СПАР. V. PELAGIUS' "POSSE," "VELLE," AND "ESSE”

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faculties, with which he says God's commandments are fulfilled,-possibility, volition, and action: meaning by "possibility," that with which a man is enabled to be just and righteous; by "volition," that he wills to be just; by action," that he actually is just. The first of these, the possibility, he allows to have been bestowed on us by the Creator of our nature; it is not in our power, and we possess it even against our will. The other two, however, the volition and the action, he asserts to be our own; and he assigns them to us so strictly as to contend that they proceed simply from ourselves. In short, according to his view, God's grace has nothing to do with assisting those two faculties which he will have to be altogether our own, the volition and the action, but that only which is not in our own power and comes to us from God, namely the possibility;/as if the faculties which are our own, that is, the volition and the action, have such avail for declining evil and doing good, that they require not any divine help,/whereas that faculty which we have of God, that is to say, the possibility, is so weak, that it is always assisted by the aid of grace.

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CHAP. 5. [IV.]

Lest, however, it should chance be said that we either do not correctly understand what he advances, or malevolently pervert to another meaning what he never meant to bear such a sense, I beg of you to consider his own actual words: “We classify," says he, "these faculties thus, arranging them into a certain graduated order. We put in the first place posse, 'possibility;' in the second velle, 'volition;' and in the third esse, or being.' The possibility we place in our nature, the volition in our will, and the being in the realization by act. The first of these faculties expressed in the term posse is especially assigned to God, who has bestowed it on His creature; the other two, indicated in the terms velle and esse, must be referred to the human agent, because they flow forth from the fountain of his will. In his willing, therefore, and doing a good work consists man's praise; or rather this praise belongs both to the human being and to God, who has bestowed on him the possibility' of exercising his actual will and

Paese veile

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work, and who evermore by the help of His grace assists this very possibility. That a man possesses this possibility of willing and effecting any good work, comes from God alone. So that this one faculty may exist, even when the other two have no being; but the converse is not true,—that these latter can exist without that former one. It is therefore at my own option not to have a good inclination and not to do a good action; but it is by no means within my own power not to have the possibility of good. This possibility is inherent in me, whether I will or no; nor does nature at any time receive in this point an option for itself. Now the meaning of all this will be rendered clearer by an example or two. That we have the possibility of seeing with our eyes is no power of ours; but it is in our own power that we make a good or a bad use of our eyes. So again, that I may, by applying a general case in illustration, embrace all, the fact that we have the possibility of accomplishing every good thing by action, speech, and thought, comes from Him who has endowed us with this possibility, and also assists it; but that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves, because we are also able to turn all these actions into evil. Accordingly, and this is a point which needs frequent repetition, because of your calumniation of us, -whenever we say that a man can live without sin, we also give praise to God by our acknowledgment of the possibility which we have received from Him, who has bestowed such power upon us; and there is here no occasion for praising the human agent, since it is God's matter alone that is for the moment treated of; for the question is not about willing, or effecting, but simply and solely about that which may possibly be."

CHAP. 6. [V.]

The whole of this dogma of Pelagius, observe, is carefully expressed in these words, and none other, in the third book of his treatise in defence of the liberty of the will, in which he has managed in respect of these three faculties,-the possibility, the volition, and the action, indicated in the first by posse, the second by velle, and the third by esse,-to distinguish them with so much subtle skill, that, whenever we read or hear of his

CHAP. VII.]

GRACE REQUIRED FOR THE THREE.

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acknowledging the assistance of divine grace in order to our avoidance of evil and accomplishment of good,-whatever he may mean by the said assistance of grace, whether the law or the doctrine [of Scripture,] or any other thing, we are sure of what he says; nor can we run into any mistake by understanding his meaning to be different from his expression of it. For we cannot help knowing that, according to his belief, it is not our volition nor our action which is assisted by the divine help, but solely the "possibility" of our will and action, which alone of the three, as he affirms, we have of God. As if that faculty were infirm which God Himself placed in our nature; while the other two, which, as he would have it, are our own property, are so strong and firm and self-sufficient as to require none of His help!/so that He does not help us to will, nor help us to act, but simply helps us to the possibility of willing and acting. The apostle, however, holds the contrary, when he says, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." And that [the Philippians] might be sure that it was not simply in the possibility of their working (for this they had already received in nature and in [Scripture] doctrine), but in their actual working that they were divinely assisted, the apostle does not go on to say to them, "For it is God that worketh in you to be able," as if they already possessed volition and operation among their own resources, without requiring His assistance in respect of these two; but he says, "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure ;"2 or, as the reading runs in other copies, especially the Greek, "both to will and to energize” [καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν]. Co: sider, now, whether the apostle did not thus long before foresee by the Holy Ghost that there would arise adversaries of the grace of God; and did not therefore declare that God works within us those two very operations, even of "willing" and "acting" [or "doing,"] which this man so determined to be our own, as if they were in no wise assisted by the help of divine grace. CHAP. 7. [VI.]

