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ministered, fo as not to inflict more evil than the demerit of the crime, nor communicate lefs good than the receiver has a title to, by a juft right of claim. As to his own property, I fay, as before, that he is left free, by the laws of common equity, to difpofe of it as he will; fo that he may communicate good, either without or beyond merit, which we call bounty, or he may remit or punish less than the crime deferves, which we call mercy, without being criminally unjuft; nay, it is fo far from being a crime, that it is noble and glorious, when the object is proper and suitable for that bounty or mercy to be exercifed upon. This being fo, I fay, that criminal injuftice is inconfiftent with God's goodness. For, that innate goodness, which dwells in God, is a bar to all fraud and cruelty; and God is fo far from exercifing fraud in with-holding that good which another has a right to claim from him, that he is rather difpofed, by his goodness, to confer that good which they have no right to, if the object be proper and fuitable to receive it; that is, in other words, bounty is a confequence of his goodnefs, but fraud is directly oppofite to it. Again, God is fo far from exercifing cruelty, in punishing beyond the demerit of the crime, that he is rather difpofed, by his goodnefs, to exercise mercy in punishing lefs than the crime deferves, if the object be proper and fuitable for that mercy to be exercifed upon; that is, in other words, mercy is a confequence of his goodness, whereas cruelty is oppofite to it. From hence it appears that God is a juft Being.

OBJECTIONS with their ANSWERS.

Obje. 1. May not God, for the glorifying of his power, make creatures to be miferable without demerit, and yet act according to the princi

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ples of juftice, forafmuch as the laws of equity or justice leave every being free to difpofe of his own property, as he will? feeing therefore God's 'creatures are his own, he may do what he will with them, without being chargeable with criminal injuftice. Anfwer, Tho' they are his own, and receive their being from him, yet we conceive it would be still criminal injuftice in him to give them being for no other end, with refpect to the creatures, but to make them miferable ; because every being has a right, from common equity, to claim a continuance in its present state, when its change will add to, or give being to its mifery, except its demerit cuts off that claim. Therefore, I fay, that non-entity has a right, if we may fo fpeak, to continue fo, when its receiving existence ferves only to make it miferable, and it would be an act of criminal injustice to non-entity, to give it exiftence to that end, because non entity is better, and rather to be chofen than a state of mifery. And farther, I fay, God will never glorify his power at the expence of his juftice and goodnefs, when he can do it a thousand ways confiftent with both.

Object. II. We fee that the fenfible creatures below us are capable of mifery, and do really fuffer it, and yet have no demerit. Anfwer, As they receive evil, fo they receive good from God's hand; and as we cannot know the meafure of the evil they fuffer, fo neither can we know the measure of the good they enjoy; fo that, for all we know, the good they receive is more than equivalent to, and a compenfation for the evil they fuffer. So again we cannot know, whether they are without demerit; for as they have inferiour capacities, and as they, feeming to us, have a freedom in the ufe and exercife of them, fo they may, for ought we know, contract an inferiour

feriour guilt, in proportion to their inferiour capacities. Upon the whole, I fay, feeing we are wholly ignorant of their cafe, we cannot determine ought concerning them, and therefore the objection is of no force.

Object, III. Doth not the unequal distribution of providence, as to good and evil, with refpect to good and bad men, feem to imply an unjuft hand in that diftribution, feeing it often happens that bad men enjoy the good, and good men the evil of life? Anfwer, As to good men, that leffer measure of good which they enjoy is all bounty, because they have no merit; and that greater measure of evil which they fuffer is still mercy, because it is lefs than their demerit; fo then there is no criminal injuftice, with refpect to good men. And as to bad men, I fay, that the greater good they enjoy is God's bounty; and forafmuch as none are wrong'd by that adminiftration, seeing God gives his own and not another's goods, there can be no criminal injuftice in that administration. As to the leffer evil which they fuffer, that is God's mercy; and forafmuch as none are wrong'd in the exercife of that mercy, it cannot be criminally unjust in God to exercise it.

Object. IV. God being in himself incompre henfible, and his ways unfearchable, who dares prefume to fay what he can, or cannot do? or what is agreeable or difagreeable to his perfections, feeing his ways are in the deep, and his paths in the great waters, and his foot-fteps are not known? tho' we may ftate the notion of justice, goodness, truth, holiness, and the like, and of what is agreeable or difagreeable to these, with relation to ourfelves; yet who can ftate the notion of them, or be capable of judging when things are agreeable or difagreeable to these in God? To pretend to

do this, is prefumptuous; 'tis looking into inacceffible light, and measuring the ways of God by the finite line of human understanding. Anfwer, First, That God is in himself incomprehenfible, and that the way of his providence is a great deep, which the line of human understanding, at prefent, doth not fathom, I readily grant: but then, I fay, as in Pfalm xcvii. 2. that as clouds and darkness are round about him, which is the foundation of our astonishment, fo righteoufnefs and judgment are the habitation of his throne, which is the foundation of our comfort. And therefore if there are fome things, in the way of his providence, which seem to clash, or to be contrary to thofe divine perfections, which the light of nature hath fufficiently demonftrated, or divine revelation hath fully revealed to be in God, this doth not arise from fuch a real clashing, but from the fhortness of our understanding, which cannot fee thro', nor to the end of things; so that God is true, tho' every man be a liar : he is really good, juft, holy, &c. and he cannot, or rather he never will, act contrary to thefe. I answer, Secondly, That tho' God is incomprehenfible in himfelf, yet we may form a conception of what he is, as he ftands related unto us. Tho' we can not form a cenception of what the nature or fubstance of God is, if I may fo fpeak, yet we may and can form a conception of him, that he is a wife, powerful, juft, good Being, and the like; because he hath abundantly demonftrated himfelf to human understanding to be such, and therefore human underftanding may, without prefumption, and ought to form a conception of thefe, and of what is agreeable or difagreeable to thefe in God; the truth of which will abundantly appear from the following confiderations. First, If human understanding cannot form a

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conception of goodness, juftice, truth, holiness, and the like, and of what is agreeable or difagreeable to thefe, as they are in God, then vain and fruitlefs are all thofe discoveries which God hath made of himself by revelation. He hath re

vealed himself to be a holy God, Lev. xix. 2. But if we may not be allowed to judge what holinefs is when applied to God, and what is agreeable or disagreeable to it, then fuch a revelation is of no manner of use to us. If the Lord hath declared himself to be, the Lord God, merciful, gracious, long-fuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, as in Exod. xxxiv, 6. To what end can this serve, if we may not be allowed to judge what merciful-· nefs and gracioufnefs are, when applied to God, and what is agreeable or disagreeable to these? Surely, all fuch revelations are useless and vain, if they are above the reach of human understanding, or if it would be prefumption to discern and judge what is intended by them. Secondly, God is the proper object of our affections, and it is not only our duty, but alfo our happiness to fear him, to love him, to delight in him, &c. Now, whatever makes him to be the object of aur affections, must be fuch things in him as we do, actually apprehend, and can form a conception of, and of what is agreeable or difagreeable to them. It must be something which we have an actual conception of, which muft excite and raise these affections in us. We must conceive God to be a holy and powerful Being, and likewife what is agreeable or difagreeable to thefe in him, or elfe we could not make him the object of our fear. We must form a conception of the goodness of God, and of his being fo to us, and of what is agreeable or difagreeable to it, as it is in God, or elfe we cannot make him the object of our love. Thirdly, God is propounded to us as the objec

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