices of one individual. Thus far therefore the two articles agree; but they differ in this, that though they both limit the specific name to some individual, the article a leaves the individual itself unascertained; whereas the article THE ascertains the individual also, and can be prefixed to the specific name only The indewhen an individual is intended, of which something may be predicated that distinguishes it from the other indi- the definite. viduals of the species. Thus, if I say-A man is fit for treasons, my assertion may appear strange and vague; but the sentence is complete, and wants nothing to make it intelligible: but if I say-THE man is fit for treasons, I speak nonsense; for as the article THE shows that I mean some particular man, it will be impossible to discover my meaning till I complete the sentence, and predicate something of the individual intended to distinguish him from other individuals.

"THE man that hath not music in himself, &c. --
"Is fit for treasons.".

A man, therefore, means some one or other of the hu-
man race indefinitely; THE man means, definitely, that
particular man who is spoken of: the former is called
the indefinite, the latter the definite, article.

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finite and

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