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ENQUIRY

Concerning Sinners deliverance from condemnation; wherein the cafe of Chrift's fatisfaction is confidered, and inpartially stated, according to the Scripture account of it.

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EFORE I enter upon this enquiry, I think it proper to make a few previous obfervations. And, firft, I obferve, that fin

is either a doing that which the light of nature, or divine revelation, makes a crime; or the omitting to do that which the light of nature, or divine revelation, makes a duty. Again, Secondly, I obferve, that as God is the original fupreme cause of the being, and relations of things, upon whom we chiefly depend, and to whom we owe our highest obligations; fo all fin is chiefly and primarily committed against him. And as God is abfolutely independent, and felf-exifting; fo, when his creatures have finned against him, they are wholly at his pleasure to be difpofed of as he fees good. From which it will follow, by a neceffary conféquence, that it is the right and property of God to ufe is pleasure, either in pardoning or punishing the finner; and if he do punish for fin, he is at liberty to exercise what kind, degree, or duration of punishment he thinks fit, provided the punishment do not exceed the demerit of the

crime.

rectitude of God's nature does difpofe him to hate fin, and to manifeft his displeasure against it, by punishing the finner, if he obftinately perfift in his folly, without repentance; and that the justice of God doth oblige him both to punish the finner, and proportion the punishment to the measure of the guilt contracted. I anfwer, Whether and how far the holiness of God doth difpofe him to hate fin, and to punish the finner, I fhall not here enquire; because if we allow what the objection fuppofes, yet ftill he is at liberty either to pardon or punish, the finner as he fees good or fit; because those difpofitions which are in God, arifing from the rectitude of his nature, do not take from him the freedom of his will; and therefore, tho' God is difpofed to hate fin, and punish the finner, because his wifdom is fuppofed to judge it beft and fittest to do fo, yet ftill he is at liberty, with refpect of his power, and will, to do otherwife. As to that part of the objection which refpects his juftice, I fay, every being is left free, by the laws of common equity or justice, to difpofe of his own peculiar property as he will, and his not accountable to any for the ufe or non-ufe, the enjoying or not enjoying, or difpofing of the fame. Seeing therefore that the right of punishing, or pardoning a finner, is God's peculiar property, in which no one is interefted but himself, it will follow, that God may use his pleasure, either in pardoning the finner, or punishing him to a greater or lefs degree, without being guilty of criminal injuftice, provided the punishment doth not exceed the demerit of the crime (as I obferv'd before) feeing no one is wrong'd by fuch an administration, nor any occafion given for a juft complaint. Thirdly, I obferve, that if God is pleafed to punish the finner for his folly, there is nothing

nothing which the finner can do for himself, nor which any other can do or suffer for him, which in the nature of the thing can properly merit his exemption from punishment, or give a right to claim his difcharge at God's hand. And here (which I defire may be carefully obferved through the whole following difcourfe) I underftand the word merit in the first and ftricteft fenfe of that term, viz. that which in its own nature gives a legal right and title to what is fuppofed to be merited by it, confidered as feparate from all grace and bounty pre-engagements, or promises of him who is the proprietor in what is thus merited, antecedent to that meritorious act. And,

First, I fay, there is nothing which the finner can do for himself which can thus merit any thing at God's hand; for as to repentance which confifts in a fenfe and conviction of Guilt, à deep forrow, humiliation, and pain of mind that we have done amifs, a confeffion of our fault, and an actual forfaking it, tho' this may difpofe us for, and make us the fuitable fubjects of God's mercy, yet this doth not, in the least measure, merit our discharge from punishment; because as our repentance doth not take away or leffen our guilt (we being equally as guilty after that repentance as before) fo neither is that repentance any way profitable unto God, and therefore cannot bring him under any obligation unto us upon the account of it.

If it should be here objected, that God's goodnefs doth difpofe, and in fome fort oblige him to discharge the finner upon his repentance, and therefore that repentance is meritorious. I anfwer, allowing what the objection fuppofes, viz. that God's goodness obliges him to difcharge the penitent, yet this repentance doth not merit that dif charge, but only difpofes and fits the perfon, wha P 3

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exercifes it, for God's mercy; for if repentance did merit, as aforefaid, then God's obligation, to difcharge the penitent, would not arife from his goodnefs, as the objection fuppofes, but from his juftice, becaufe it would not be an act of goodnefs, but juftice, for God to exercise it; the criminal might demand it as his right, and it would be an act of criminal injuftice in God to withhold it from him; and therefore, if God's good, nefs doth oblige him to difcharge the penitent, then this is fomething in God himfelf which brings him under this obligation, and not any thing in the finner which merits it at his hand.

As to works of fupererogation, or good works over and above duty, I think, properly speaking, there is no fuch thing; because as God is the original fupreme caufe of the being and relations of all things, fo I think he hath made it the duty of every rational confcious being (even from the being and relations in which he hath placed them) to fill up the relations in which they ftand, by doing every thing which is fit and proper to be done; and confequently, every good work, which every derived rational confcious being is capable of performing, comes within this general rule of duty, and law of God, founded in the being and relations, and fo, in the reafon of things. And likewife whatever is unfit or improper to be done, is a defect of duty from this rule. If there are any works which are neither fit nor unfit, neither proper nor improper, fuch works are neither good nor evil, but are of an indifferent nature, and fo are not within the prefent queftion. But allow ing, tho' not really granting, that there are fuch good works which are over and above duty, yet fuch good works cannot, in the nature of the thing, merit any thing at God's hand; because, fir, no being whatever can give to God any

thing but what is God's own, antecedent to that gift; for as all derived beings received their beings, and all that they are and have from God, fo from hence it will follow, that if any one, or every one of thefe fhould offer up themselves, and all that they are or have, to God, they do but return to him his own; they give him that which he hath a greater intereft in, and right to, than themselves; and therefore the giving to God his own, cannot, in juftice, be fuppofed to lay him under any obligation upon the account of it, Secondly, Whatever any one doth for God, he doth it by that ability which he originally recived from him, and confequently can never oblige him by fuch a performance. Thirdly, Whatever any one offers up to, or doth for God, cannot, upon any account, be profitable unto him, and confequently cannot lay him under any obligation, which is the cafe of merit. Again,

I fay, fecondly, there is nothing which any other can do or fuffer for the finner, which originally, in the nature of the thing, can merit his discharge from condemnation. That nothing, which any other can do for the finner, is, in this ftrict and proper fenfe, meritorious, appears from the reafons laft mentioned, viz. because, first, there is nothing which any one can give to God, but what is God's own, antecedent to that gift; and, fecondly, because there is nothing which any one can do for God, but what is done by an ability and power originally received from him; and, thirdly, because there is nothing which any one can give to, or do for God, which can, in any refpect, be profitable to him; and confequently, there is nothing which any person can do for the finner, which, in the nature of the thing, can merit any thing from God for him. So likewife neither is there any thing which any one can fuffer for him, which, in P 4

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