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find that it is the moral fitness of things. Whoever takes a view of this planet, and of all the other works of God, which come within the reach of human knowledge, will easily see the marks of wisdom and goodness that run thro' the whole, every part being directed to answer fome wife and good end. To go about to exemplify this, by an induction of particulars, would be to offer an affront to the common fenfe and reafon of mankind; it being that which falls within every man's obfervation, tho' it is more abundantly evident to all those who are qualify'd to examine and look into the works of nature; and therefore, if an argument, drawn from analogy, is at any time of weight, it must be fo in the prefent cafe; and confequently, true religion is not founded on arbitrary pleasure, but on the moral fitnefs of things. Again,

Secondly, If we examine what it is, in the nature of things, which is moft likely to direct and determine God's actions, we fhall find it to be the moral fitnefs of things, as aforefaid. That God is, and what he is with regard to his natural properties, thefe I fhall not meddle with the proof of; but shall take it for granted, that God is, and that he is neceffarily an immenfe, eternal, allknowing, all-powerful, and confequently a felffufficient, independent, and unchangeable Being. This being allowed, from hence it will follow, that as God is always capable of doing what is moft worthy and valuable in itfelf, and which in the nature of things is right, good, beft, and fitteft to be done; feeing he knows wherein the goodness, fitnefs, and valuableness of every action lies; fo it is most likely, that he always will act thus, because right, good, &c. are so very beauriful and excellent in themfelves, and fo highly preferable, in the nature of things, to arbitrary pleafure,

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pleasure, that God cannot but be under a ftronger difpofition to make thefe, rather than the other, the rule and measure of his actions. So that, whether we confider the method of God's dealing in other cafes, or whether we confult the nature of things; these both conclude very strongly, that true religion arifes from, and is founded upon the moral fitness of things, and not on the arbitrary will of God.

If it fhould be urged, allowing that God does generally make the fitnefs of things the rule of his actions, yet it will not follow that he always does fo; he is the great and only Potentate, whofe dominion is underived, and therefore he may fometimes act arbitrarily, to fhew his creatures the abfolute fovereignty he has over them. I anfwer, God may or can do thus, with regard to any phyfical neceffity he is under to the contrary; but that he does act thus will not be allowed; for if the moral fitness of things is a motive proper and fufficient to influence the divine conduct in one cafe, it must be so in every cafe; the reafon being the fame, and as proper to influence in all cafes, as in Jome. Befides, this is measuring the ways of God, by what we fee take place among weak and vain men; they are apt to fhew the power and dominion they have over their fellow-creatures, by acting fuch a part as the objection fuppofes: But can we have fo mean and contemptible a thought of our Maker? can we imagine that our wife and good God will prefer fuch an affected fhew of greatness, to what is truly great and valuable yea, rather let us call back the ungenerous thought, with a God forbid !

Note, When I fay it will not be allow'd that God acts arbitrarily, my meaning is, that he will not act thus in all those cafes where the moral fitnefs of things can be a rule to him; as to all

other

other cafes, he must act arbitrarily, if he acts at all; because the fitnefs of things does not come into the question. As thus, fuppofe it equally indifferent with regard to this fyftem, and all other fyftems in the universe, that the folar system be placed where it now is, or in any other part of space, then fitness, or unfitness, does not come into the cafe; and therefore the placing the fo lar fyftem in this part of space, and not in any other, must be arbitrary; because there was not any thing, in the nature of things, which could give the preference, and make it more fit, that it hould be placed where it is, rather than in any other part of space.

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A

SUPLEMENT

TO THE

Previous Question, with regard to

RELIGIO N.

Wherein feveral objections made to the Previous Queftion are examined, and in which God's moral character is more fully vindicated.

I

ter to a Friend,

SIR,

In a Let

Take it very kindly, that you would inform me of what has been urged to you, by way

of objection, to my previous question. For tho',

I cannot but think myself in the right, the contrary fuppofition implying in it a plain contradiction; yet feeing error is what all men are liable to, and feeing my mind may poffibly be biaffed by fome unfeen prejudice in its favour therefore I cannot but think it proper, to examine, with care and freedom, what is offered against any opinion I embrace or maintain. In the tract referred to, I only gave a fair representation of the cafe, without entering into any of thofe questions the fubject is liable to, or might be perplexed with; defigning thereby to bring it into as narrow a compafs as poffible. And if this was a defect, I hope it will be supply'd in the following lines, in which I fhall examine

what

what the Gentleman (your friend) has been pleafed to urge against it. The fum of what is objected may (if I understand it aright) be reduced to the following propofitions.

PROPOSITION I.

Tho' God does in fome inftances act from or according to the moral fitnefs of things, yet he does not always do fo, that is, be fometimes alts arbitrarily.

PROPOSITION II.

Tho' true religion, or that which is the ground of divine acceptance, does confift in doing what is right and fit in the nature of things; yet it does not confift in this alone, but also in our complying with thofe forms of worship which are of divine inftitution. So that, tho' we do the former, yet we fball not be accepted of God unless we perform the latter.

of

Before I proceed, I beg leave to obferve, that, in order to judge aright of the moral fitness or unfitness of any action, every circumftance and confequence, which ftand related to it, must be taken into the cafe; because the fitness or unfitness any action arifes from the good or bad purpofes it is fubfervient to, and thefe oftentimes arise from the different circumftances the action is perform'd under. So that the fame action may be morally fit under fome circumftances, and unfit under others. And from hence it is, that in fome cafes we, not being apprized of the circumstances that attend an action, or the confequences which follow it, judge the action fit at the performance, and afterwards are convinc'd of the contrary. Again, I obferve, that, at the conclufion of my previous question, I made the following remark: " Note, When I fay it will not be allow'd that God acts arbitrarily, my meaning is, that he will not B b 4

act

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