within their reach; but when we see the vifible creation, which is the work of God, we do, by reflecting, discover its maker; and fo this truth, that there is a God, is convey'd to our understandings by our internal fenfes, namely, our reflecting powers, or, in other words, by our reafon. Thirdly, Truth is convey'd to our underftandings by fuch report or teftimony of others; for example, that there was fuch a man as Julius Cefar, is a truth which is convey'd to our underftandings by fuch report; for Julius Cæfar died long before any perfon now living was born, and confequently no perfon now living can be informed of this truth by an external perception of his perfon; and our reflecting powers alone cannot discover to us that there was fuch a man; confequently, it is impoffible that our understandings fhould be informed of this truth, if it were not fome way or other convey'd to us by the report or testimony of others. Now as truth is convey'd to our understandings different ways, fo the act of the understanding, in the apprehending of truth, is called by different names, from thofe different ways of conveyance. When truth is convey'd to our understandings by our exter nal, or by our internal fenfes, then, in propriety of fpeech, this is called knowledge. And when truth is convey'd by the report or teftimony of others, then, in propriety of fpeech, it is called faith. Not but that thefe terms are commonly ufed promifcuously, being put one for the other; for we often call that knowledge, which, properly fpeaking, is an act of believing; and we like wife call that believing, which, to speak properly, is an act of knowledge. And in all thefe, the act of the mind is the fame, viz. the apprehending of, and affenting to any thing as truth, from the information that it hath received, either from

Our

our external or internal fenfes, or from the report and teftimony of others. And it is fo far, and only fo far an act, either of knowledge or belief, as our understandings do apprehend and affent to it; for, what our understandings do not apprehend and affent to is neither an act of knowledge nor belief, because that cannot properly be called an act of the understanding, as knowledge and faith are, which our understandings do not perceive. So then faith, in propriety of fpeech, and when distinguished from knowledge, is that act of the understanding, which affents to any thing as truth, barely upon the credit of him that reports it I fay, barely upon the credit of the reporter, because if any truth is reported to us by another, which upon reflection appears to be felf-evident, or which is made so our external fenfes, then the act of the understanding, in affenting in fuch a cafe, cannot properly be called faith, because that act does not wholly arife from fuch report. And here it may not be amifs to obferve the common diftinction between human and divine faith. Human faith is an affent to a credible propofition, merely upon the teftimony of man, the juft ground of that affent being the ability of the teftifier to know the truth of what he teftifies, and his honesty in teftifying what he knows; which, because we can have no abfolute affurance of, we can have no absolute reliance on the truth of any purely human teftimony. I fay, it is an affenting to a thing credible, upon the forementioned ground, because if we affent to a thing incredi ble, or to a credible thing, when we have not juft ground for that affent, this, I think, is not properly called faith or believing, but credulity or prefuming. Divine faith is an affent to a propoition revealed by God, who, being omniscient, cannot be ignorant of the thing revealed, and be

ing the God of truth, cannot deceive us with a lie.

Secondly, What the object of faith is ? In anfwer to this enquiry, I obferve, that the object of faith may be confidered in a three-fold refpect; first, what a man ought to believe; fecondly, what he does believe; and, thirdly, what he can, or is capable of believing. Note, I here refer only to divine faith. First, A man ought to believe all thofe divine propofitions, whofe fenfe and meaning hath been revealed or made known to his underftanding, or that might have been, were it not fome way or other his own fault; which propofitions have fuch evidence accompanying them, as, in reafon and juftice, proves them to be divine or from God; and therefore all fuch propofitions, in this refpect, are the object of faith. Secondly, A man does believe all thofe divine. propofitions, whofe fenfe and meaning he actually affents to the truth of; and therefore, in this refpect, all fuch propofitions are the object of faith. Thirdly, What a man can, or is capable of be. leving. This likewife may be confidered in two refpects; first, what he can believe, if all impediments were removed; fecondly, what he can or is capable of believing in the prefent circumftances of things, that is, while thofe impediments are ftill remaining. First, A man can, or is capable of believing, fuppofing all impediments remov'd, all divine propofitions; and fo, in this refpect, all fuch propofitions are the object of faith. Secondly, What a man can, or is capable of believing in the prefent circumstances of things, which fuppofes the impediments to faith, fuch as floth, carelefonefs, prejudice, the propofition being delivered in an unknown tongue, and the like, ftill remaining; the object of faith, in this refpect, being what we are at prefent enquiring

after,

after. To this I anfwer, that a man can, or is capable of believing all thofe divine propofitions, and only thofe, the fenfe and meaning of which are revealed to his understanding, so far, and to that degree, as they are thus revealed. Thus, for example, God hath declared that he will judge the world. Now all thofe men, whose understandings are informed of the fense and meaning of this propofition, can believe, that is, they are capable of giving their affent to this truth [that God will judge the world] but all thofe men, whofe understandings are not informed of the fenfe and meaning of the aforefaid propofition, fuch men cannot affent to, or believe it, whilst they continue in that uninformed state; because faith follows, but never goes before the underLanding; we firft understand the fense and meaning of the propofition, and then believe it, or affent to the truth of it, and we cannot believe the leaft tittle, 'till it be firft apprehended by the understanding. This is evident from the nature of faith; for as faith is an affent of the mind, to the truth of a propofition, convey'd to the un derstanding by the report or teftimony of others; fo this affent neceffarily pre-fuppofes, that the understanding is informed of, or apprehends the thing which it affents to, there being no fuch thing in nature as the believing an unintelligible propofition. Toaffent to we understand not what is, in reality, no affent; and therefore if the forementioned truth, viz. that God will judge the world, had been declared in fuch a language, of in fuch a manner, that mankind could not, or did not difcern what God Almighty did fignify and intend by it; as this, properly fpeaking, would not have been a revelation, becaufe 'there is nothing discovered or made known by it; fo no man could poffibly have given his affent to

the

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the truth of it, whilft he remained thus ignorant, because there was no truth discovered or revealed for him to give his affent to. And fuppofing that the perfon, employ'd to make the forementioned declaration, had given fight the blind, feet to the lame, health to the sick, and life to the dead, and had done all that was necessary, or that could be done, to prove his meffage to be from God; yet fo long as men remained ignorant of that meffage, or fo long as their underftandings remained uninformed of the fenfe and meaning of it, fo long they were utterly incapable of giving their affent to the truth of it, Indeed, they may believe this meffage to be divine, from the evidence which attended it, and they may be affured, from natural reason, that all divine propofitions are true, and confequently that the forementioned propofition is true in the sense of the propofer; but then this is no more than a general faith in divine propofitions at large, and not a particular act of faith in the fenfe and meaning of the forementioned propofition. The fense and meaning of this propofition is, that God will judge the world; but they being wholly ignorant of this meaning, it makes them wholly incapable of giving their affent to this truth, viz. that God will judge the world. They believe at large, that all God reveals is true, and, as a confequence of this general faith, they believe every particular divine propofition to be true in the fenfe of the revealer, tho' they do not understand what the sense and meaning of that propofition is; but this is not a particular act of faith in the truth contained in that propofition, but only a general faith in God, that all he faith is true. Thus the Difciples of our Lord believed what the Prophets had fpoken was from God, and they doubtlefs were perfuaded that all divine propofi