Let not Pelagius, however, in this way deceive incautious and simple persons, or even himself; for after saying, "Man's

1 Phil. ii. 12.

Phil. ii. 13.

praise consists in his willing and doing a good work," he added, as if by way of correcting himself, these words: "Or rather, this praise belongs to the human being and to God." It was not, however, that he wished to be understood as showing any deference to the sound doctrine, that it is "God which worketh in us both to will and to do," that he thus expressed himself; but it is clear enough, on his own showing, why he added the latter clause, for he immediately subjoins: "Who has bestowed on him the 'possibility' of exercising this very will and work." From his preceding words it is manifest that he places this possibility in our nature. Lest he should seem, however, to have said nothing about grace, he added these words: "And who evermore, by the help of His grace, assists this very possibility,"-" this very possibility," observe; not [man's] very will, or very action; for if he had said so much as this, he would clearly not be at variance with the doctrine of the apostle. But there are his words: "this very possibility;" meaning that very one of the three faculties which he had placed in our nature. This God "evermore assists by the help of His grace." The result, indeed, is, that God does not share with the human agent the praise which comes in the processes of will and action, in such wise that man either so wills as to have God also inspiring his volition with the ardour of love, or so works as to have God also co-operating with him. And without such help, what is man after all? But he has associated God [with man] in this praise of which he treats, in this wise, that were it not for the nature which God gave us in our creation wherewith it might be possible to exercise volition and action, we should neither will nor act.

CHAP. 8.-Grace, according to the Pelagians, consists in the internal and manifold illumination of the mind.

As to his allowing that this possibility of our nature is assisted by the grace of God, it is by no means clear from the passage either what grace he means, or to what extent he supposes our nature to be assisted by it. But, as is the case in other passages in which he expresses himself with more clearness and decision, [so, deriving information from them,] we may here also perceive that no other grace is intended by him as

CHAP. VIII.] PELAGIUS OWNS, YET STINTS, GRACE.

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helping the possibility of our nature than the law and the doctrine [of revelation.] [vII.] For in one passage he says: "We are supposed by very ignorant persons to do wrong in this matter to the divine grace, because we say that it is by no means able to effect sanctification in us without our own will, as if God could have imposed any command on His grace, without also supplying the help of His grace to those on whom he imposed His commands, so that men might more easily accomplish through grace what they are required to do by their free will." Then, as if he meant to explain what grace he meant, he immediately went on to add these words: "And this grace we for our part do not, as you suppose, allow to consist merely in the law, but also in the help of God." Now who can help wishing that he would show us what grace it is that he would have us understand? Indeed we have the strongest reason for expecting him to tell us what he means by saying that he does not allow grace merely to consist in the law. Whilst, however, we are in the suspense of our expectation, observe, I pray you, what he has further to tell us: "God helps us," says he, "by His doctrine and revelation, whilst He opens the eyes of our heart; whilst He points out to us the future, that we may not be absorbed in the present; whilst He discovers to us the snares of the devil; whilst He enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace." He then concludes his statement with a kind of clinching appeal: "Does the man," he asks, "who says all this appear to you to be a denier of grace? Does he not acknowledge both man's free will and God's grace?" But, after all, he has not got beyond his commendation of the law and of the doctrine [of revelation ;] assiduously inculcating this as the grace that helps us, and so following up the idea with which he had started, when he said, "We, however, allow it to consist in the help of God." God's help, indeed, he supposed must be recommended to us by manifold lures; by setting forth doctrine and revelation, the opening of the eyes of the heart, the demonstration of the future, the discovery of the devil's wiles, and the illumination of our minds by the varied and indescribable gift of heavenly grace,—all this, of course, with a view to our learning the commandments and