The cafe is the fame with respect to any thing external, fuch as miracles, which may attend a re velation; the having thefe, or the want of them, cannot poffibly prove a revelation to be divine, or to be the contrary. The baving them proves nothing, in the prefent cafe, because miracles are evidences of the power, but not of the the veracity of the being that works them; and confe quently, they may attend a lie, for any thing we know, or for any juft ground we have to think the contrary. Το urge, in this cafe, that God will not use his power, nor fuffer other beings, viz. evil fpirits to ufe theirs, for the confirmation of a lie, in a matter of fuch importance, this is the fame as to fay, that God does not act arbitrarily, but from the fitness of things; because. this argument is founded upon the moral unfitnefs of fuch a conduct. Again, The want of mira cles does not avail any thing, with regard to the divinity of a revelation, or the contrary. For as God does not make the fitness of things, but fo vereign pleasure, the rule and meafure of his actions; fo when he gives a revelation, it must be wholly at his pleafure, whether miracles fhall attend it or not; and confequently, we cannot fairly conclude, from the want of miracles, either for or against the divinity of that revelation, they do not attend. Again,

Fourthly, If true religion is founded on the mo ral fitnefs of things, then man is naturally qua. lify'd to discover the true fenfe and meaning of di vine revelation, at leaft he is or may be fecure from all dangerous and hurtful errors. Divine revelation, in this cafe, muft accord with the nature and relations of things; and therefore, if any difficulty fhould arife about the fenfe and meaning of any branch of it, man has a fafe and plain rule, viz. the fitness of things, to interpret

it by; which, in the nature of the thing, is moft likely to lead him into the true fenfe of it; however, it will fecure him from all dangerous errors, because he cannot poffibly fall into a burtful error, when the moral fitnefs of things is his guide.

If it should be urged, that tho' the fitness of things is a proper guide in this cafe, with regard to thofe parts of divine revelation that relate to practice; yet it can give no light with regard to thofe points, which are purely fpeculative. I anfwer, Points of fpeculation are of two kinds, viz. those which are abfolutely fo, and those which are so only with regard to us. As to the former, they relate to the phyfical nature of things; and therefore, if God fhall think fit to give any revelations of this kind, then it must be granted, that the moral fitness of things can give no light in fuch cafes. But then it ought to be remembered, that God will either fo clearly deliver fuch points, as that there fhall be no place for error, or else he will excufe all errors which arise from them; it being moft abfurd and ridiculous, to fuppofe, that fuch a wife and good Being, as (upon the prefent fuppofition) God is allowed to be, fhould give a revelation in a way, in which it is liable to be misunderstood, and then be difpleafed with his creatures, if they mistake the fenfe of it; feeing fuch errors are not, in the nature of the thing, a proper foundation for refentment.

As to the latter, viz. points of speculation, which are so only with regard to us, these relate to facts paft, prefent, or to come, performed by God, or fome other agent; with respect to which, the fame answer in general will ferve, as in the former cafe; namely, that if God fhall think fit to reveal any thing of this kind, he will either make

the

the revelation fo plain, as that there fhall be no place for error, or elfe excufe all errors which Ipring from it. And, If the point be fuch as relates to divine conduct, either what God has done, or will do; and if any difficulty arifes about the fenfe and meaning of any fuch branch of divine revelation, then, I fay, the fitness of things is the best rule to interpret it by, and is moft likely to lead us into the true fenfe and meaning of it. And the reafon of this is evident; namely, because (upon the prefent fuppofition) it is the moral fitness of things, which is the rule and measure of God's actions. On the other fide,

If true religion is founded on the arbitrary will of God, and if God gives a revelation to mankind, then man is not naturally qualify'd to dif cover the true fenfe and meaning of it, he not having any thing to guide him in his enquiries, and therefore must be under the utmost uncertainty in that cafe. For, As God acts from fovereign pleasure, fo he may deliver his mind either clearly or darkly, exprefsly or in figures; he may use the fame term in the fame or in different fenfes, and apply it properly or improperly to the fubject, as he pleafes; and man has not any thing to affift or guide him in his fearches after truth. To reafon, in this cafe, is likewife abfurd; because that, which arifes from arbitrary pleasure, is out of reafon's province; and therefore thofe men fay right, who fay that reafon is not a judge of the fenfe and meaning of divine revelation, and that it must be interpreted by the fame fpirit which gave it. I fay, this is evidently the cafe, fuppofing God acts arbitrarily with his creatures; only this difficulty will ftill remain, namely, that we have as little affurance of the fenfe and meaning of any fecond explanatory revelation, as of the firft. To fay in this cafe, that

God

God will not suffer a fincere and honeft enquirer, who feeks his face, to fall into, or continue in any. dangerous error; this, if it be urged with any ftrength, is to reafon from the moral fitnefs of things, which is here fuppofed to be discarded. And, as man is not fecure from error, fo his errors may be made as fatal to him as his Maker pleafes: God may, if he pleases, punish every miftake with eternal mifery, and if he should do fo (the contrary to which we cannot be affured of, upon the prefent fuppofition) there is no relief, For who can deliver out of his hand ? Again,

Fifthly, and lastly, If true religion is founded on the moral fitnefs of things, then it is one plain, fimple, uniform thing, which admits of no alteration, with regard to time or place, any otherwise than as the nature, the relations, and the circumtances of things differ or change, True religion is the fame in all ages, in all countries, and in all worlds, (if I may fo fpeak) for if any of the other planets are inhabited with creatures conftituted, circumftanced, and related as we are, their religion muft of courfe be the fame as ours is; the moral fitnefs of things being the fame in all space, and thro' all duration.

Note, I would not here be understood to exclude all pofitive inftitutions; for, as the circumtances of things may render fome inftitutions proper and useful to mankind, as contributing to girtue, or true goodness; fo, .when that is the cafe, there is a moral fitnefs even in those institutions, not for any intrinfick goodness in them, but upon the account of that virtue they are fubfervient to, On the other fide,'

If true religion is founded on the arbitrary will of God, then it depends upon his pleafure, whether it fhall be the fame at all times, and to all people,

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people, or not; he may, if he pleafes, make different terms of acceptance, in every age, and to every nation or family; and that, which entitles to his favour to day, may draw forth his difpleafure to-morrow, for any thing we know, or for any ground we have to think the contrary. To fay, in this cafe, that God will always make known his pleasure to us, when he makes any fuch change, with regard to religion, this is what we can have no juft ground for. That it is right and fit, in the nature of things, for God to act thus fairly with his creatures, will be granted; but what have right and fit to do, or what influence can they have, where arbitrary pleasure is the rule of action? Which is the prefent cafe,

Thus, I think, I have given a fair reprefenta tion of this matter, and have fhewn in all the inftances I have given above, how the cafe will ftand, whether we confider true religion as founded on the moral fitness of things, or on the arbitrary will of God. And I imagine, it will easily be difcerned, of what great importance this question is, and what neceffity there is of determining it, in order to the fettling and determining all other quef tions on this fubject. But, poffibly it may be urged, that I have ftarted a difficulty, but not removed it; and therefore I crave leave to obferve farther, that there are two ways only, in which we are capable of bringing this point to an iffue; namely, firt, by examining what it is which God makes the rule of action in other cafes, and fo to argue by analogy, that is, to infer from his conduct in one cafe, how he will act in another; and, fecondly, to examine what it is, in the nature of things, which is most likely to direct and determine his actions. And,

First, If we examine what it is which God makes the rule of action in other cafes, we fhall